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my supervisor Falko Jüßen. More than anyone else he has helped me with support, advice,
patience and his subtle ways to motivate me during this time. He has created a perfect
environment for me and my research undertakings. I am also especially grateful to Christian
Bredemeier. He opened the wonderful field of family economics to me during my Bachelor
and Master studies at the TU Dortmund University. It is fair to say that without his initial
efforts, this thesis would have been never written.
Additionally, I want to thank many colleagues from the University of Wuppertal. They
have given plenty of suggestions and comments during several Brown Bag Seminar presen-
tations and discussions. I want to thank Hendrik Jürges, André Betzer, Werner Bönte, and
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Since the pioneering work of Becker (1960, 1965), an increasing number of studies analyze
the impact of family decisions on economic outcomes. Originally, the focus was on family-
related topics such as marriage, fertility, or time use of spouses. Nowadays, also other fields
of economics take the family dimension seriously, for example macroeconomics, see Doepke
and Tertilt (2016) and Greenwood et al. (2017) for overviews; development economics, see
for example Doepke and Tertilt (2009) and Fernández (2014); and financial economics, see
Addoum et al. (2016) and Hertzberg (2019). My Thesis contributes to this growing liter-
ature by analyzing intra-household decision-making of couple households and the resulting
outcomes, in particular, labor-supply decisions of couples, intra-household risk sharing, and
inefficiencies caused by limited commitment between spouses. I follow the majority of the
literature on intra-household decision-making by assuming that couples behave cooperatively.
This is in line with the findings of Del Boca and Flinn (2012) that the majority of all couples,
about 75%, behave cooperatively.1
The first generation of family-economics models have been unitary models of the house-
hold. Starting with Becker (1965), unitary models abstract from intra-household decision-
making, i.e., individual preferences do not matter in the sense that the couple has joint
preferences which are exogenously given. This implies that, in the unitary framework, indi-
vidual preferences cannot be deduced from an empirical analysis. An important implication
of the unitary model is income pooling, implying that the distribution of incomes among
spouses does not matter for the allocation of goods within the household. Several empirical
studies provide evidence against the unitary-model approach.2
The second generation of couple-household models are collective household models with
full commitment. Full commitment means that, at the time of household formation, spouses
choose a contingency plan for their future lives and can make binding promises to stick
to this plan. Starting with the work of Chiappori (1988), collective models assume that
individual preferences of spouses determine the behavior of couples.3 Any Pareto efficient
allocation within a couple can be derived from a weighted sum of individual preferences. The
corresponding weights of the spouses are called Pareto weights. In collective models, Pareto
weights are usually the result of a black-box intra-household decision-making process since any
decision procedure which guarantees efficiency is compatible with the collective approach. In
1The literature on non-cooperative couple behavior is much smaller, see, e.g., Meier and Rainer (2015),
and Doepke and Tertilt (2019) for recent examples.
2See for example Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Anderson and Baland (2002).
3Some early studies are Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) who analyze intra-
household decision-making using Nash bargaining which is a special case of the collective approach of Chiappori
(1988).
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general, the Pareto weights are functions of prices, incomes, and distribution factors. Since
Pareto weights depend on the distribution of incomes of spouses they have an impact on
the allocation which is a contradiction to the income pooling hypothesis. Several empirical
studies have provided evidence that the collective household model with full commitment
characterizes well intra-household decision-making in static environments, see Browning et al.
(2014) and Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017) for overviews. However, there is strong empirical
evidence that commitment between spouses is limited over time, see, e.g., Mazzocco (2007),
Cesarini et al. (2017), and Lise and Yamada (2019).4
Starting with the seminal paper by Mazzocco (2007), the third generation of couple-
household models considers frameworks where commitment between spouses is limited. In
these collective household models with limited commitment, the Pareto weights of the spouses
become time-varying. Full and limited-commitment models have in common that spouses
join the household only if their expected lifetime utility within the couple is at least as high
as their corresponding expected lifetime utility outside the couple, i.e., their participation
constraints must be fulfilled. A key difference between both model types is the frequency
of relevant participation constraints. In the full commitment case, participation constraints
must be fulfilled only at the stage of household formation. Under limited commitment, by
contrast, participation constraints must be fulfilled in every period and in any state of the
world because household members are free to leave the household at any time (unilateral
divorce). Whenever one spouse has an incentive to leave the household, this spouse must
be compensated by the other spouse such that the incentive is removed. This is achieved
by adjustments in the Pareto weights which is the reason why these weights become time-
varying in the case of limited commitment. This can be interpreted in at least two ways. The
first interpretation stems from the literature on implicit contracts, see Marcet and Marimon
(2019). Spouses engage in an implicit contract at marriage which must be self-enforcing
since such contracts are not legally enforceable. This contract has to include all possible
future scenarios. Then, when one spouse has an incentive to leave the household, the self-
enforcing compensation mechanism applies which was bargained over in advance at marriage
and which guarantees that both spouses remain within the couple. A second interpretation
stems from the family-economics literature. Whenever one spouse has an incentive to leave
the household, spouses re-bargain over the Pareto weights such that both spouses remain in
the couple.
All three generations of couple-household models are used in the literature depending on
4In Chapter III, I discuss the limited commitment literature in detail.
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the particular research question. In my Thesis, I consider all three types of household models.
The main part of the Thesis consists of four chapters. The chapters are connected by con-
tributing to two major topics. A first major topic is how the estimation of Frisch labor-supply
elasticities is affected by intra-household decision making. In Chapter II, insights from family
economics are used to overcome an estimation bias in labor-supply elasticities when couples
are borrowing-constrained. In Chapter IV, it is shown that also limited commitment between
spouses introduces a bias when estimating Frisch elasticities and how family economics can
be used to address the estimation problem. The second major topic connecting the chap-
ters of this Thesis is the analysis of economic outcomes of intra-household decision-making
with limited commitment among spouses. In Chapter III, I investigate the impact of limited
commitment on intra-household risk sharing. Chapter V focuses on savings behavior under
limited commitment. A particular contribution of these chapters is to develop fast numeri-
cal methods to solve collective models with limited commitment and savings opportunities.
Chapter VI presents a summary of the Thesis.
In Chapter II (joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Falko Jüßen) we use a (uni-
tary) couple-household model to contribute to the literature on the micro/macro puzzle of
labor-supply elasticities.5 Usually, quantitative models in macroeconomics have to assume
large values for the Frisch labor-supply elasticity to match empirical targets well. In contrast,
microeconometric studies tend to find small estimates for Frisch elasticities. The literature
discusses several biases which may help to explain this puzzle, see Keane and Rogerson (2015)
for an overview. Using a Bachelor household perspective (and thus no family decision mak-
ing), Domeij and Floden (2006) have provided an explanation that is related to the presence
of borrowing constraints. They have shown shown that estimates of labor-supply elasticities
are downward biased when individuals are borrowing constrained. The intuition is that in-
dividuals cannot smooth consumption perfectly through (dis-)saving/borrowing when they
have low wage rate realizations compared to their mean wage rate and when they are addi-
tionally borrowing constrained. Individuals then have to raise their labor supply to smooth
consumption because dis-saving is not possible. Thus, the reaction of labor supply to wage-
rate changes is not solely determined by the Frisch labor-supply elasticity, but also by the
willingness to borrow. Domeij and Floden (2006) show that the correlation between the
willingness to borrow and wage-rate changes causes an omitted variable bias which biases
the estimate of the labor-supply elasticity downward. The unique solution of Domeij and
5This chapter has been published in Bredemeier et al. (2019). My Thesis contains a slightly different
version of this article.
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Floden (2006) to overcome this bias is to estimate labor-supply elasticities only from house-
holds where asset holdings are sufficiently large. We show in Chapter II that an alternative
approach to address the estimation bias can be derived from family economics. In particular,
we show that exploiting the couple structure of most households can overcome the estima-
tion bias due to borrowing constraints. We extend the model of Domeij and Floden (2006)
to a (unitary) couple-household model. Using the couple structure, we derive analytically
an unbiased estimator of the Frisch elasticity using the first-order conditions of the couple-
household maximization problem. In particular, we show analytically that changes in hours
growth between two periods depend linearly on an individual’s contribution to household
earnings. The lower the contribution of a spouse to total household labor income, the lower
is the incentive of the household to borrow against future wage growth of this spouse af-
ter a negative wage rate shock. Exploiting this relation, we derive a regression approach
where we include an interaction term between the average contribution to total household
income and expected wage growth, the latter variable being the regressor that recovers the
Frisch elasticity. We show analytically that our approach yields an unbiased estimate of the
Frisch labor-supply elasticity. To investigate the quantitative performance of the estimation
approach, we conduct Monte-Carlo experiments using simulated data from our calibrated
model. Finally, we apply our estimation approach to household panel data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the U.S.. For men, we estimate a Frisch labor-supply
elasticity of about 0.7 and about 1 for women. These estimates are larger than estimates
reported in the majority of microeconometric studies. A general implication of our results
is that differences in estimated Frisch elasticities of population groups which tend to have
different earner roles in the household tend to be overestimated. A key advantage of our
approach is that it does not require data on assets but only information on wage rates and
hours worked of both spouses.
In Chapter III, I analyze risk-sharing implications of limited commitment between
spouses. A large literature finds that intra-household risk sharing is an important source
of insurance, see for example Ortigueira and Siassi (2013), Blundell et al. (2016), and Blun-
dell et al. (2018). Risk-averse spouses wish to share income risk and smooth consumption as
much as possible. Usually, studies on intra-household risk sharing assume that spouses can
make binding promises to future intra-household allocation rule, i.e., spouses can fully com-
mit to (future) allocation rules, implying perfect intra-household risk sharing. Thus, the ratio
of marginal utilities of individual consumption of the spouses is fixed over time and states
of nature. However, several studies provide empirical evidence that commitment between
5
spouses is limited, see for example Mazzocco (2007), Cesarini et al. (2017), and Lise and
Yamada (2019). Spouses wish to share income risk also when commitment between spouses
is limited, i.e., spouses have the opportunity to leave the household. While it is initially
rational for either spouse to promise to share positive income shocks with the partner in
return for the promise of insurance against negative shocks, incentives to keep the promises
are reduced once shocks have materialized. For example, after being promoted, an individ-
ual may not be willing to share the increased salary with the partner because the partner’s
promise of support in case the promotion had not taken place is now essentially worthless.
Then, spouses re-bargain over the consumption share such that the incentive is vanished.
Hence, risk sharing is incomplete when commitment is limited which increases the volatility
of consumption for individuals and induces a welfare loss. After discussing the literature on
limited commitment among spouses in detail, I contribute to the intra-household risk-sharing
literature by developing and calibrating an incomplete-markets model with limited commit-
ment in dual-earner households. In particular, I calibrate the model to be in line with an
empirically reasonable amount of commitment issues using recent evidence on the extent of
commitment issues by Lise and Yamada (2019). This is of particular importance since I want
to make quantitative predictions of the impact of limited commitment. In my calibrated
model, I find that variances of individual consumption increase by about 25% compared to a
reference model with full commitment. The Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficient
is reduced by about 36% due to limited commitment. This reduced ability to share risks cause
a significant welfare loss of about 0.6% of consumption when commitment between spouses is
limited. This welfare loss is in the range of the lower bound of the welfare costs of the business
cycle in recent studies.6 After the quantitative analysis of risk-sharing, I use my model to
assess which parts of the population are particularly subject to incomplete intra-household
risk sharing due to limited commitment. In the cross-section, I find that risk-sharing pos-
sibilities are particularly reduced for individuals whose patience or risk aversion is below
average while individuals with strong gains from marriage or high degrees of altruism are less
affected. Further, when the correlation in spouses’ incomes is low or when couples face little
income risk, individuals are affected rather strongly by limited commitment. Quantitatively,
small differences in terms of direct utility gains from marriage and the degree of altruism
around their respective mean values are predicted to lead to rather large differences in the
extent to which intra-household risk sharing is worsened by limited commitment between
spouses. These results are helpful for empirical studies as they help to identify subgroups
6Krebs (2007) estimates welfare costs of business cycles of about 0.5% and the number reported by Krusell
et al. (2009) is over 1%
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of the population which tend to have a higher or lower extent of commitment issues. My
results have important policy implications as they show that individuals face substantially
higher consumption risk than is suggested by a pure household perspective that implicitly
assumes full commitment. This raises demand for other forms of insurance, including in-
surance through public programs such as unemployment insurance or progressive taxation.
Second, there are also implications for the design of such programs. Limited commitment
in the household implies that it should be the individual suffering from a negative income
shock who is entitled to a compensation transfer payment, and not the household in which
the individual lives. My results further show that there can be individuals suffering from
low consumption even in households that in principle have sufficient means. Accordingly, my
analysis suggest that means testing of transfer programs should at least in part be performed
at the individual level and not at the household level.
In Chapter IV (joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Falko Jüßen), we consider
how limited commitment between spouses affects estimates of Frisch labor-supply elasticities.
We show that estimates are downward biased when commitment between spouses is limited
and we develop new estimation approaches that reduce or fully eliminate this bias. The Frisch
elasticity of labor supply can be estimated in a regression of hours worked on the hourly wage
rate when controlling for consumption. Theory suggests to control for consumption of the
individual worker but most household panel surveys contain consumption information only
at the household level (if at all).7 We show that proxying individual consumption by house-
hold consumption causes substantial biases in estimated Frisch elasticities when commitment
between household members is limited. The labor-supply conditions comprise the individual
Pareto weights of the spouses. Since one cannot observe these Pareto weights in the data, a
potential omitted variable bias occurs. This is unproblematic when spouses can fully com-
mit since individual fixed-effects capture Pareto weights as long as they are time-invariant.
In contrast, when commitment between spouses is limited, Pareto weights may change over
time such that a panel regression with household consumption and individual fixed effects is
subject to a bias. We develop a limited-commitment model with dual earners and idiosyn-
cratic risk and exploit first-order conditions to show analytically that estimates for the Frisch
elasticity are biased downward under limited commitment. We provide a graphical illustra-
tion of the associated bias and perform Monte-Carlo experiments to quantify the bias using
synthetic panel data from our calibrated model. We find that estimates of the Frisch labor-
7Until recently, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) had incomplete consumption data and only
information on food consumption was provided. Starting in 1999, the PSID was redesigned and more detailed
information on household consumption has become available.
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supply elasticity are up to 30% below its true value when household rather than individual
consumption is controlled for and hence changes in individual bargaining positions are not
taken into account properly. We develop two new estimation approaches that reduce or fully
eliminate this bias. Both approaches exploit insights from family economics and explicitly
exploit the couple structure of households. The key idea is to use information from relative
labor-supply conditions of spouses. In the first approach, we use an approximation of first-
order conditions to show that an improved estimation approach is obtained when including
the wage rate and hours worked of the individual’s spouse in the labor-supply regression.
We show that this approach becomes more accurate when higher-order terms are included
as additional controls. The approximated estimation approach including higher-order terms
yields almost unbiased estimates. Our second approach is an iterative procedure. We deduce
the Pareto weights using first-order conditions by guessing starting values for the parameters,
including the Frisch labor-supply elasticities. Using these deduced Pareto weights, we up-
date the guess using a labor-supply regression where we use the Pareto weights as additional
controls. This procedure is iterated until convergence. Using Monte-Carlo experiments, we
show that the procedure converges to the true parameter values but the iterative approach
is more difficult to apply in practical applications than our approximated approach. We
present an empirical application using PSID data where we use our preferred approximated
estimation approach. This approach is recommended as it offers the best combination of close
to unbiased estimates and empirical applicability.8 As an intermediate step, we show that a
regression using total household consumption leads to an underestimation of the Frisch elas-
ticity as total household consumption is an imperfect proxy for individual consumption. Our
preferred estimation approach yields a Frisch elasticity of 0.71. In line with the predictions of
our model, this estimate is substantially larger than those obtained from labor-supply regres-
sions that do not control for behavior of the partner and hence fail to account for the effects
of limited commitment. Our estimate for the Frisch elasticity is also very similar to our own
estimate that we obtain using a different estimation approach in first-differences where one
has to control for a bias due to borrowing constraints, see Chapter II of this Thesis.
In Chapter V (joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Falko Jüßen), we analyze
quantitatively how limited commitment between spouses affects savings decisions of couples.
Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) show that couples save more when commitment between spouses
is limited. Within their model, higher asset holdings make divorce more costly since spouses
8Specifically, the estimated model is a linear labor-supply regression that includes hours worked and the
wage rate of the individual’s partner as well as second-order terms in these variable and the individual’s own
wage as additional controls.
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lose all assets upon divorce. Thus, the wealthier the household, the more an individual would
lose upon divorce. In consequence, higher household savings relax future participation con-
straints. This behavior is inefficient from an ex-ante perspective since couples save inefficiently
high which would not have been necessary if spouses could fully commit. Ábrahám and Laczó
(2018) derive these results using restrictive assumptions. Incomes of spouses are assumed to
be perfectly negatively correlated so that total household income is assumed to be constant,
spouses lose all assets upon divorce, and individuals are not allowed to save in the outside
option. The assumption of constant household income is useful for their purposes because it
shuts down precautionary savings under full commitment and hence isolates savings due to
limited commitment. The assumptions regarding asset losses and saving possibilities upon
divorce facilitate the model solution. While Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) discuss that their
main results are independent of these assumptions, there is still a lack of quantitative results
on savings and risk sharing under limited commitment. Chapter V of my Thesis fills this gap.
In particular, we compare the quantitative importance of the limited-commitment saving mo-
tive to the well-studied precautionary saving motive. Additionally, we analyze quantitatively
the impact of property division rules upon divorce on economic outcomes, complementing
the analysis by Ábrahám and Laczó (2016).9 First, we develop a generalized version of the
Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) set-up where we introduce general stochastic income processes,
relax the assumption that all household assets are lost upon divorce, and allow divorcees to
save. To perform our quantitative analysis, we develop a practically feasible and fast nu-
merical approach which constitutes another contribution to the literature.10 We show that
limited commitment between spouses has a sizable effect on savings behavior of couples. Cou-
ples increase their yearly saving by about 4% which leads to an average rise in accumulated
wealth of about 11%. Despite living in wealthier households, married individuals share risk
less efficiently with their spouses when commitment between them is limited. Quantitatively,
limited commitment reduces the insurance value of marriage by about 20% and the wellbe-
ing of married individuals by an amount equivalent to 0.3% of lifetime consumption. About
40% of this welfare loss is due to over-saving Regarding the quantitative effects of property
division rules, we find that asset losses upon divorce and penalties for the spouse who files for
divorce can have substantial effects on decision making within the marriage. Both measures
have the potential to reduce intra-household inefficiencies substantially. Large asset losses
or penalties of about 70% can even raise consumption insurance within the marriage to the
full-commitment level. However, the largest gains are obtained for moderate losses or penal-
9Ábrahám and Laczó (2016) is a follow-up paper to Ábrahám and Laczó (2018).
10Under limited commitment, the additional participation constraints complicate the numerical solution.
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ties. Losses or penalties in the range of 20% already close half of the gap in consumption
insurance due to limited commitment. By contrast, uneven property division rules that do
not depend on events within the marriage or on who files for divorce affect efficiency within









The Frisch elasticity of labor supply measures the percentage reaction of hours worked to
a one percent change in the net wage rate holding the marginal utility of wealth constant.1
Thus, the Frisch elasticity determines adjustments in labor supply to wage-rate changes that
trigger pure intertemporal substitution effects but no accompanying income effects. There are
various examples for wage-rate changes that have this property. First, under perfect capital
markets, purely transitory wage-rate changes should have no impact on the marginal utility
of wealth. Second, if agents are forward-looking and can borrow freely, wage-rate changes
that can be expected by the agent in advance should also leave the marginal utility of wealth
unchanged. Accordingly, the Frisch elasticity is important for reactions to transitory tax or
productivity shocks and to predictable life-cycle patterns in wage rates.2
In the literature, there is no consensus on the size of the Frisch elasticity. In fact, the micro
and macro view on labor-supply elasticities differ markedly, see, e.g., Keane and Rogerson
(2015). While quantitative macroeconomic models tend to require a relatively large value for
the Frisch elasticity to match the data well, existing microeconometric studies on the Frisch
elasticity typically estimate smaller values for this parameter. The micro/macro puzzle on
the Frisch elasticity may be due to a number of estimation biases discussed in the literature,
see, e.g., Blomquist (1985), Alogoskoufis (1987), Blomquist (1988), Heckman (1993), Rupert
et al. (2000), or Imai and Keane (2004).
A particular estimation problem has been highlighted by Domeij and Floden (2006), who
have shown that, in presence of borrowing constraints, conventional methods to estimate
the Frisch elasticity are subject to a downward bias. This bias is important since borrowing
constraints are a substantial restriction to many households in the U.S. (see, e.g., Dı́az-
Jiménez et al. 2011). In this paper, we derive a new estimation approach for the Frisch
elasticity that yields unbiased estimates even in samples of potentially borrowing-constrained
households. Our approach critically exploits the couple structure of households, i.e., we
1A slightly different version of this chapter is published in Bredemeier et al. (2019). ©2019 by The
University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0734-306X/2019/3704-0006$10.00
2In macroeconomics, the Frisch elasticity is a key determinant of the size of the fiscal multiplier and the
costs of business cycles. The Frisch elasticity is also important in microeconomic applications, where often
other elasticity concepts, such as Marshall and Hicks elasticities, are relevant, as these other elasticity concepts
can be deducted from the Frisch elasticity and the Frisch can be shown to be an upper bound for these other
elasticities.
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exploit information from households with two potential earners.3 Our approach is appealing
to the applied researcher as it takes the form of a simple interaction-term regression with
minimum data requirements. When we apply our method to household data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we estimate relatively large values for the Frisch elasticity
in comparison to previous studies.
The point of departure for our analysis is the conventional approach for estimating the
Frisch elasticity using microeconomic panel data going back to Altonji (1986). He has shown
that, in a world without borrowing constraints, the Frisch elasticity can be identified from the
covariance of hours changes and expected wage-rate changes. In this approach, using expected
wage-rate changes as regressor is key as expected wage-rate changes have the property of
leaving the marginal utility of wealth unchanged (which is the Frisch concept). Thus, the
Frisch elasticity can be recovered from a simple regression of hours growth on expected wage
growth when there are no borrowing constraints. In the following, we will refer to such
regressions as ”Altonji (1986) regressions”.
To understand the bias in Altonji (1986) regressions that occurs when borrowing con-
straints are occasionally binding, i.e., when capital markets are incomplete (see, e.g., Deaton
1991, Aiyagari 1994), consider a situation where an individual’s current wage rate is lower
than the future wage rate —either due to a negative transitory wage shock or a predictable
life-cycle pattern. Without restrictions on borrowing, the individual would work less today
and smooth consumption through borrowing, so that the hours change between now and the
future is only determined by the Frisch elasticity which is thereby identified. However, if
borrowing is not possible, the household’s marginal valuation of borrowing and with it the
marginal utility of wealth is affected—which violates the Frisch concept. In a borrowing-
constrained household, a negative wage-rate shock then tends to increase (rather than de-
crease) labor supply today since households cannot smooth consumption through borrowing.
As a consequence, the hours change is not only determined by the Frisch elasticity in these
households. Put differently, the intertemporal-substitution effect of expected wage changes
is confounded by a willingness-to-borrow effect which impedes identification in an Altonji
(1986) regression. Domeij and Floden (2006) have shown that, in a pooled sample of con-
strained and unconstrained households, the negative relation between changes in wage rates
and changes in labor supply in borrowing-constrained households biases the estimate of the
Frisch elasticity downward. A main result of their analysis is that, without conditioning
correctly on household asset holdings—for instance, by eliminating wealth-poor households
3In 2015, 70% of all men aged 35-55 in the U.S. were married or lived together with a partner as an
unmarried couple (Census Bureau).
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from the estimation sample— the Frisch elasticity cannot be estimated correctly in an Altonji
(1986) set-up. Yet, from a practical point of view, reliable household panel data on assets
are hardly available, and even if they are, such data are often not observed in the same panel
as labor earnings and working time.
We contribute by extending the analysis of Domeij and Floden (2006) to a two-person
household set-up and by deriving an unbiased estimator of the Frisch elasticity. Our ap-
proach critically exploits the couple structure of the model and the data but does not require
information on household assets. Intuitively, in a double-earner household, also the partner
can react to one’s own wage-rate shocks, i.e., also the partner’s labor supply can be used
to smooth consumption. This is particularly important if the partner earns relatively much.
Then, a given negative wage-rate shock can be smoothed relatively easily as the partner’s
hours have to be raised by only relatively little. Importantly, this relation holds even when
the household is borrowing constrained. And, when it is predominantly the partner’s labor
supply that smooths consumption, one’s own hours change is again mostly (in the limit,
only) determined by the Frisch elasticity. Accordingly, to derive an unbiased estimator of
the Frisch elasticity in presence of borrowing constraints, we can exploit the relation that the
household’s desire to borrow against wage growth is the less important the less an individual
contributes to total household earnings.4
In an analytical part of the paper, we make this relation explicit and show that, in
borrowing-constrained households, the slope of the decision rule for hours growth is linear in
a spouse’s usual percentage contribution to household earnings. This relation allows us to
derive a regression framework where an interaction term between expected wage growth and
this earnings contribution takes up the willingness-to-borrow effect and the non-interacted
coefficient on expected wage growth is an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity. Intu-
itively, expected wage growth multiplied with the relative earnings contribution measures
the expected earnings growth (in percent) associated with the expected wage growth if labor
supply was unchanged. And it is earnings growth that borrowing-constrained households
would want to borrow against and thus causes the estimation bias in the first place.
We then evaluate our estimator in Monte Carlo experiments using a calibrated incomplete-
markets model populated by double-earner households, and finally we use the method for es-
4Blundell et al. (2016) provide direct empirical evidence that household consumption reacts more strongly
to husbands’ wage shocks than to wives’ wage shocks which is line with our model since husbands on average
contribute larger shares to household earnings. In Guner, Kaygusz, and Ventura (2011, 2012), Domeij and
Klein (2013), and Bick (2016), similar mechanisms to ours affect labor-supply reactions to permanent wage-
rate changes. In these studies, income effects are weaker for women (who are often secondary earners) such
that their reactions to permanent wage-rate changes mostly reflect substitution effects governed by the Frisch
elasticity.
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timations using PSID data. Importantly, our approach critically exploits the couple structure
of our model and the data, the key issue being that, only in a population of double-earner
households, there is variation in individuals’ percentage contribution to household earnings
which we use to identify the Frisch elasticity.5 Our estimations using PSID data suggest
Frisch elasticities for men of about 0.7. We also take into account modifications of our
interaction-term approach to cope with challenges that arise when estimating Frisch elastic-
ities for women. For women, we find Frisch elasticities of around one.
A direct implication of our analysis is that conventional methods tend to overestimate
differences in labor-supply elasticities between population groups that tend to have different
earner roles in the household. One example is the often-discussed difference in labor-supply
elasticities between men and women, with women usually being attributed a substantially
larger value for the Frisch elasticity than men. Another example is the difference in labor-
supply elasticities between individuals with high and low levels of earnings. Our analysis
suggests that potential differences in the true elasticities are magnified by the differential
importance of the estimation bias so that differences in true elasticities are in fact smaller
than suggested by previous studies. This way, our analysis has implications for, e.g., the
taxation of couples (Kleven et al. 2009), genders (Alesina et al. 2011), and top-income earners
(Saez 2001). Further, our analysis shows that the negative estimation bias is of particular
importance in samples where individuals contribute large shares to total household income—a
sample of prime-age male household heads being a prominent example. When we correct for
the downward bias, we estimate a Frisch elasticity for men of about 0.7 which is larger than
the majority of previous microeconometric estimates, see, e.g., Keane and Rogerson (2015).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop an incom-
plete markets model with two earners. In Section 3, we derive an unbiased estimator of the
Frisch elasticity in presence of borrowing constraints exploiting the couple structure of our
model. In Section 4, we perform Monte Carlo experiments where we test our estimator on
synthetic data from a realistically calibrated version of our model. Section 5 provides an em-
pirical application using PSID data. In Section 6, we discuss the implications of our results
for estimated differences in labor-supply elasticities between population groups. Section 7
concludes.
5By contrast, single earners by definition always contribute 100% to household earnings.
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2 A simple incomplete-markets model with two-earner house-
holds
The model is a partial-equilibrium incomplete-markets model with two household members.
Households differ from one another by asset holdings and wage rates. Members of a house-
hold are subject to joint budget and borrowing constraints and take decisions cooperatively
under full commitment, so that the resulting allocations are Pareto optimal. Households are
potentially borrowing constrained and use precautionary savings in a non-state contingent
asset and labor supply of both household members to insure against bad wage-rate realiza-
tions. This behavior is similar as in the model of Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) and extends
the model of Domeij and Floden (2006) to a two-person setup.
2.1 Decision problem
The decision problem can be represented by the decisions of a household planner. The
planner maximizes a weighted sum of members’ utilities with weights µ and 1−µ for the two
household members i = 1, 2, respectively. The household problem in recursive formulation is
given by
V (a, ω) = max
a′,c,n1,n2









subject to the household budget constraint
c+ a′ = w1n1 + w2n2 + (1 + r) · a, (2)
and the borrowing constraint
a′ ≥ 0, (3)
where ui is the instantaneous utility function, c is household consumption, ni is hours worked
by household member i, β is the rate of time preference, E is the expectation operator,
a denotes the household’s asset holdings, ω is the vector of wage rates of both household
members, ω = (w1, w2), and r is the exogenous interest rate.
1 A prime (′) denotes next
period values.
In our baseline model, we consider the standard additively separable utility function
1A partial-equilibrium set-up is sufficient for our purposes because we neither analyze policy nor parameter
changes. We assume β (1 + r) < 1.
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where σ denotes risk aversion and αi is the taste for leisure. This utility function has the
property that the true value of the Frisch elasticity is given by the curvature parameter
ηi. In Appendix A.6.1, we consider an alternative model specification with non-separable
preferences which yields similar results as our baseline model. The preference parameters are
indexed by i as, in our quantitative evaluations, we will account for potential differences in
these parameters between household members.
Wage rates are stochastic and exogenous. Our analytical results depend on wage dif-
ferences within the household and on variation in expected wage growth but not on the
particular specification of the wage process. In our calibrated model, we will assume that
wage rates follow stationary first-order autoregressive processes with constant terms that
differ between members of the same household as well as across different households (”fixed
effects”). Intra-household differences in these constant wage components lead to long-run
differences in earner roles among spouses. Transitory wage-rate fluctuations may induce bor-
rowing constraints to bind. Since wage rates are mean-reverting, low wage-rate realizations
lead to positive expected wage growth which induces workers to wish to substitute working
time intertemporally and to work less in the current period. At the same time, households
wish to smooth consumption. For households who do not hold sufficient assets, the borrowing
constraint is then binding.
The solution to the maximization problem is described by the policy functions
x = x (a, ω) , (5)
with x ∈ X = {c, n1, n2, a′}.
In our baseline model, we assume that consumption is a household public good, i.e.,
there is no consumption rivalry between spouses. Along with additive separability, the public
good assumption allows a simple notion of Frisch elasticities in a context with two earners.
Specifically, the issue of whose marginal utility of wealth is held constant (husband’s, wife’s,
or household’s) does not arise, since, if one of them is constant, the other two are constant as
well, independent of bargaining. For completeness, we also considered a model version with
private instead of public consumption. In this version, we obtain almost identical results, see
Appendix A.6.2. Even allowing for endogenous time-varying Pareto weights in the spirit of a
limited-commitment model (see, e.g., Ligon et al. 2002) would have no substantial impact on
our results since the weights would mostly react to unexpected changes in wage rates while
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the Frisch elasticity is identified through changes in expected wage rates. In our baseline
model, we further abstract from non-linear taxation. This assumption allows to recover the
true Frisch elasticity consistently in absence of borrowing constraints. We also consider a
model version with progressive joint taxation of spouses in Appendix A.6.3. Also in this
version, we obtain similar results as in our baseline economy.
In a further model extension, we follow the literature (Guner et al. 2011, 2012, Bick 2016)
and take into account the possibility that labor supply of women is also affected by fluctua-
tions in the disutility of work originating from taste-for-work shocks, e.g., capturing shocks
to home production or child care, see Section 6.2 for details. This model extension delivers
important insights for our empirical investigation of labor-supply elasticities for women.
2.2 Equilibrium conditions
The first-order conditions of the household problem are
µ · ∂u (c, n1)
∂c





= λ , (6)





λ · w1 = µ · α1 · n1/η11 , (8)
λ · w2 = (1− µ) · α2 · n1/η22 , (9)
φ≥ 0 , (10)
a′≥ 0 , (11)
φ · a′= 0, (12)
together with the budget constraint (2), given exogenous wage rates w1 and w2 and the initial
asset stock a0. φ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the borrowing constraint (3) and λ is the
Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (2). Condition (6) reflects that the household
equalizes marginal utility of consumption and marginal utility of wealth. Condition (7) is
the household’s consumption Euler equation which takes its standard form if the borrowing
constraint does not bind, φ = 0, and otherwise determines the household’s willingness to
borrow. Conditions (8) and (9) are the labor-supply conditions of the household members
which also reflect that an individual’s labor supply depends negatively on his or her Pareto
weight within the household. However, the weights do not impact on changes in labor
supply, which is the dependent variable in Altonji (1986) regressions (the same holds for α1
and α2). Conditions (10)-(12) are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the borrowing
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constraint (3). From conditions (8) and (9), it can be seen that the Frisch labor-supply
elasticities are equal to the parameters η1 and η2, independent of whether the household
is borrowing constrained or not. With more general preferences, the true Frisch elasticities
would depend on the form of the labor-disutility function but not on the bindingness of the
borrowing constraint.
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3 Exploiting the couple structure to derive an unbiased esti-
mator of the Frisch elasticity
We now derive a procedure for obtaining an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity in
presence of borrowing constraints. We first derive our approach analytically and then evaluate
it numerically using Monte Carlo experiments. To derive the estimator analytically, we
apply a simplifying assumption on data frequency, which will be relaxed in the Monte Carlo
experiments where we will consider a realistic, i.e., annual, data frequency. Specifically, to
obtain closed-form solutions, we assume an arbitrarily small period length. Due to this
assumption, it is sufficient to consider the group of borrowing-constrained households and
the group of unconstrained households and, in first differences, one can neglect households
that move from one group to the other.1 For both groups, we can derive the relation between
hours changes and expected wage growth analytically, and then we can pool both groups
to derive the population estimate. In Appendix A.2, we derive analytical results which are
independent of the period length. While the derivations are more cumbersome, the main
results presented here under the assumption of an arbitrarily small period length carry over
to the more general case. For simplicity, we assume in the analytical part that spouses’
Frisch elasticities are identical, η1 = η2 = η. In the quantitative model analysis in Section
4, we account for potential heterogeneity in the true Frisch elasticity to capture gender
differences. Further, we assume in the analytical part that the process for stochastic wage-
rate components is homogeneous across the population. In the quantitative model analysis
in Section 4, we take into account gender differences in these processes.
3.1 Households unaffected by borrowing constraints
For households unaffected by borrowing constraints, a regression of hours growth on expected
wage growth yields an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity. For bachelor households,
this has been shown in the seminal paper by Altonji (1986). Our case of a double-earner
household is a straightforward extension. In Appendix A.1.1, we show that, after taking logs
and first differences, the Frisch elasticity can be recovered through regressions of the form





1As Altonji (1986) and Domeij and Floden (2006), we estimate labor-supply regressions in first differences,
i.e., these regressions use data from periods t+ 1 and t. Our simplifying assumption ensures that the number
of households that are borrowing constrained in one but not both periods is infinitely small.
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for household members i = 1, 2, where ξ′ = lnλ′ − E lnλ′ is an expectation error which
results from using the Euler equation to substitute marginal utility of consumption from the
labor-supply conditions. The terms ω′i, i = 1, 2, are unexpected components of wage growth
which result from a decomposition of observed wage growth in an expected and unexpected
component. As shown by Altonji (1986), the combined residual η · (ξ′ − ω′i) is uncorrelated
with the regressor expected wage growth, see Appendix A.1.1 for an intuitive explanation.
The terms η · ln (1 + r) and η · lnβ, can be captured by time fixed effects and a constant,
respectively. Thus, when borrowing constraints are not binding, a simple regression of hours
growth on expected wage growth (“Altonji (1986) regression”) identifies the Frisch elasticity.
3.2 Borrowing-constrained households
When borrowing constraints are binding, a standard Altonji (1986) regression does not yield
an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity. This has been shown by Domeij and Floden
(2006) who consider bachelor households and directly translates to our double-earner set-up.
Other than Domeij and Floden (2006), we obtain closed-form expressions for the estimates
and biases due to our simplifying assumption of an arbitrarily small period length.
For borrowing-constrained households, for which a = a′ = 0, we can log-linearize and
summarize the first-order conditions (2), (6), (8), and (9),














=−σ · (s1 · (ln (w1/w1) + ln (n1/n1)) + s2 · (ln (w2/w2) + ln (n2/n2))) , (16)
where variables with a bar refer to the point of approximation and si is individual i’s per-
centage contribution to household earnings at this point, i.e.,
si = wini/ (w1n1 + w2n2) ,
see Appendix A.1.2 for a derivation.2 We measure the earnings contribution in the point
of approximation si by the individual’s average contribution to household earnings during
the sample period. Put differently, the point of approximation is the situation where both
spouses contribute their usual shares to household income.3
2Equation (16) is a first-order approximation of the budget constraint (in logs). In Appendix A.4, we
evaluate the importance of the approximation for our results and find that the approximation has a negligible
effect.
3Other variables referring to the point of approximation will drop out in the following due to taking first
differences.
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In Appendix A.1.2, we solve this system to obtain
∆ lnn′i =
(




· E ∆ lnw′i + κ′, (17)
where the combined residual κ′ =
(
η − ση(η+1)ση+1 · si
)
· (lnw′i − E lnw′i) −
ση(η+1)
ση+1 · (1− si) ·
∆ lnw′−i. The first term in this residual stems from a decomposition of observed wage growth
in an expected and unexpected component. The second term reflects the cross-reaction to
the partner’s wage-rate changes.
Equation (17) separates the two effects of expected wage growth on hours growth in a
borrowing-constrained household. First, as in an unconstrained household, expected wage
growth induces the wish to substitute labor into periods where it is paid more. This
intertemporal-substitution effect is governed by the Frisch elasticity, η. Second, expected
wage growth induces the willingness to borrow against expected future earnings in order to
smooth consumption. However, a borrowing-constrained household can only smooth con-
sumption by supplying more labor which counteracts the intertemporal-substitution effect.
The strength of this willingness-to-borrow effect depends on the individual’s usual contri-
bution to household earnings si. Expected wage growth for individuals with low earnings
contributions induces only relatively small expected changes in total household earnings and
can more easily be smoothed through labor-supply adjustments of the partner. Hence, for
these individuals, the willingness-to-borrow effect is weak and hours growth is mostly deter-
mined by intertemporal substitution and, thus, the Frisch elasticity.4
Assuming that E ∆ lnw′i has a homogeneous variance across the population, the estimated
coefficient in a regression of hours growth on expected wage growth in a sample of individuals
from borrowing-constrained households with usual earnings contribution s equals
η − ση (η + 1)
ση + 1
· s,
which shows that the estimate does not generally recover the true Frisch elasticity.
4A similar mechanism applies to permanent changes in wage rates for which borrowing constraints are
less important but classical income effects play an important role. For individuals who contribute little to
household earnings, changes in hourly wage rates induce a small change in household earnings which mutes
the income effect of changes in wage rates. As a consequence, the labor-supply response to these changes is
mostly driven by substitution effects and, hence, tends to be stronger than for individuals who contribute
larger shares to household earnings or who are the sole earners in their households. This mechanism can help
to understand findings reported by Guner, Kaygusz, and Ventura (2011, 2012), Domeij and Klein (2013), and
Bick (2016) who all document that, in quantitative macro models with double-earner households, labor supply
is particularly responsive for groups that can be expected to contribute small shares to household earnings.
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3.3 Mixed population
We now consider a sample that includes individuals from both borrowing-constrained and
unconstrained households. We denote the sample shares of the constrained and unconstrained
households by p and 1 − p, respectively. As an intermediate step, we consider a group of
individuals with usual earnings contribution s but which include both, unconstrained and
constrained households. In such a sample, a standard Altonji (1986) regression of hours
growth on expected wage growth yields the following estimate for the Frisch elasticity:
cov (∆ lnn′,E ∆ lnw′)




E (∆ lnn′ · E ∆ lnw′)
var (E ∆ lnw′)
− E (∆ lnn
′) · E (E ∆ lnw′)
var (E ∆ lnw′)
= p ·
(




+ (1− p) · η (18)
= η − p · ση (η + 1)
ση + 1
· s,
which uses that E (∆ lnn′) · E (E ∆ lnw′) = 0.5 The final step is to consider a sample where
individuals differ in their usual contributions to household earnings. In such a sample, the
OLS estimate averages over the different s such that the coefficient on expected wage growth
is
η̂ =
cov (∆ lnn′,E ∆ lnw′)
var (E ∆ lnw′)
= η − p · ση (η + 1)
ση + 1
· s, (19)
where s is the sample average of the usual earnings contribution of individuals from borrowing-
constrained households.
The bias term in equation (19), −p · ση(η+1)ση+1 · s, has three important properties. First, as
pointed out by Domeij and Floden (2006), borrowing constraints lead to a downward biased
estimate η̂ as the term that is subtracted from the true Frisch elasticity is unambiguously
positive. Second, we also see Domeij and Floden (2006)’s result that an unbiased estimate can
in principle be obtained in a sample of individuals from households which are unaffected by
borrowing constraints as, in such sample, p = 0. The third property is of utmost importance
from a practical point of view. Standard Altonji (1986) regressions yield less strongly biased
estimates of the Frisch elasticity in samples of individuals that usually contribute only little
to household earnings as, in such samples, s is small (for example, in a sample of secondary
earners). In empirical applications using PSID data, we will provide evidence supporting this
relation.
5Since the wage process is assumed to be identical for both groups, also the variance of the regressor
expected wage growth is identical for both groups. Consequently, the OLS estimator weighs both groups
according to their respective sample shares.
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3.4 Deriving an unbiased estimator
The relation between the earnings contribution and the covariance term cov (∆ lnn′,E ∆ lnw′)
in (19) holds two key insights for deriving a regression specification that yields an unbiased
estimate of the Frisch elasticity, even in samples that include borrowing-constrained house-
holds. First, in a population of double-earner households, there is variation in individuals’
contribution to household earnings which can be used to identify the Frisch elasticity. Second,
the covariance cov (∆ lnn′,E ∆ lnw′) is a linear function of s, see (18).
This implies that, in a sample that consists of individuals with different usual contributions
to household earnings, an interaction-term regression of the type (introducing household and
time indices to clarify the panel dimension of the estimation)
∆ lnnijt+1 = const.+ δ1 · Et ∆ lnwijt+1 + δ2 · Et ∆ lnwijt+1 · sij + uijt+1, (20)
gives
δ̂2 = −





where sij is the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household
j and the index ijt+1 refers to member i of household j in period t+1. Thus, in a regression
that controls for the interaction between expected wage growth and the individual’s average
contribution to household earnings, the coefficient on expected wage growth is an unbiased
estimate of the Frisch elasticity. Note that, in our approach, the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term is not of interest per se but the interaction term needs to be included as a
control variable to correctly identify the Frisch elasticity as the coefficient on expected wage
growth.
Intuitively, our interaction-term regression controls for the product of expected wage
growth and the individual’s average percentage earnings contribution. This product measures
the expected earnings growth (in percent) which is implied by the expected wage growth. For
a borrowing-constrained household, income growth is tightly connected to earnings growth.
And it is expected income growth a household would like to borrow against. Thus, we control
for the expected income growth caused by the individual’s expected wage growth and hence we
control for the change in the willingness to borrow. This takes out the willingness-to-borrow
effect from the coefficient on the non-interacted regressor E ∆ lnwijt+1 and what remains is
the pure intertemporal-substitution effect governed by the Frisch elasticity.
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Figure 1: Policy functions for labor supply.
(a) Primary earner’s labor supply




























(b) Secondary earner’s labor supply





























NOTE.–Policy functions refer to household type X, which is a household type with pronounced long-run
intra-household wage differences. In the left panel, the wage rate of the secondary earner is at its lowest
possible grid value. In the right panel, the wage rate of the primary earner is at its highest possible grid
value. Solid lines refer to zero asset holdings. Dashed lines refer to an unconstrained household.
Note that the double-earner framework is incremental for this method to recover the Frisch
elasticity. For singles or single earners, s = 1 so that the two regressors in the regression
above are the same and it is impossible to identify δ1 and δ2 separately.
3.5 Graphical illustration
Figure 1 shows policy functions from a numerical solution of our calibrated full model.6 For
the graphs, we compare the household member who contributes, in the long run, more to
household earnings (the primary earner) and the member who contributes less (the secondary
earner). For illustration, we consider a household with strong wage-rate differences between
household members such that the willingness-to-borrow effect is strong for the primary earner
and weak for the secondary earner.
The labor-supply curve of the primary earner (left panel) is globally upward-sloping if
the household is wealth-rich (dashed line), reflecting the intertemporal-substitution effect
governed by the Frisch elasticity, due to the household’s ability to smooth consumption
through dis-saving when wage rates are low. The standard Altonji (1986) regression identifies
the Frisch elasticity from this upward-sloping shape of the labor-supply curve. By contrast,
for a household with low asset holdings (solid lines), the borrowing constraint is binding when
6The model calibration is discussed in Section 4.1.
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wage rates are low. Then, the labor-supply curve of the primary earner has a downward-
sloping range where a further wage decrease triggers an increase in labor supply (rather than a
decrease), because consumption cannot be smoothed through borrowing but only through an
increase in labor supply. This negative relation between wage-rate changes and labor-supply
changes leads to a downward estimation bias.
In contrast to the primary earner, the labor-supply curves of the secondary earner (right
panel) are globally upward-sloping, independent of whether the household is wealth-rich or
borrowing constrained. Also at the borrowing constraint, low wage rates of the secondary
earner can be compensated relatively easily by a relatively small increase in the primary
earner’s hours. Thus, for secondary earners, the labor-supply reaction to transitory wage-
rate changes is mostly governed by the Frisch elasticity, so that, everything else equal, an
estimate for the Frisch elasticity based on data for secondary earners can be expected to be
less biased than an estimate based on data for primary earners. The larger the intra-couple
wage gap, the stronger is this effect. Our interaction-term approach given by (20) generalizes
this to the case where we exploit variation in individuals’ usual contribution to household
earnings and its continuous effect on the slope of the labor-supply curve.
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4 Estimating labor-supply elasticities from synthetic data
In this section, we use our model which is calibrated to a period length of one year to quan-
tify how successful our interaction-term approach is to recover the true Frisch elasticity in
data sets that have realistic properties and where households are occasionally borrowing
constrained, i.e., where households move from being borrowing constrained to being uncon-
strained between periods. We solve the full model globally using numerical techniques.
4.1 Calibration
Our baseline PSID sample used for the calibration covers the period 1972-1997, see Appendix
A.3.1 for details on the sample selection. Due to our focus on double-earner households, we
consider household heads and their partners for whom both partners’ wage rates are observed.
Further, we apply similar sample selection criteria as Altonji (1986) and Domeij and Floden
(2006). In particular, we consider individuals between age 25 and 60.
In the numerical evaluations, we assume that the wage process consists of a stochastic
component zi which follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation ρi and innovations εi, and
we account for constant terms ψi leading to long-run wage differences between individuals
within and across households (fixed effects),
lnwi = ψi + zi,
z′i = ρi · zi + ε′i.
(21)
We estimate the parameters of the stochastic wage processes, i.e., autocorrelations ρm, ρf
and innovation variances σ2m,ε, σ
2
f,ε, separately for men (m) and women (f).
1 We first obtain
residual wages by filtering deterministic cross-sectional variation using an OLS regression.
We then identify autocorrelations and innovation variances from gender-specific Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimations, see Appendix A.3.2 for details.2
Our interaction-term approach that corrects for the bias due to borrowing constraints
exploits variation in individuals’ usual percentage contribution to household earnings. In
order to assess our method in the model, the simulated economy has to feature sufficient
1Blundell et al. (2016) document that alternatively using a combination of permanent and transitory shocks
leads to similar estimation results for preference parameters such as Frisch elasticities.
2For the numerical solution of the model, the joint wage process is discretized using Tauchen’s (1986)
algorithm with 21 grid points per household member, i.e., 441 husband-wife wage combinations. We solve
the model using the endogenous grid point method of Kabukçuoğlu and Mart́ınez-Garćıa (2016) who extend
Carroll (2006)’s method to an infinite horizon model with an arbitrary number of control variables.
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and realistic variation in individuals’ contribution to household earnings. We therefore solve
and simulate our model with ten household types. Household types differ in the constant
(=permanent) wage components ψi of its members which we set to match average male and
female wage rates in the ten deciles of the empirical distribution of relative wage rates of
spouses in couple households in our PSID sample. We then calibrate household-type specific
preference weights αm and αf to match average hours worked by gender and group, and, as a
result, our calibrated model displays a realistic distribution of relative labor earnings within
households.3
We calibrate the gender-specific values for the Frisch elasticities so that the estimated
Frisch elasticities in our Monte Carlo study coincide with the estimated Frisch elasticities
for men and women that we estimate from the PSID data (see Section 5), both using a
standard Altonji (1986) regression. We will discuss in Section 6 that one needs only relatively
small differences in the true gender-specific Frisch elasticities (ηm = 0.65 and ηf = 0.90) to
rationalize the relatively strong difference in empirically estimated Frisch elasticities (roughly
factor 2), as the difference in the true elasticities is magnified by the differential importance
of the estimation bias for men and women.
For the remaining preference parameters we use standard values from the literature.
Relative risk aversion is set to σ = 1.5.4 Following Domeij and Floden (2006), we set
β = 0.95 (annual model frequency), and calibrate the interest rate so that the bottom 40%
of the wealth distribution own 1.4% of total wealth. Table 7 in Appendix A.3.3 summarizes
all parameter values of our baseline model.
4.2 Simulation set-up
We simulate a synthetic panel data set with similar size as our baseline PSID sample. Specif-
ically, we simulate households for a long period of time and calculate hours growth, expected
wage growth, average wage rates, and average contributions to household earnings. We then
draw 10,000 samples of 15,000 household-year observations which we use for the regressions
and report mean point estimates and mean standard deviations. In the estimations, we con-
sider separate samples of men and women to take into account gender differences in both,
true Frisch elasticities and usual earner roles. In the main text, we report the estimation
3An alternative approach would be to target the estimated variance of fixed effects from the microecono-
metric wage process estimation. While this would capture the gender-specific across-household variance of
(residual) wage rates appropriately, we implement the former approach to obtain a realistic distribution of
within-household wage differences.
4We also considered a model specification with differences in risk aversion between household members.
The results are very similar to the ones obtained from our baseline model.
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Table 1: Estimation results for men, from synthetic household panel data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expected 0.41 0.50 0.67 0.63 0.62
wage growth (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
expected wage growth -0.10 -0.01
× primary earner (0.05) (0.07)
expected wage growth -0.32 -0.33
× earnings contribution (%) (0.15) (0.17)
bias -38% — — -3% -5%
sample all all a > a all wm > wf
observations 15,000 15,000 4,600 15,000 13,518
NOTE.–Estimation results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in
household j in period t + 1. Constant included but not shown. Primary-earner dummy dij is one when
individual i is the primary earner in household j and zero otherwise. Individuals identified as primary earn-
ers if the mean realized wage rate in the simulation wij exceeds the mean realized wage rate of the spouse
w−ij . Usual earnings contribution is the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of
household j in the simulation. Average estimates from 10,000 Monte-Carlo draws, average standard errors
in parentheses. In columns (3) and (5), we first draw a sample of 15,000 observations in each Monte-Carlo
repetition and then only keep the observations which satisfy the respective sample selection criterion (see
second to last row). Reported sample sizes in columns (3) and (5) are average sample sizes.
results for men while results for women are similar and can be found in Appendix A.5. To
determine the regressor expected wage growth, we exploit the properties of the wage process
(21), i.e., we calculate Et ∆ lnwijt+1 = (ρi − 1) · zijt.
4.3 Monte Carlo results
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results from various regression specifications using the
simulated model data. To begin with, column (1) shows the results from a standard Altonji
(1986) regression, i.e., a regression of hours growth on expected wage growth without the in-
teraction term that we proposed in Section 3. This auxiliary regression reflects our calibration
target, as we calibrated the true Frisch elasticity for men (0.65) so that the standard Altonji
(1986) regression yields an estimated value of 0.41 (which we obtain in our estimations from
PSID data) and illustrates the negative estimation bias.
Before applying our preferred interaction-term approach to simulated model data, we
illustrate two main implications of our model for standard Altonji (1986) regressions. Later,
we will test both implications empirically using PSID data. The first implication is that
estimates of the Frisch elasticity obtained by Altonji (1986) regressions should, ceteris paribus,
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be smaller in samples of individuals that contribute larger shares to household earnings, i.e.,
in samples of individuals with large s in equation (19). The second implication is that
differences in estimated Frisch elasticities between groups with different contributions to
household earnings should become smaller when the samples are less affected by borrowing
constraints, i.e., in samples of wealthier households where p in equation (19) tends to be
small.
To illustrate both implications, we estimate otherwise standard labor-supply regressions
but include an interaction between expected wage growth and a dummy variable that indicates
whether the individual is the primary earner in the household, i.e., has a higher average
wage rate than the spouse in our simulation. When we estimate this specification from the
simulated data, we obtain a negative estimate for this interaction term, see column (2). This
indicates that standard Altonji (1986) regressions would assign a smaller estimate of the
Frisch elasticity to primary earners although the true Frisch elasticity η is the same across
the male population. The reason is that, almost by definition, primary earners have a high
contribution to household earnings.
Column (3) relates our analysis to Domeij and Floden (2006) and shows results for samples
where we condition on household assets. Specifically, we restrict the sample to households
whose asset holdings exceed the average asset holdings in the simulated economy. As ex-
pected, the estimated coefficient on the primary-earner interaction becomes substantially
smaller in absolute value than the one in column (2), reflecting that earner roles tend to
become irrelevant when borrowing constraints are not relevant in the estimation sample. In
line with Domeij and Floden (2006), we find that the estimated coefficient on expected wage
growth is rather close to the true Frisch elasticity when the sample is restricted to above-
average wealth. However, in an estimation based on real-world data, a sufficiently strong
restriction on assets can be practically problematic, for example due to data availability or
small sample sizes due to missing information on wealth components.
Column (4) shows the estimation results for our preferred interaction-term model sum-
marized in equation (20), estimated from the unrestricted sample. In this model, we extend
the standard Altonji (1986) regression by an interaction term between expected wage growth
and an individual’s average earnings contribution as a control variable. We find that our
interaction-term regression works well in samples with annual data frequency. The estimated
Frisch elasticity is 0.63 which is very close to the true value of 0.65. Hence, our approach
that exploits the couple structure of the data yields almost unbiased estimates of the Frisch
elasticity in data sets that have realistic properties in terms of sample size and data fre-
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quency. Note that we estimate our interaction-term approach on the unrestricted sample of
individuals, i.e., without using any information on household wealth. Thus, our Monte Carlo
experiments show that our interaction-term approach yields almost unbiased estimates even
in samples of potentially borrowing-constrained individuals.
While we have shown that the bias due to borrowing constraints in Altonji (1986) regres-
sions is smaller for individuals who contribute little to household income, in real-world data,
men often tend to be primary earners in the household. Accordingly, one might be concerned
that, in an application using empirical data, a group of male secondary earners has specific
characteristics which might cause additional problems when inferring the Frisch elasticity.
We therefore perform an additional Monte Carlo experiment to corroborate that, while men
with low earnings contributions are less subject to the bias due to borrowing constraints in
Altonji (1986) regressions, they are not necessarily needed for identification in the regression
framework we propose. To do so, we estimate equation (20) on a restricted sample that
includes only men who are primary earners in their respective households. Column (5) shows
that also in such a sample, we obtain an estimate very close to the true Frisch elasticity when
we account for our interaction term. Put differently, also variation in the upper part of the
distribution of earnings contributions can be exploited to successfully recover the Frisch elas-
ticity through our method. To understand this result, recall that we have shown in Section
3 that the covariance between expected wage growth and hours growth for different groups
of individuals with earnings contribution s is a linear function of s, see (18). Also in the full
model, the relation seems to be close to linear.
We have considered several extensions of our baseline model and have investigated the
performance of our interaction-term approach in these extended model environments. Specif-
ically, we have incorporated non-separable preferences, progressive income taxes, and private
instead of public consumption, see Appendices A.6.1-A.6.3 for details. In all model exten-
sions, we find that our preferred interaction-term approach delivers an estimate of the Frisch
elasticity which is close to its true value while standard Altonji (1986) regressions under-
estimate it considerably. Finally, we have developed modifications of our interaction-term
approach to cope with challenges when estimating the Frisch elasticity for women instead of
men. In Appendix A.6.4, we show that our modified approaches are robust in presence of
taste-for-work shocks originating from, e.g., child care or home production, in particular our
approach using predicted instead of actually observed earnings contributions.
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5 Estimating labor-supply elasticities from PSID data
In this section, we present empirical results for our interaction-term approach using PSID
data. Details on the data and sample selection can be found in Appendix A.3.1. As shown
above, our approach corrects for the bias due to borrowing constraints and is able to deliver
an almost unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity. The outline of the empirical analysis
closely follows our Monte Carlo experiments, i.e., we first investigate two key implications
of our model and then apply our preferred interaction-term approach to the data. Before
presenting estimation results, we discuss some econometric aspects that are relevant in an
empirical application of our approach.
5.1 Econometric aspects
As in our theoretical model, we analyze the choice of hours worked at the intensive margin
in double-earner households.1 When estimating labor-supply regressions from PSID data,
we use individual characteristics to determine expected future wage changes, Et ∆wijt+1, in
gender-specific OLS regressions. Specifically, we follow, e.g., MaCurdy (1981) and Domeij and
Floden (2006) and use as predictors age, age squared, years of schooling, and an interaction
term between age and years of schooling. If there were no borrowing constraints, predictable
wage growth would leave the marginal utility of wealth unchanged and would hence identify
the Frisch elasticity. Using individual characteristics as predictors has the advantage that
measurement error in these variables is uncorrelated with measurement error in wage rates.2
In empirical data, individual labor supply may also be affected by taste shifters.3 Using
first-differenced data is helpful in addressing this aspect. First-differencing eliminates the
1In our sample, the standard deviation of annual hours growth, which is the left-hand side variable in our
regressions, is 16.9% for men (and 24.8% for women). Thus, the data show that there is substantial variation
in hours at the intensive margin.
2Measurement error in hours on the left-hand side of the regression reduces the R2 of the regression but
the estimate for η is consistent. As discussed by Altonji (1986), Domeij and Floden (2006) and Keane (2011),
the instruments used to determine expected wage growth are potentially weak, one reason being that most
wage changes may simply be unexpected. A potentially strong instrument is the lagged wage rate but this
instrument should be avoided because it magnifies biases stemming from measurement error in the wage data
(see Altonji, 1986, for further discussion). Using higher lags of the wage rate would mitigate this problem, but,
in our sample, such instruments are barely informative for future wage changes. In our gender-specific first-
stage regressions to obtain expected wage growth, the F statistics are 18.59 for men and 11.69 for women. In
the IV literature (see Stock et al. 2002), instruments are regarded as reliable if, in the case of one endogenous
regressor, the F statistic exceeds 10.
3Technically, hours growth in our model is also affected by changes in preferences and bargaining weights,
∆ lnα and ∆ lnµ, which are both equal to zero in our model but need not be in empirical data.
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need to control for permanent taste shifters which are likely correlated with wages, such as
education. In turn, this means that only transitory taste shifters may still be present in the
first-differenced regression. As argued by, e.g., Keane (2011), transitory taste shifters are less
likely to be correlated with expected wage changes.
Empirical estimates of labor-supply elasticities can also be affected by non-linear taxa-
tion (e.g., Aaronson and French 2009). When taxes are progressive, changes in gross wage
rates overstate changes in net wage rates. Even if marginal net wages were observable, they
would be endogenous as changes in hours affect marginal tax rates under progressive income
taxation. In Appendix A.6.3, we present Monte-Carlo estimations for a model version with
progressive income taxation which show that, in our context, the biases due to progressive
taxation are small compared to the biases arising from borrowing constraints. Relatedly, it
may be argued that taxes will largely drop out of a labor-supply condition in yearly differ-
ences as the household’s marginal tax rate typically does not change substantially from year
to year, see, e.g., Altonji (1986).
5.2 Testing two key implications of our model
As in the Monte Carlo experiments, we begin with comparing estimates for primary and
secondary earners. For this, we use the same regression specification as in the Monte Carlo
experiments, i.e., an otherwise standard Altonji (1986) labor-supply regression which we
augment by an interaction between expected wage growth and a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is the primary earner in the household. In our baseline specification,
we classify the spouse with the higher average wage rate over the sample period as the primary
earner, as we did in the Monte Carlo experiments.
Our theory predicts a negative coefficient for the interaction term. This is confirmed in
our estimations using PSID data, see Table 2. For both, men and women, the incremental
effect of being a primary earner on the estimated Frisch elasticity is significantly negative.
This corroborates that labor-supply elasticities are estimated to be substantially smaller for
primary than for secondary earners when borrowing constraints are ignored. Considering
gender-specific regressions is important to make this point as they show that the estimated
differences in labor-supply elasticities of primary and secondary earners are indeed related to
differences in earner status and do not primarily pick up gender differences in the true Frisch
elasticities. In Appendix A.7, we present additional evaluations corroborating this point.
Specifically, we consider alternative definitions of primary and secondary earners and we
compare Altonji (1986) regressions in several ranges of the relative contribution to household
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wage growth (0.12) (0.17)
expected wage growth -0.15 -0.45
× primary earner (0.09) (0.10)
η̂prim/η̂sec 0.70 0.48
time effects yes yes
observations 14,340 14,340
NOTE.–Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i
in household j in period t+ 1. Constant included but not shown. Indi-
viduals identified as primary earners if the mean realized wage rate in
the sample wij exceeds the mean realized wage rate of the spouse w−ij .
Standard errors in parentheses.
earnings.
We find a particularly large Altonji (1986) estimate for female secondary earners which
is in line with our argumentation as this group of women contributes particularly little to
household earnings (29% on average in our sample). Of course, estimated gender differences
may also reflect differences in the true Frisch elasticities. We come back to the issue of gender
differences in true labor-supply elasticities in Section 6.2.
The second testable implication of our analysis is that differences in estimated Frisch
elasticities from Altonji (1986) regressions should become smaller when the samples are less
affected by borrowing constraints. As in our Monte Carlo experiments, we test this prediction
by comparing male primary and secondary earners in samples of households with different
liquid wealth. In particular, we repeat the estimations including an interaction term with
the primary-earner dummy but only consider households with liquid wealth above a certain
threshold which we increase step by step. For this evaluation, we build on Domeij and Floden
(2006) and restrict the PSID data to three 3-year panels for which detailed asset data are
available. Our theoretical model predicts the coefficient on the interaction term to decrease
with an increasing wealth cut-off. We find that this pattern is confirmed in the PSID data,
see Appendix A.7.3 for details.
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5.3 Frisch-elasticity estimates for men
We now estimate Frisch elasticities for men, comparing results from a standard Altonji (1986)
regression to results from our preferred interaction-term approach. Column (1) in Table 3
shows results for a standard Altonji (1986) regression of hours growth on expected wage
growth that does not include an interaction term. This specification is subject to the negative
borrowing-constraint bias and delivers an estimated Frisch elasticity of 0.41.
We estimate a substantially larger Frisch elasticity when we use our preferred interaction-
term approach that exploits the couple structure. This is in line with our theoretical analysis
where we have shown that our approach corrects for the negative bias due to borrowing
constraints. Our interaction-term approach using the husband’s average percentage earnings
contribution yields an estimated Frisch elasticity (the coefficient on non-interacted expected
wage growth) of 0.72, see column (2). Compared to the estimation without the interaction
term in column (1), the bias-corrected estimate is hence about three quarters higher.4 Com-
paring the estimation results in columns (1) and (2) suggests that the bias due to borrowing
constraints in Altonji (1986) regressions amounts to more than 40% for men which is quanti-
tatively in line with our Monte-Carlo experiments. The negative coefficient on the interaction
term in column (2) reflects that men with higher earnings contributions have a weaker con-
nection between expected wage growth and hours growth. This corroborates that their labor
supply is particularly strongly exposed to the effects of borrowing constraints which induce a
negative co-movement of expected wage growth and hours growth counteracting the positive
co-movement induced by intertemporal substitution and governed by the Frisch elasticity.
As in our Monte Carlo experiments, we also investigate in how far our estimates are
driven by male secondary earners in the sample. As discussed before, these individuals
may be particular in various aspects and one may be skeptical when identification would
largely depend on these individuals. In order to address this concern, we re-estimate our
interaction-term specification for a restricted sample, where we only include men who are
primary earners, see column (3) of Table 3. We find that the estimate for the primary-earner
only sample is similar to the one obtained for the full sample, in line with our results from
the Monte Carlo analysis. This corroborates that male secondary earners are not solely
responsible for identification although we use the covariance between expected wage growth
and hours growth if the male earnings contribution were small.
4A one-sided test supports the hypothesis that the estimate in column (2) is significantly larger than the
one in column (1) (alternative hypothesis rejected with p-value of 0.08).
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Table 3: Empirical labor-supply regressions for men, PSID data, preferred approach exploiting
variation in relative contributions to household earnings.
(1) (2) (3)
expected 0.41 0.72 0.69
wage growth (0.10) (0.21) (0.27)
expected wage growth -0.52 -0.51
× earnings contribution (%) (0.29) (0.38)
time effects yes yes yes
sample all all wm > wf
observations 14,340 14,340 11,632
NOTE.–Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in household
j in period t+ 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribution is
the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household j
in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses.
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6 Implications for labor-supply elasticities of different popu-
lation groups
A direct implication of our analysis is that conventional methods tend to overestimate differ-
ences in labor-supply elasticities between population groups that tend to have different earner
roles in the household, e.g., between primary and secondary earners. Another example is the
often-discussed difference in labor-supply elasticities between men and women, with women
usually being attributed a substantially larger value for the Frisch elasticity than men. A
third example is the difference in labor-supply elasticities between individuals with high and
low earnings, respectively. Our analysis suggests that potential differences in the true elastic-
ities are magnified by the differential importance of the estimation bias so that differences in
true elasticities are in fact smaller than suggested by previous studies that ignore borrowing
constraints and earner roles.
6.1 Primary and secondary earners
In our baseline Altonji (1986) estimations where we allowed the estimate for the Frisch elastic-
ity to depend on earner status, we find substantial differences between primary and secondary
earners, see Table 2. The results of our preferred interaction-term approach using an indi-
vidual’s earnings contribution, see Table 3, corroborate that the differences between primary
and secondary earners suggested by standard Altonji (1986) regressions are mostly the result
of differential estimation biases rather than of differences in true Frisch elasticities. In fact,
when we apply our interaction-term approach that corrects for the borrowing-constraint bias
to a sample of male primary earners only, we obtain a similar estimate (0.69, see column
(3) of Table 3) compared to the total sample of men that also includes secondary earners
(0.72, see column (2) of Table 3). Put differently, differences between primary and secondary
earners are small once the borrowing-constraint bias is corrected for.
This suggests that the usual sample restriction to, e.g., male household heads working full-
time is potentially problematic in microeconometric estimations of the labor-supply elasticity.
Such samples consist mostly of primary earners and are hence subject to strong estimation
biases, which may be one reason why previous studies have often obtained relatively small
estimates for the Frisch elasticity. Keane (2011) explicitly makes the point that, even among
men, labor-supply elasticities are likely larger than estimated by the majority of existing
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studies. Our study supports this view, as we obtain substantially larger estimates in samples
where the bias due to borrowing constraints is expected to be less severe. Our analysis can
thus help to reconcile micro and macro estimates of labor-supply elasticities (Keane and
Rogerson 2015).
6.2 Men and women
Our study suggests that part of the often-discussed gender difference in labor-supply elas-
ticities can be attributed to the fact that men, who are in most cases primary earners in
the household, usually contribute larger shares to household income than women, so that
everything else equal, the negative estimation bias in Altonji (1986) regressions is larger for
men than for women. To address potential gender differences in true elasticities, we take
into account that while our interaction-term approach corrects for the bias due to borrow-
ing constraints, this does not necessarily imply that it yields an unbiased estimate of the
Frisch elasticity when there are other important sources of biases. While the literature has
discussed savings as the most important non-wage labor-supply determinant for men, issues
like child care are of particular relevance for women (see Keane 2011). Moreover, these issues
can be particularly important for those women for whom we also observe low contributions
to household earnings. This could then confound with the correction for the borrowing-
constraint bias.
For example, we could measure low contributions to household earnings for women who
work only few hours and have a relatively elastic labor supply because of child-care obliga-
tions, as shown by Alesina et al. (2011). Then, our derived estimator would put relatively
much weight on a group of women whose labor-supply elasticity is not representative for
the total population. We therefore develop modifications of our baseline interaction-term
approach to address challenges when estimating the Frisch elasticity for women.1
Specifically, we first extend our theoretical model by shocks to wives’ preferences for labor
supply and then modify our interaction-term approach appropriately. In particular, we add
a stochastic term h to the disutility of work of women such that women’s preferences are
described by








1In terms of descriptive statistics, we also find that women with low contributions to households earnings
have particular characteristics. Women with low earnings contributions (below 30%) work fewer hours and
have more children than other women. Further, they earn on average almost 50% less than predicted by their
characteristics (prediction regression based on a full set of age, education, and year dummies for women). By
contrast, men with low contributions to household earnings are rather similar to other men in terms of hours
worked, children, and deviations from predicted earnings.
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The shock h can be understood as a home production requirement, e.g., the presence of
children without the availability of informal or affordable formal child care.2 Similar to
Guner, Kaygusz, and Ventura (2011, 2012), we model h as a two-state Markov process with
states hlow and hhigh and transition probabilities κ1 from hlow to hhigh and κ2 from hhigh to
hlow.
3
In Appendix A.6.4, we present a detailed analysis of the model extension with preference
shocks and we show that our baseline interaction-term approach tends to over-estimate the
true Frisch elasticity in this setting. We therefore suggest modifications of our baseline
approach and we show in Monte-Carlo experiments that, with these modifications, we obtain
almost unbiased estimates also in the model with preference shocks. First, we adopt an
approach where we consider a sample restriction and only consider women who contribute at
least 30% to household earnings. Second, we apply an approach where we replace the wife’s
actual earnings contribution by the predicted earnings contribution based on a regression with
observable determinants as regressors.4 This alternative measure of the earnings contribution
is less affected by idiosyncratic determinants (such as child care needs).
When we apply these two approaches to the PSID data, we obtain an estimated Frisch
elasticity for women of around one, see columns (2) and (3) of Table 4. These estimates for
women are only about 45% larger than the one for men. By contrast, comparing gender-
specific labor-supply elasticities on the basis of Altonji (1986) regressions, i.e., comparing the
results in column (1) of Table 4 and column (1) of Table 3, would suggest considerably larger
gender differences of about 90%.5 Also the calibration of our theoretical model suggests
rather small gender differences in labor-supply elasticities. In fact, a difference of only about
40% is needed to rationalize the substantially larger difference in Altonji (1986) estimates.
In summary, our analysis for women suggests that potential gender differences in the true
elasticities are magnified by the differential importance of the estimation bias so that differ-
ences in true elasticities are in fact smaller than suggested by previous studies. This way,
our analysis has implications for, e.g., the taxation of couples (Kleven et al. 2009) or gen-
2Alesina et al. (2011) use these preferences to rationalize gender differences in labor-supply elasticities as
a result of the division of household chores. Also Guner, Kaygusz, and Ventura (2011, 2012) and Bick (2016)
apply similar preferences when analyzing the responses of female labor supply to tax reforms and child care
subsidies, respectively. Most relatedly, Guner, Kaygusz, and Ventura (2011, 2012) add a constant term to
mothers’ (but not fathers’) working time while young children are present in the household, which happens
exogenously in their model.
3We follow Guner et al. (2011) and Bick (2016) to calibrate these additional parameters, see Appendix
A.6.4 for details.
4In the empirical application, we predict log earnings using a full set of age, education, and year dummies.
5When we estimate an Altonji (1986) regression for women with s < 0.3, we obtain a particularly large
estimate in line with our extended model version with preference shocks.
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Table 4: Empirical labor-supply regressions for women, PSID data, modified approaches exploiting
variation in relative contributions to household earnings.
(1) (2) (3)
expected 0.78 1.08 1.05
wage growth (0.17) (0.27) (0.23)
expected wage growth -1.49
× earnings contribution (%) (0.46)
expected wage growth -0.77
× predicted contribution (0.43)
time effects yes yes yes
sample all sij ≥ 0.3 all
observations 14,340 8,966 14,340
NOTE.–Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in household
j in period t+1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribution sij
is the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household
j in the sample. Predicted earnings contribution based on a regression with a full set
of age, education, and year dummies as regressors. Standard errors in parentheses.
ders (Alesina et al. 2011) where arguments often rely on gender differences in labor-supply
elasticities.
6.3 High and low earnings
Our analysis also implies that conventional methods overestimate the differences in labor-
supply elasticities between groups with high and low levels of earnings.6 When we distinguish
between men in the upper 25% of the distribution of current labor earnings and those in the
bottom 75%, see columns (1) and (3) of Table 5, estimates from standard Altonji (1986) re-
gressions suggest that the labor supply of individuals with high earnings is considerably less
elastic. Accordingly, one might draw the conclusion that strong tax progressivity is efficient,
see, e.g., Saez (2001) who relate optimal income tax rates to labor-supply elasticities.7 How-
ever, our analysis suggests that this difference in labor-supply elasticities is over-estimated
as individuals with high earnings on average also contribute larger shares to household earn-
6Due to assortative mating, men with high earnings also tend to have partners with above-average earnings.
Nevertheless, men in the high-income group contribute larger average shares to household earnings (on average
about 75% compared to 65%).
7The optimal tax rates derived by Saez (2001) use Marshall and Hicks labor-supply elasticities. In our
model, Marshall and Hicks elasticities are monotonically increasing in the parameter η. Independent of the
specific form of preferences, the Frisch elasticity is an upper bound for the other two elasticities. Saez (2001)
considers both, preferences without income effects where the elasticities are identical as well as preferences
with income effects. The shape of the optimal tax schedules is remarkably similar for both preference types
and, hence, mostly determined by substitution effects.
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Table 5: Empirical labor-supply regressions for men, PSID data, by earnings group.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
top 25% earnings bottom 75% earnings
expected 0.18 0.62 0.52 0.87
wage growth (0.16) (0.41) (0.13) (0.25)
expected wage growth -0.68 -0.59
× earnings contribution (%) (0.56) (0.36)
time effects yes yes yes yes
observations 3,735 3,735 10,605 10,605
NOTE.–Estimation results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i
in household j in period t+ 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribution is the
average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household j in the sample. Earn-
ings groups defined using the position of current labor earnings in the distribution of individual labor
earnings in the year of observation. Standard errors in parentheses.
ings. In fact, when we apply our preferred interaction-term approach, estimated labor-supply
elasticities are found to be more similar for both earnings groups, see columns (2) and (4) of
Table 5. Remaining differences in estimated elasticities may reflect, among other things, that
the top-earnings group is on average older and more educated than the rest of the population.
We also considered a specification where we exclude individuals who switch back and forth
between the two earnings groups. In this specification, we obtain very similar results as for
the total sample, see Appendix A.7.4 for details.
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7 Conclusion
Estimates of Frisch labor-supply elasticities are biased in presence of borrowing constraints.
We have shown that the strength of this bias depends on individuals’ relative contribution
to household earnings. In couples with joint borrowing constraints, wage-rate fluctuations of
secondary earners are less important for the couples’ willingness to borrow and this relation
is the stronger the more pronounced are intra-household wage differences. This results in
smaller estimation biases for individuals who contribute little to household earnings. We
have presented an incomplete-markets model with two earners to make this point explicit.
We have used the model to develop a new method that corrects for the bias due to borrowing
constraints. Specifically, we have extended standard Altonji (1986) regressions by the inter-
action between expected wage growth and the individual’s usual contribution to household
earnings. This estimation approach yields an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity.
Empirically, we estimate a Frisch elasticity for men of about 0.7. This is larger than the
majority of previous estimates from microeconometric studies. Further, we find rather homo-
geneous labor-supply elasticities across the population compared to estimates from methods
that neglect borrowing constraints and do not exploit the couple structure of the data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Deriving an unbiased estimator of the Frisch elasticity: Analytical
details
A.1.1 Households unaffected by borrowing constraints
For households unaffected by borrowing constraints, the multiplier on the borrowing con-
straint equals zero, φ = 0. Taking logs of the first-order conditions (7), (8), and (9) gives








lnλ= ln (1 + r) + lnβ + ln Eλ′. (25)
Iterating forward (23) and (24) and taking first differences gives
∆ lnn′1 = η ·∆ lnw′1 + η ·∆ lnλ′, (26)
∆ lnn′2 = η ·∆ lnw′2 + η ·∆ lnλ′, (27)
where, for a generic variable y, ∆ ln y′ = ln y′ − ln y. The next step is to use the Euler
equation to substitute for the unobservable term ∆ lnλ′. Rearranging the Euler equation
(25), we obtain
ln Eλ′ − lnλ = − ln (1 + r)− lnβ.
While the Euler equation relates to the expected marginal utility of consumption, it is the
actual change in the marginal utility of consumption that is part of the labor-supply condi-
tions, see (26) and (27). We therefore introduce an expectation error ξ′ = lnλ′−E lnλ′ such
that
∆ lnλ′ = lnλ′ − lnλ = − ln (1 + r)− lnβ − ξ′. (28)
In (28), we use that ln Eλ′ = E lnλ′ up to first order and we neglect higher-order terms. In
Appendix A.4, we evaluate the importance of the approximation for our results.
Substituting (28) into (26) gives
∆ lnn′1 = η ·∆ lnw′1 − η · ln (1 + r)− η · lnβ − η · ξ′, (29)
∆ lnn′2 = η ·∆ lnw′2 − η · ln (1 + r)− η · lnβ − η · ξ′. (30)
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Note that the residual η · ξ′ is correlated with ∆ lnw′1 as well as with ∆ lnw′2. Intuitively,
wage growth, if not perfectly foreseen, leads to an increase in consumption and a reduction of
marginal utility compared to their previously planned levels. Put differently, a household that
enjoys unforeseen wage growth for either spouse will increase its consumption and marginal
utility will be lower than it was expected one period before, ξ′ = lnλ′ − E lnλ′ < 0. To
address the resulting endogeneity problem, Altonji (1986) suggests a decomposition of wage
growth into an expected and an unexpected component,










where ω′1 and ω
′
2 are the unexpected components of wage growth. Using these decompositions
in (29) and (30) gives (13) for i = 1, 2 from the main text. These equations can be estimated
by OLS as the expectation errors ξ′ and ω′i, i = 1, 2, which form the joint residual, are
both uncorrelated with the regressor ∆ E lnw′i: Under rational expectations, the expectation
error ω′i is uncorrelated with the expectation E ∆ lnw
′
i itself. Further, expected wage growth
E ∆ lnw′i does not cause an adjustment of the marginal utility of consumption and hence a
non-zero value of ξ′ if the household is not affected by borrowing constraints. Intuitively, the
household will use expected wage growth to finance already contemporaneous increases in
consumption through either dis-saving or borrowing.
A.1.2 Borrowing-constrained households
To derive (14), (15), and (16), we first take logs of (6), (8), and (9):
−σ ln c= lnλ, (31)








In the point of approximation, it holds that
−σ ln c= lnλ, (34)














= −σ ln (c/c) , (37)
as well as the expressions (14) and (15) from the main text.
To obtain (16), we log-linearize the budget constraint. For borrowing-constrained house-
holds (a = a′ = 0), the budget constraint reads
c = w1n1 + w2n2.
Applying a first-order Taylor approximation gives1
c− c = w1 · (n1 − n1) + n1 · (w1 − w1) + w2 · (n2 − n2) + n2 · (w2 − w2) .





















· w2 − w2
w2
.
Using the definitions s1 = w1 ·n1/ (w1n1 + w2n2) and s2 = w2 ·n2/ (w1n1 + w2n2), and using
that, for a generic variable y, (y − y) /y ≈ ln (y/y), we obtain
ln (c/c) = s1 · (ln (w1/w1) + ln (n1/n1)) + s2 · (ln (w2/w2) + ln (n2/n2)) . (38)
Substituting (38) into (37) gives (16) from the main text.
To obtain the labor-supply policy functions, we solve (14), (15), and (16) for ln (ni/ni),
i = 1, 2,
ln (ni/ni) =
(




· ln (wi/wi) (39)
−ση (η + 1)
ση + 1
· (1− si) · ln (w−i/w−i) ,
which show that labor supply depends on one’s own wage rate as well as on the wage rate
of the partner. As we want to recover the own-wage Frisch elasticity, we will focus on the
reaction to one’s own wage-rate shocks and summarize the response to the partner’s wage
1In Appendix A.4, we evaluate the importance of approximation errors for our results.
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rate in a residual. Taking first differences yields




− ln (ni/ni) =(




·∆ lnw′i + ζ ′,
where ζ ′ = −ση(η+1)ση+1 · (1− si) · ∆ lnw
′
−i. As for unconstrained households, we can now
decompose wage growth ∆ lnw′i into an expected and an unexpected component, where the
latter becomes part of the combined residual. This gives equation (17) from the main text.
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A.2 Generalizing the relation between the borrowing-constraint bias and
the relative earnings contribution
In this Appendix, we show that the estimation bias due to borrowing constraints in Altonji
(1986) regressions is decreasing in an individual’s contribution to household earnings for an
arbitrary data frequency. For the general case, the estimation bias cannot be derived in closed
form but we can express it in a comprehensive way as a function of endogenous moments
as also done by Domeij and Floden (2006). First, we show that a standard Altonji (1986)
regression is subject to a downward bias also in our two-earner model. This result and its
derivation are very similar to the corresponding result in the bachelor model of Domeij and
Floden (2006). Then, we show that this bias is the less important the less an individual
contributes to household earnings. This second result critically requires the double-earner
structure.
We start by deriving the true relation between hours growth and expected wage growth
in our model. Taking logs and first differences of the labor-supply conditions (8) and (9), we




·∆ lnni −∆ lnλ′. (40)
A log-linear approximation of the Euler equation (7) implies
∆ lnλ′ = − lnβ − ln (1 + r)− φ
λ
+ ξ′, (41)
where ξ′ = lnλ′−E lnλ′ denotes an expectation error. Inserting (41) into (40) and rearranging
yields
∆ lnn′i = η ·∆ lnw′i − η · lnβ − η · ln (1 + r)− η ·
φ
λ
+ η · ξ′. (42)
Note that this expression nests both relations, for unconstrained and constrained households,
respectively, derived in the main text. For households unaffected by borrowing constraints,





borrowing-constrained households, the multiplier ratio φ/λ can be substituted to obtain (17).
Further, (42) also covers households who transition between being borrowing constrained and
unconstrained.
As pointed out by Altonji (1986), the residual ξ′ is correlated with wage growth ∆ lnw′i
but not with expected wage growth E ∆ lnw′i. As in Section 3.1, one therefore applies
a decomposition of ∆ lnw′i into E ∆ lnw
′
i and an unexpected component ω
′
i. However, the
multiplier ratio φ/λ which measures the household’s willingness to borrow affects labor supply
but is not observable in empirical data and is therefore part of the combined residual. This
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causes the estimation bias due to borrowing constraints because the willingness to borrow is
correlated with wage growth.2
We will now show that the associated estimation bias differs depending on an individual’s
earner role in the household. In our derivations, we distinguish between two cases regard-
ing the observability of expected wage growth. First, when using synthetic data, one can
calculate the expected wage change E ∆ lnw′i from the particular wage process assumed. In
the quantitative evaluations of our model, we assume an AR(1) process with fixed effects,
w′i = ψi + zi, z
′
i = ρ · zi + ε′i, where ψi is a fixed effect, ρ determines persistence and ε is a
wage-rate shock. We also apply this assumption here. Thus, we can calculate expected wage
growth as
E ∆ lnw′i = E(z
′
i − zi) = E((ρ− 1) · zi + ε′i) = (ρ− 1) · zi. (43)
Second, in real-world data, expected wage changes can be obtained through a first-stage
regression using variables as regressors which are known to the agent in advance, see MaCurdy
(1981), Altonji (1986), and Keane (2011). In the following, we cover both cases and derive
important properties of the results of Altonji (1986) regressions in our model.
Proposition 1 When expected wage growth E ∆ lnw′ is known, the percentage bias in the




= − 1 + ρ

















− cov (φ/λ, ν)
)
,
where γ̂ is the estimated coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression and ν is
the residual from the first-stage regression.
Proof. If expected wage changes are known to the econometrician, the labor-supply regres-
sion is
∆ lnn′ = const+ η · E ∆ lnw′ + u
and the estimate η̂ is
η̂ =
cov (∆ lnn′,E ∆ lnw′)
var (E ∆ lnw′)
=
cov (∆ lnn′, (ρ− 1) z)
var ((ρ− 1) z)
=
cov (∆ lnn′, z)
(ρ− 1) · var (z)
. (44)
2This problem is not resolved by using expected wage-rate changes as regressors. The willingness to
borrow is correlated with precisely the expected component of wage changes as expected wage growth induces
households to wish to front-load consumption through borrowing.
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We rearrange the true labor-supply relation (42) to
∆ lnn′= κ+ η ·∆ lnw′ − η · φ
λ




− η · φ
λ
+ ξ̃′
= κ+ η · (ρz + ε− z)− η · φ
λ
+ ξ̃′ = κ+ η · ((ρ− 1) z + ε)− η · φ
λ
+ ξ̃′,



















Inserting this into (44) gives the estimate as
η̂ =












(ρ− 1) var (z)
.









(ρ− 1) var (z)
= −cov (φ/λ,E ∆ lnw
′/ (ρ− 1))
(ρ− 1) var (z)
(45)
=−cov (φ/λ,E ∆ lnw
′)
(ρ− 1)2 · var (z)
= − 1 + ρ










· σ2ε and 1− ρ2 = (1 + ρ) · (1− ρ).
If expected wage-rate changes are identified based on a first-stage regression, ∆ lnw′ =
const1 + γ · y + ν, where y is an instrument, the first-stage results are
γ̂ =
cov (∆ lnw′, y)
var (y)
, ∆̂ lnw′ = const1 +
cov (∆ lnw′, y)
var (y)
· y.
Then, the second-stage regression is
∆ lnn′ = const+ η · cov (∆ lnw
′, y)
var (y)
· y + u,



















cov (∆ lnw′, y)
. (46)
We rearrange the true relation (42) to
∆ lnn′ = κ+ η ·∆ lnw′ − η · φ
λ





which uses the notation from above. Hence, the covariance between the dependent variable





= ηγ · var (y)− η · cov (y, φ/λ) .
Expressing the instrument as y = (∆ lnw′ − const1 − ν)/γ̂, we can state that









· cov (ν, φ/λ) .
We can use the first-stage results to determine the covariance in the denominator of the





= γ̂ · var (y) .
Inserting this into (46) gives
η̂ =
ηγ var (y)− η · cov (y, φ/λ)
γ̂ · var (y)
= η − η · cov (∆ lnw
′, φ/λ)− cov (ν, φ/λ)
γ̂2 · var (y)
.











− cov (ν, φ/λ)
)
as stated in the proposition.
For the following analytical results, we consider a simplified version of the model, where
we assume η1 = η2 = η, α1 = α2 = 2, µ = 1/2, ρ = 0, and var (ε1) = var (ε2). Importantly,
the assumptions on the preference weights α and µ imply that differences in long-run earner
roles stem solely from differences in the wage fixed effects ψ. The higher a spouse’s fixed effect,
the more this person contributes to household earnings (see Lemma 3 below). Therefore, it
is convenient to first perform comparative statistics in the fixed effects ψ and to transfer the
results to relative earner roles thereafter.
As an intermediate step, we can state that the multiplier ratio in the true labor-supply
relation (42) is weakly decreasing in a symmetric, increasing function of spouses’ wage levels:
Lemma 1 Define Λ = w1+η1 + w
1+η




Proof. Consider a period with state variables a, w1 = Z1, and w2 = Ψ2 · Z2. Using the




λ− β (1 + r) Eλ′
λ





Obviously, this ratio is zero if the household is not borrowing constrained in the current
period, i.e., if a′ > 0⇔ φ = 0. Since z2 and z1 are i.i.d., a borrowing-constrained household
expects to enter the next period with state variables a′ = z′1 = z
′
2 = 0. Hence, we can consider
Eλ′ in case of being borrowing constrained as a constant, which we denote by λ.










It is weakly increasing in the Lagrange multiplier on the current period’s budget constraint
λ̃, ∂ (φ/λ) /∂λ̃ ≤ 0.
When the household is borrowing constrained, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing
constraint can be determined from the remaining first-order conditions for the current period:
n
1/η
2 = λ̃ · w2 = λ̃ · Z2 ·Ψ2,
n
1/η
1 = λ̃ · w1 = λ̃ · Z1,
λ̃= c−σ,
c=w2 · n2 + w1 · n1 + a
=Z2 ·Ψ2 · n2 + Z1 · n1 + a,







− a = 0,








1 . Defining the left-hand side of this expression
















Together with ∂ (φ/λ) /∂λ̃ ≤ 0 from above, this gives ∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ ≤ 0.
Second, the covariance between the symmetric function Λ of the spouses’ wage rates and
an individual’s stochastic wage component zi increases in the individual’s relative wage-fixed
effect in the household Ψi/Ψ−i. This implies that the relative strength of the estimation bias
also increases in the relative wage fixed effect.
Lemma 2 The relative estimation bias in the household, biasi /bias−i is an increasing func-
tion of the relative wage fixed effects, Ψi/Ψ−i. Further, biasi → 0 for Ψi → 0 and for
Ψ−i →∞.
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Proof. From Proposition 1, it follows that the relative estimation bias in the household
is given by cov (φ/λ,E lnw′i − lnwi) / cov
(
φ/λ,E lnw′−i − lnw−i
)
. Using the specification of












Combining ∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ ≤ 0 and ∂Λ/∂zi > 0 gives ∂ (φ/λ) /∂zi ≤ 0 and cov (φ/λ, zi) ≤ 0.
Now, consider the covariance between Λ and the individual stochastic wage compo-


























nous constant determined by the parameters of the wage process, cov (Λ, Zi) is an increasing
function of Ψi with cov (Λ, Zi)→ 0 for Ψi → 0. For the other household member −i, we have




















Since the stochastic wage components are i.i.d., the correlation between current wages
and the beginning-of-period asset level a, which is determined in the previous period, is zero.
The proof continues by stating results conditional on the beginning-of-period asset holdings
a and later continues by aggregating over a.
Generally, for a function f (x), it holds that cov (f (x) , x|a) = E (∂f/∂x|a) · cov (x, y|a).
Define f(Λ) = φ/λ and consider the covariance
cov (f (Λ) , Zi|a) = E (∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ|a) · cov (Λ, Zi|a)
= E (∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ|a) · cov (Λ, Zi) .
The fact that ∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ ≤ 0 implies that the first factor on the right-hand side is negative
but it does not depend on the person index i.
Now, aggregating over the different a gives cov (f (Λ) , Zi) =
∫
cov (f (Λ) , Zi|a) dh (a) =
cov (Λ, Zi) ·
∫
E (∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ|a) dh (a) and hence
cov (f (Λ) , Zi)
cov (f (Λ) , Z−i)
=
cov (Λ, Zi) ·
∫
E (∂ (φ/λ) /∂Λ|a) dh (a)
cov (Λ, Zi) ·
∫








where the final step uses (48).









From this, it follows that the estimation bias for household member approaches zero if either
Ψi → 0 or Ψ−i → ∞. Further, the estimation bias for household member i is strictly
increasing in his or her relative wage fixed effect Ψi/Ψ−i.
Lemma 3 The relative contribution of household member i to household earnings is mono-
tonically increasing in his or her relative wage fixed effect, Ψi/Ψ−i.
Proof. Consider the first-order conditions for labor supply, (8) and (9), to see wini/ (w−in−i) =
(wi/w−i)
1+η for any combination of wi, w−i, a. Hence, for any asset level, relative earnings
are an increasing function of relative wage rates. Taking logs gives lnwini − lnw−in−i =
(1 + η) · (lnw1 − lnw2) and taking expectations gives
E (lnw1n1 − lnw2n2) = (1 + η) · (E lnw1 − E lnw2) = (1 + η) · ln (Ψ1/Ψ2) .
Hence, the mean earnings gap is an increasing function of the relative wage fixed effects
Ψi/Ψ−i. Finally, it is straightforward to show that the relation between the earnings gap
and the earnings contribution is positive and monotonic. Define υ = lnw1n1 − lnw2n2 and
x1 = w1n1/ (w1n1 + w2n2). Then s = υ/ (υ + 1).
Proposition 4 The estimation bias (η̂ − η) /η for an individual is monotonically related to
the individual’s percentage contribution to household earnings: The higher is the contribution
to household earnings, the stronger is the estimation bias. The estimation bias converges to
zero for individuals whose percentage contribution to household earnings converges to zero.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2 together with Lemma 3.
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A.3 Sample selection and calibration
A.3.1 Sample selection
We use observations for the years 1972-1997 from the PSID. Before 1972, there is no informa-
tion on wives’ education. After 1997, the PSID switched from annual to biennial interviews.
We consider household heads and wives for whom both partners’ wage rates are available.
For both partners, we calculate the wage rate as total labor income divided by total hours
worked and deflate wages to 1983 prices using the CPI. We restrict the sample to individuals
between age 25 and 60 and drop the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample which is
not representative for the U.S. We drop household-years where individuals’ reported annual
hours of work are larger than 4860 (more than 92 average weekly hours) and where hours
worked or the wage rate fall by more than 40 percent or increase by more than 250 percent
between two consecutive years (see Domeij and Floden 2006). To eliminate the influence of
extreme observations and data errors, we drop observations falling in the top 0.5 percentiles
of male and female wages, respectively.
Note that our baseline sample is relatively large in comparison to related studies. For
instance, Domeij and Floden (2006) have to restrict the data to three subpanels around the
years 1984, 1989 and 1994, where the PSID contained a supplement on household wealth. In
our specifications where we exploit asset holdings to control for borrowing constraints, we
also consider this subsample of the PSID data, see Section 5 and Appendix A.7.3.
A.3.2 Estimation of stochastic wage process
We distinguish between two components of wage rates. First, there is a component that
captures (observed or unobserved) characteristics of the individual and that leads to long-
run wage differences between individuals (both, within and across households). Second,
there is a component that captures idiosyncratic and temporary fluctuations in wage rates
which may induce borrowing constraints to bind. We use a combination of microeconometric
estimation (idiosyncratic and temporary wage components) and calibration (long-run wage-
rate differences within and across households) to obtain the parameters of the model.
Idiosyncratic and temporary wage components. We assume in our model that the
idiosyncratic and temporary component follows an AR(1) process. The parameters of this
process are important for frequency and expected duration of binding borrowing constraints
and for the process of expected wage growth which is key to labor-supply regressions. We
quantify the parameters of the AR(1) process through gender-specific Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimations. As discussed in Section 4.1, we quantify long-run wage
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differences through calibration.
To determine the parameters of the AR(1) process, the following steps have to be carried
out that do not have direct counterparts in the theoretical model. To save on notation, we do
not account for a gender index g = m, f in the following. We first filter predictable influences
on observed log wage rates ln w̃∗it using a filter regression
ln w̃∗it = q (oit) + ŵit,
where oit denote characteristics (time dummies, age dummies, and education dummies inter-
acted up to a quadratic age trend) of individual i in year t.3 The wage process estimation is
then performed for residual log wage rates ŵit.
4
In the empirical process for residual wages, we account for individual fixed effects and we
follow the applied literature, see, e.g., Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), by incorporating
time-varying factor loadings that allow the permanent and transitory components to change
over time in a way that is common across individuals. While the variance terms are time-
invariant in our theoretical model, the empirical literature has shown the importance of
allowing for such flexibility in the estimated processes to correctly identify persistence and
idiosyncratic risk. Hence, residual log wages are decomposed into
ŵit = πt · χi + ζt · z̃it, (50)
where πt and ζt are factor loadings, χi is an individual fixed effect, and z̃it is the transitory
component of observed wage rates.
Next to an autoregressive component, we also incorporate a moving-average term in the
process for the transitory wage component z̃it to take into account measurement error in
empirical wage-rate data that would otherwise bias the estimated AR coefficients5,
z̃it,= ρ · z̃it−1 + θ · εit−1 + εit, (51)
where ρ is the persistence parameter, θ is the MA parameter, and εit is the shock to the
transitory wage component with variance σ2ε .
We estimate the process for residual wages, (50) and (51), by a Generalized Method
3We drop all observations where the residual of this regression belongs to the bottom or top 1 percent of
all residuals for an age group. We then re-estimate the filter regression to obtain the final vector of residual
wage rates, ŵit.
4A measure of dispersion after controlling for observables is the relevant concept in the incomplete markets
literature where the focus is on idiosyncratic uncertainty, see, e.g., Storesletten et al. (2004), Krueger and
Perri (2006), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010), and Bayer and Juessen (2012).
5Accounting for a moving-average component to deal with measurement error is widely adopted in the
empirical literature, see, e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
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of Moments (GMM). Specifically, we exploit as moment conditions the variance-covariance
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, t = 1 and s > 0
cov (ŵt, ŵt+s) = πtπt+sσ
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χ + ζtζt+s
ρ2t+s−2σ2w1 + ρ2K t−1∑
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ρ2j + ρs−1θσ2ε
 , t > 1 and s > 0,
where K = σ2ε
(
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)
. Concerning initial conditions, we follow the approach by
MaCurdy (1982) and treat the variance at the start of the sample period, σ2w1, as an additional
parameter to be estimated. GMM estimation is carried out by replacing population moment
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}
.
For identification, the first-period factor loadings π1, ζ1 are set to one. In our unbalanced
panel data, each sample moment is constructed using all available observations covering
the respective time span.6 We follow Altonji and Segal (1996) and Clark (1996) and use the
identity matrix as the weighting matrix, which has been shown to lead to better small sample
performance than the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix.
Table 6 summarizes the parameter estimates.7 For men, the estimated autocorrelation
of idiosyncratic wages is ρm = 0.82 and the estimated standard deviation is σm,ε = 0.22.
These results are well in line with the literature, see, e.g., Domeij and Floden (2006) and the
references therein. For women, the estimated autocorrelation ρf = 0.82 is similar compared
to men’s, and the estimated degree of idiosyncratic labor market risk σf,ε = 0.45 is about
twice as large as for men.
Long-run wage-rate differences within and across households. Next to the autore-
gressive component, we include constant terms ψ in the wage process of our model to induce
6Following Haider (2001), we adjust the standard errors of the parameter estimates to take into account
the number of observations used in the computation for each moment.
7To save on space, the point estimates for the time-varying factor loadings are not shown. In line with
the literature, we find that idiosyncratic labor market risk tends to increase over time. Results for the filter
regressions are available on request.
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# moments 351 351
NOTE.–GMM estimation results for the covariance struc-
ture of residual wage rates. Residual wages obtained us-
ing a filter regression with time dummies, age dummies,
and schooling dummies interacted up to a quadratic age
trend. Standard errors in parentheses.
long-run differences in earner roles. We quantify these constant terms by calibration. Specif-
ically, we distinguish between ten household types matching average male and female wage
rates in the ten deciles of the empirical distribution of relative wage rates of spouses in our
PSID data. An alternative approach would be to target the estimated variance of fixed effects,
σ2χ from the microeconometric wage process estimation. While this would capture the gender-
specific across-household variance of (residual) wage rates appropriately, we implement the
former approach to obtain a realistic distribution of within-household wage differences.
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A.3.3 Parameter values
Table 7 summarizes the parameter values of our baseline model.
Table 7: Parameter values, baseline model
Description Parameter Value(s)
Aggregate parameters
Interest rate r 1.45% cal.
Discount factor β 0.95 set
Risk aversion σ 1.5 set
Pareto weight µ 0.5 set
Gender-specific parameters male female
Autocorrelation z ρg 0.84 0.81 est.
Standard deviation z σg 0.24 0.44 est.
True Frisch elasticity ηg 0.65 0.90 est.
HH-type specific parameters I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Const. wage comp. husband ψmj -2.8 -2.6 -2.6 -2.5 -2.4 -2.5 -2.3 -2.3 -2.2 -2.0 cal.
Const. wage comp. wife ψfj -2.5 -2.7 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.5 cal.
Labor-disutility husband αmj 48.4 61.2 68.3 73.7 75.8 84.1 84.5 86.4 99.6 105.7 cal.
Labor-disutility wife αfj 60.5 51.1 49.3 47.4 45.3 45.2 43.1 42.0 41.9 36.1 cal.
NOTE.–HH-type: household type. Roman numbers (I-X) indicate household types. cal.: calibrated. est.:
estimated
58
A.4 Log-linearization and approximation bias
The derivation of our interaction-term approach (20) uses first-order approximations. In
this appendix, we use second-order Taylor approximations to evaluate the importance of
approximation errors.
Compared to the expressions in Appendix A.1.1, a second-order approximation of the
Euler equation for unconstrained households yields the additional term, ξ′+ 12 (ξ
′)2, where ξ′
is the ex-post percentage expectation error in marginal utility ξ′ = (λ′ − Eλ′) /λ′, see Domeij
and Floden (2006) for a derivation. When substituted into the labor-supply conditions (26)
and (27), this higher-order term enters additively and multiplied with a negative constant on
the right-hand side of equation (13) in the main text.
For borrowing-constrained households, we have to approximate the budget constraint
(2). A second-order approximation yields the additional term si · (ln (wi/wi) · ln (ni/ni)) +
s−i · (ln (w−i/w−i) · ln (n−i/n−i)) compared to the expressions in Appendix A.1.2. When
substituted into the system of first-order conditions, this higher order term enters in first
differences, additively, and multiplied with a negative constant on the right-hand side of
equation (16) in the main text.
To evaluate the importance of approximation errors, we calculate both higher-order terms
(h.o.t.) for unconstrained and constrained households, respectively, in our simulation. When
determining the expectation term in the expression for constrained households, we first cal-
culate ξ and ξ2 as functions of state variables and then determine their expectations by
applying transition probabilities.8 We then include the h.o.t. as additional regressors in
our interaction-term regression (20). Table 8 shows that this has almost no effect on the
non-interacted coefficient on expected wage growth (which is the estimated Frisch elasticity).
Thus, higher-order terms are almost irrelevant for our results and our preferred first-order
approximation is sufficient for obtaining an almost unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity.
8A regression-based approach as applied by Domeij and Floden (2006) delivers almost identical results.
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Table 8: Estimation results from synthetic household panel data, the role of approximation errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expected 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61
wage growth (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
expected wage growth -0.32 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30
× earnings contribution (%) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
h.o.t. (unconstrained) 0.10 -0.33
(0.22) (0.23)
h.o.t. (constrained) -0.03 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00)
NOTE.–Results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in
household j in period t + 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribu-
tion is the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household
j in the simulation. h.o.t. (unconstrained): Et(ξjt+1 + ξ
2
jt+1/2). h.o.t. (constrained):
∆ (sij · (ln(wijt+1/wij) · ln(nijt+1/nij)) + s−ij · (ln(w−ijt+1/w−ij) · ln(n−ijt+1/n−ij))). Aver-
age estimates from 10,000 Monte-Carlo draws, average standard errors in parentheses.
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A.5 Monte Carlo results for women
In this appendix, we repeat the baseline Monte Carlo experiments for women. Column (1)
in Table 9 shows the results from a standard Altonji (1986) regression. As women’s average
earnings contribution is smaller than men’s, the downward bias is less pronounced for women
than it is for men. Column (2) shows the results of our preferred interaction-term approach,
see equation (20). The remaining bias is only about 5%, comparable to the one for men.
Table 9: Estimation results from synthetic household panel data, for women, baseline model.
(1) (2)
expected 0.78 0.85
wage growth (0.02) (0.07)
expected wage growth -0.18
× earnings contribution (%) (0.19)
observations 15,000 15,000
NOTE.–Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i
in household j in period t+ 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual
earnings contribution is the average percentage contribution of individ-
ual i to labor earnings of household j in the simulation. Average esti-




A.6.1 Model version with non-separable preferences
In a model with non-separable preferences, the true Frisch elasticities of labor supply are not
determined by the curvatures of the disutility of working alone but also depend on household
decisions. Thus, even at the individual level, the Frisch elasticity is not constant but varies
over time. Non-separabilities in preferences might result from two potential sources. First,
consumption and leisure may not be separable as individuals may enjoy consumption more
in their leisure time. Second, in the context of a couple household, spouses may enjoy leisure
more when they spend it together. To account for both dimensions, we follow Wu and Krueger
(2015) and use the household target function
v =
(
α · cγ + (1− α) ·
(




where c, n1, and n2 denote consumption, and hours of household members 1 and 2, respec-
tively.9
Other than in the baseline model, we do not calibrate the elasticities of the utility function
to match the empirical estimates of Altonji (1986) regressions. Since it is the purpose of this
model extension to check our estimation approach in an environment with realistic degrees of
complementarities, we take the substitution elasticities γ and θ directly from Wu and Krueger
(2015), σ = 2.42, γ = −2.7, and θ = 2.25 which implies that there are complementarities
between consumption and leisure as well as between the leisure times of the two spouses.
Similar to the calibration of our baseline model, we calibrate the preference weights α and
ζ for each of the 10 household types to match average hours worked by husband and wife.
Again, we set the economy-wide interest rate r to match the wealth share of the bottom
40% of the distribution. All other parameters are unchanged. In our calibrated model, the
average true Frisch elasticity of men is 0.80.
Column (1) in Table 10 shows estimation results from a standard Altonji (1986) regres-
sion using simulated data from the model with non-separable preferences. We find that the
downward bias is quantitatively similar. The estimated Frisch elasticity using our preferred
interaction-term approach is much closer to the true value, see column (2).
9For simplicity, we directly specify a household target function (instead of individual preferences) as we
have already discussed that a unitary model is sufficient for our purposes. Accordingly, the household directly
maximizes V = v + β · EV ′ in this model version.
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wage growth (0.02) (0.10)
expected wage growth -0.26
× earnings contribution (%) (0.14)
observations 15,000 15,000
NOTE.–Results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1
of individual i in household j in period t+1. Constant included but not
shown. Usual earnings contribution is the average percentage contribu-
tion of individual i to labor earnings of household j in the simulation.
Average estimates from 10,000 Monte-Carlo draws, average standard er-
rors in parentheses.
A.6.2 Model version with private consumption
For the case where consumption is a private good within the household, the household budget
constraint (2) is replaced by c1 + c2 +
a′
1+r ≤ w1n1 + w2n2 + a, where c1 and c2 denote
consumption of both spouses and are choice variables. Further, instead of the first-order




∂a = λ and
∂v
∂c2
= (1−µ) · c−σ2 =
∂V (a,ω)
∂a = λ.
For the calibration, we use the same targets as in the baseline model. The true Frisch
elasticity of men in this model version is also 0.65. Table 11 shows that we obtain very
similar estimation results as in our baseline model with private consumption.
A.6.3 Model version with progressive taxation
In this appendix, we augment our baseline model by progressive taxation. We apply the para-
metric tax function used by Blundell et al. (2016) and Heathcote et al. (2017). Specifically,
the average tax rate is
1− (1− ξ) · (w1n1 + w2n2)−τ , (53)
such that the household budget constraint is c+ a
′
1+r ≤ (1− ξ) ·(w1n1 + w2n2)
1−τ +a, instead
of (2). Guner et al. (2014) have estimated this tax function and we use their estimates for the
”all married couples” sample to quantify the parameters in (53), ξ = 0.1260 and τ = 0.060.10
For the calibration, we use the same targets as in our baseline model. The true Frisch
10In Guner et al. (2014), the counterpart to ξ is 0.087 · yτ , where 0.087 is an estimate and y is mean
household income. In our model, this gives ξ = 0.1260. Guner et al. (2014) use actual taxes paid (data from
the Internal Revenue Service) rather than statutory tax rates and find that effective tax rates are substantially
less progressive than statutory ones.
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wage growth (0.01) (0.10)
expected wage growth -0.34
× earnings contribution (%) (0.14)
observations 15,000 15,000
NOTE.–Results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1
of individual i in household j in period t+1. Constant included but not
shown. Usual earnings contribution is the average percentage contribu-
tion of individual i to labor earnings of household j in the simulation.
Average estimates from 10,000 Monte-Carlo draws, average standard er-
rors in parentheses.
elasticity of men in this model version is 0.70.
Table 12 shows the results of labor-supply regressions for the model with progressive
income taxation. As the estimation ignores taxes (the right-hand side variable is, as before,
expected growth in gross wages), the results are informative about the additional biases
stemming from progressive taxation. The estimation bias in an Altonji (1986) regression, see
column (1), is somewhat stronger but overall similar to the baseline model. Put differently,
the additional bias due to progressive taxation is small compared to the bias stemming from
borrowing constraints. Most importantly, our proposed interaction-term approach delivers a
good estimate of the Frisch elasticity also in this model version, see column (2) of Table 12.
A.6.4 Model version with preference shocks
With preferences given by (22), the first-order condition for labor supply of the wife is
(nf + h)
1/η = λ · wf ,
from which we can derive the Frisch elasticity as a function of h. Taking logs and the












Hence, a large realization of h increases the Frisch elasticity conditional on hours worked. By
contrast, for h = 0, the Frisch elasticity is η as before.
Next to raising the Frisch elasticity, large values of h also increase the marginal disutility
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wage growth (0.02) (0.10)
expected wage growth -0.36
× earnings contribution (%) (0.15)
observations 15,000 15,000
NOTE.–Results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1
of individual i in household j in period t+1. Constant included but not
shown. Usual earnings contribution is the average percentage contribu-
tion of individual i to labor earnings of household j in the simulation.
Average estimates from 10,000 Monte-Carlo draws, average standard er-
rors in parentheses.
of labor supply inducing women to work fewer hours.11 Hence, for a given realization of
the wife’s wage rate, a large realization of h leads to low but elastic labor supply. As a
consequence, one observes women with low contributions to household earnings (due to low
labor supply) to have a strong connection between hours growth and expected wage growth.
We rely on Guner et al. (2011) and Bick (2016) to calibrate the new parameters in this
model extension. We have to quantify (i) how many households are in the hhigh state in the
long-run distribution, (ii) for how long households stay in this state, and (iii) the numbers
for hhigh and hlow. For the first statistic, we refer to Bick (2016) who reports that about 90%
of parents have grandparents living within one driving hour. Considering grandparents as an
available form of informal child care, we target the population share with h = hhigh in the
ergodic distribution, κ1/ (κ1 + κ2), to be 10%. We set the expected duration of h = hhigh to
ten years (to mimic the time from child birth to start of middle school or junior high school).
Hence, we set the transition probability κ2 to 0.1. We set hlow to zero as Guner et al. (2011)
do for women without (young) children, which implies that there is a large fraction of the
population with a Frisch elasticity given by η as in our baseline model, and hhigh to 0.1,
which corresponds to a third of average male working time as in Guner et al. (2011).12
We calibrate the remaining parameters to match the same targets as in the baseline model.
The decisive parameter is of course the curvature parameter in female labor disutility, ηf .
11In this model version, also non-participation of the wife is possible when h > 0. As in the empirical
analysis, we drop households where one spouse does not work from the sample and consider only double-
earner households in the estimations.
12While Guner et al. (2011) assign this value to all mothers but only while children are young (ages 0-4),
we consider the case that a small fraction of household does not have access to child care at later ages of the
children and, accordingly, has to bear these time costs for longer.
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Table 13: Estimation results for women, from synthetic household panel data, extended
model version with preference shocks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expected 0.78 0.97 0.91 0.87
wage growth (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
expected wage growth -0.51 -0.35
× earnings contribution (%) (0.09) (0.09)
expected wage growth -0.26
× predicted contribution (0.24)
sample all all sij ≥ 0.3 all
observations 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000
NOTE.–Results for women. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in
household j in period t + 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribution
sij is the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household j in
a seven-period window around the observation. Average estimates from 10,000 Monte-Carlo
draws, average standard errors in parentheses.
We calibrate ηf = 0.84 which directly translates into the true Frisch elasticity of the 90% of
women with h = 0. From the remaining 10% of the female population with h > 0, about
9% supply zero hours and are hence excluded from the sample. The 9.2% of women in the
remaining sample who have h > 0 supply 0.18 hours on average and hence have an average
Frisch elasticity of about 1.3. Accordingly, the average Frisch elasticity in the total population
of working women is about 0.88.
As in the baseline model, we use simulated data of double-earner households for labor-
supply regressions. Table 13 shows the results for women while results for men are similar
to those of the baseline model and are hence not shown. Column (1) shows that we have
calibrated also the extended model to yield a coefficient on expected wage growth of 0.78 in a
standard Altonji (1986) regression. Column (2) shows the results for our baseline interaction-
term specification that we used for men in the main text. Here, it is important that we
calculate the average earnings contribution of wives over a seven-year span mimicking the
average length of observing a given household in our PSID sample. We find that, first, the
coefficient on the interaction term is negative reflecting that individuals with low contributions
to household earnings have a more elastic labor supply. Second, the coefficient on non-
interacted expected wage growth (0.97) exceeds the true average Frisch elasticity (0.88). This
shows that our baseline interaction-term approach puts relatively much weight on the small
share of women with high Frisch elasticities.
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Columns (3)-(4) address this point and provide guidance how to obtain a more repre-
sentative estimate of the Frisch elasticity for the majority of the population. Instead of
conditioning directly on h, which is difficult in empirical data, we consider approaches that
can more easily be implemented in empirical applications. First, in column (3), we eliminate
women with contributions to household earnings below 30%. In this sample, our baseline
interaction-term approach yields an average Frisch elasticity of 0.91 which is closer to the
economy-wide true female Frisch elasticity of 0.88 than the estimate from the full sample.
While the sample restriction yields an improved estimate and is easy to implement empiri-
cally, one can improve further by taking out the idiosyncratic choices of hours worked when
determining the earnings contribution. Specifically, in column (4), we consider an approach
where we use predicted earnings contributions instead of the actually observed ones but es-
timate from the total sample of double-earner households. In the Monte Carlo experiment,
we use the prediction from a regression of earnings contributions on household-type dummies
which capture the only source of deterministic heterogeneity in our model.13 We obtain an
estimated Frisch elasticity of 0.87 which is close to the true value of 0.88. Thus, both of our
modified approaches are robust in the presence of taste shocks and in particular our approach
using predicted earnings contributions delivers almost unbiased estimates of the Frisch elas-
ticity. Table 4 in the main text shows the results of both specifications estimated from PSID
data.
13In an empirical application, this can be captured by characteristics such as education and age.
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A.7 Additional regression results from PSID data
A.7.1 Alternative definitions of primary and secondary earners
In this appendix, we consider alternative definitions of primary and secondary earners to
corroborate that standard Altonji (1986) regressions assign smaller estimates of the Frisch
elasticity to primary earners than to secondary earners. To make sure that our results are not
driven by gender differences together with the fact that most secondary earners are women,
we rely on a within-gender perspective and report results for samples of men.
Column (1) of Table 14 replicates the results for men using our baseline definition where
we defined primary earners as having the higher average wage rate over the observation period
compared to the spouse (see Table 2). Column (2) of Table 14 refers to a specification where
we compare average earnings rather than average wage rates, i.e., a husband is identified as
primary earner if his average earnings exceed those of his wife. Compared to our baseline
definition, this criterion has little within-gender variation as 90% of men in our sample have
higher average earnings than their wives while only 81% have higher average wage rates.14
Nevertheless, we obtain similar results as for our baseline definition.
In column (3) of Table 14, we define the earner status using a comparison of contempora-
neous wage rates instead of average wage rates, i.e., the primary-earner dummy djt equals one
if the husband’s average wage rate in years t and t+ 1 exceeds the wife’s average wage rate
in these two years (also in this estimation, we consider a sample of males only). Compared
to the baseline definition, this definition has the advantage that it does not include past or
future earnings potentials. However, the disadvantage is that it is heavily affected by con-
temporaneous wage-rate shocks while our theoretical results relate to the usual contribution
to household earnings. Again, we obtain similar results as for our baseline definition.
A.7.2 Altonji (1986) estimates in different ranges of the contribution to
household earnings
In this appendix, we corroborate the negative relation between the relative contribution to
household earnings and the estimated Frisch elasticity in standard Altonji (1986) regressions.
Specifically, we run regressions where we compare several groups of workers defined through
ranges of their percentage contribution to household earnings rather than using a binary
distinction between primary and secondary earners. We include interaction terms between
expected wage growth and three dummy variables that indicate whether the individual’s
average earnings contribution exceeds thresholds of one third, one half, and 90%, respectively.
14Note that, in our preferred interaction-term approach, the usual contribution to household earnings is a
continuous variable and displays substantial within-gender variation.
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wage rates earnings wage rates
expected 0.52 0.59 0.57
wage growth (0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
expected wage growth -0.15 -0.21 -0.25
× primary earner (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)
time effects yes yes yes
observations 14,340 14,340 14,340
NOTE.–Results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individ-
ual i in household j in period t + 1. Constant included but not shown. Individuals
identified as primary earners if the mean realized wage rate in the sample wij exceeds
the mean realized wage rate of the spouse w−ij (column 1), the mean realized earn-
ings in the sample yi exceed the mean realized earnings of the spouse y−i (column 2),
and the mean realized wage rate in years t and t+ 1, (wijt + wijt+1)/2, exceeds the
mean realized wage rate of the spouse, (w−ijt +w−ijt+1)/2 (column 3), respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The implied estimated elasticities for the different groups of individuals can be obtained
by summing up the coefficients appropriately. Our model predicts all coefficients on these
interaction terms to be negative as implied estimated elasticities should be smaller for groups
who contribute larger shares to household earnings. Table 15 shows that this is confirmed in
the PSID data. The group of husbands contributing more than 90% to household earnings is
particularly interesting as these men are almost single earners in their respective households.
In line with our model, we find that a standard Altonji (1986) regression yields a particularly
small point estimate (0.13) for this group.
A.7.3 Conditioning on asset holdings in the Domeij and Flodén (2006)
sample
In this appendix, we investigate the implication of our model that differences in estimated
Frisch elasticities should become smaller when the samples are less affected by borrowing con-
straints. For this, we repeat the estimations including an interaction term with the primary-
earner dummy but only consider households with liquid wealth above a certain threshold
which we increase step by step. While information on wealth components is not available in
most waves of the PSID, we can use the subsample constructed by Domeij and Floden (2006)
for this purpose. Domeij and Floden (2006) pool three subsamples of the PSID around the
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Table 15: Empirical labor-supply regressions for men, PSID data, distinction by ranges
of the percentage contribution to household earnings.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expected wage growth 0.70 0.59 0.41 0.69
(0.41) (0.14) (0.10) (0.41)
expected wage growth -0.30 -0.12
× I(s > 1/3) (0.41) (0.42)
expected wage growth -0.21 -0.20
× I(s > 0.5) (0.12) (0.12)
expected wage growth -0.27 -0.25
× I(s > 0.9) (0.23) (0.23)
NOTE.–Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in household j in period
t+ 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribution is the average percentage
contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household j in the sample. I is the indicator
function. Standard errors in parentheses.
years where data on household wealth is available: 1983-1985, 1988-1990, and 1993-1995.
Liquid assets are measured as the sum of checking and savings account balances, bonds,
and stocks minus other debts, such as credit card debt, medical or legal bills, or loans from
relatives. This subsample is substantially smaller than our baseline sample and, accordingly,
estimates turn out to be imprecise. Nevertheless, we use the subsample to test the hypothesis
whether the coefficient on the interaction with the primary-earner dummy decreases with an
increasing wealth cut-off.
From Table 16, one can see that this pattern is confirmed in the PSID data. As expected,
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term, measuring the difference between estimated
elasticities between primary and secondary earners, is the smaller (in absolute terms), the
wealthier is the considered group of households. Borrowing constraints are less relevant in
wealthier households such that the implied biases shrink and estimated labor-supply elastic-
ities for primary earners rise relative to those of secondary earners, in line with our model.
A.7.4 Labor-supply elasticities of individuals with high and low earnings
Some individuals move up and down the income distribution and hence switch back and
forth between the two earnings groups considered in Section 6.3. These individuals do not
necessarily change their own true Frisch elasticity but still may change the average true Frisch
elasticity in the groups. In order to limit the influence of individuals who move up and down
the earnings distribution, we consider a specification where we exclude these individuals.
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Table 16: Empirical labor-supply regressions for men, PSID data, distinction by earner status and
household liquid wealth.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all men assets > 0
assets assets
> 0.5 · ym > ym
expected 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.52
wage growth (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
expected wage growth -0.35 -0.31 -0.25 -0.19
× primary earner (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
time effects yes yes yes yes
observations 9,780 6,886 6,023 5,511
NOTE.–Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i in household j in period
t+ 1. Constant included but not shown. Individuals identified as primary earners if the mean
realized wage rate in the sample wij exceeds the mean realized wage rate of the spouse w−ij .
ym is an average full-time male monthly income, ym = $2014 (1983 dollars). Assets: sum of
checking and savings account balances, bonds, and stocks minus other debts, such as credit
card debt, medical or legal bills, or loans from relatives. Standard errors in parentheses.
While this reduces the sample size by more than 20%, we find that the results remain very
similar.
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Table 17: Empirical labor-supply regressions for men, PSID data, by earnings group, excluding
individuals moving up and down the earnings distribution.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
top 25% earnings bottom 75% earnings
expected 0.17 0.60 0.54 0.87
wage growth (0.19) (0.47) (0.14) (0.27)
expected wage growth -0.63 -0.55
× earnings contribution (%) (0.64) (0.39)
time effects yes yes yes yes
observations 2,514 2,514 8,784 8,784
NOTE.–Estimation results for men. Dependent variable is hours growth ∆ lnnijt+1 of individual i
in household j in period t + 1. Constant included but not shown. Usual earnings contribution is
the average percentage contribution of individual i to labor earnings of household j in the sample.
Earnings groups defined using the position of current labor earnings in the distribution of individual
labor earnings in the year of observation. Here, we exclude individuals who change between earnings










A large literature quantifies insurance possibilities of individuals under market imperfections
(see for example Blundell et al. 2008, Kaplan and Violante 2010, and Heathcote et al. 2014).
An important channel of insurance against idiosyncratic income risk is intra-household risk
sharing, i.e., to pool income risk with other members of the family (see Ortigueira and
Siassi 2013, Blundell et al. 2016, and Blundell et al. 2018). For example, in the model
of Ortigueira and Siassi (2013), family insurance can cushion an individual’s consumption
drop upon unemployment by up to 75%. The existing literature typically uses models of the
family that assume full commitment between family members. Full commitment means that,
at the time of household formation, spouses choose a contingency plan for their future lives
and can make binding promises to stick to this plan. By contrast, in the family-economics
literature a number of recent papers have taken a new direction in modeling decision-making
by considering limited commitment in household decision making, i.e., that individuals are
free to leave the household whenever this is preferable to them independent of promises made
in the past. Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017) provide a first survey of the limited-commitment
literature focusing on the general theoretical modeling strategy and applications.
Limited commitment between household members reduces the possibility to share risk
within the family. This point has been discussed by Voena (2015) and Ábrahám and Laczó
(2018). In general, risk-averse spouses would like to share their income risk and smooth
consumption as much as possible. When spouses are able to commit to plans, they can
achieve perfect intra-household risk sharing. A negative shock to one spouse’s income is
then equally shared by both spouses, i.e., consumption drops for both spouses similarly. In
turn, after a positive shock to one spouse’s income, this spouse has to share the additional
income with the other spouse. While it is initially rational for either spouse to promise to
share positive income shocks with the partner in return for the promise of insurance against
negative shocks, incentives to keep the promises are reduced once shocks have materialized.
For example, after being promoted, an individual may not be willing to share the increased
salary with the partner because the partner’s promise of support in case the promotion
had not taken place is now essentially worthless. Hence, risk sharing is incomplete when
commitment is limited which increases the volatility of consumption for individuals and
induces a welfare loss.
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In this paper, we quantify the impact of limited commitment in household decision mak-
ing on the degree of intra-household risk sharing. We develop a quantitative incomplete-
markets model with dual-earner households whose individual members cannot fully commit
to promises made to each other. A particular contribution of this chapter is that we calibrate
the model to obtain a realistic degree of limited commitment. This is important as our aim
is to make quantitative predictions about the risk-sharing implications of limited commit-
ment. Specifically, we use the evidence provided recently by Lise and Yamada (2019) who
use Japanese data on individual consumption shares in a household and document that a
fifth of the variance of these consumption shares occurs within households over time. This
observation is informative about the degree of limited commitment within households as per-
fect risk sharing under full commitment would imply this within-household variance to be
zero. Matching this target, our model implies that limited commitment increases individual
consumption variances on average by about 25% compared to a reference model with full
commitment. The aggregate Kaplan and Violante (2010) risk-sharing coefficient is reduced
by about one third through spouses’ inability to fully commit.
We use our model to assess the welfare consequences of foregone intra-household insur-
ance. The aggregate welfare loss from incomplete intra-household risk sharing due to limited
commitment amounts to an equivalent of 0.6% of life-time consumption. This number can
be compared to the estimated welfare costs of other frictions or the costs of business cycles.
Guner et al. (2011) estimate a consumption equivalent of 0.2% for the welfare effect of joint
taxation of married couples. In their incomplete-markets set-ups, Krebs (2007) estimates
welfare costs of business cycles of about 0.5% and the number reported by Krusell et al.
(2009) is about 1%.
We also use our model to assess which parts of the population are particularly subject to
incomplete intra-household risk sharing due to limited commitment. To do so, we incorporate
further exogenous heterogeneity into the model. In particular, we consider differences in time
preferences, risk aversion, direct utility gains from marriage, altruism for the partner, as well
as in the variance and intra-household correlation of income shocks. We find that the effect of
limited commitment on the degree of intra-household risk sharing varies substantially across
the population. It is particularly strong for impatient and rather risk-tolerant individuals. By
contrast, individuals with high direct utility gains from marriage and those who care strongly
about their partners’ well-being can achieve high degrees of intra-household risk sharing even
in presence of limited commitment. Further, when the correlation in spouses’ incomes is low
or when couples face little income risk, individuals are affected rather strongly by limited
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commitment. Quantitatively, small differences in terms of direct utility gains from marriage
and the degree of altruism around their respective mean values are predicted to lead to rather
large differences in the extent to which intra-household risk sharing is worsened by limited
commitment between spouses.
Our results have important policy implications. Given that imperfections in intra-household
risk sharing due to limited commitment are substantial, policy makers should take them into
account when designing policies to protect people against income risk. First, our results
show that individuals face substantially higher consumption risk than is suggested by a pure
household perspective that implicitly assumes full commitment. This raises demand for other
forms of insurance, including insurance through public programs such as unemployment in-
surance or progressive taxation. Second, our results also have implications for the design
of such programs. Limited commitment in the household implies that it should be the in-
dividual suffering from a negative income shock who is entitled to a compensation transfer
payment, and not the household in which the individual lives. This ensures that the bulk
of the transfer payment actually reaches the targeted individual and is not consumed by
the household member with the largest bargaining power, i.e., in such situations most often
the other spouse. Our results further show that there can be individuals suffering from low
consumption even in households that in principle have sufficient means. Accordingly, our
analysis suggest that means testing of transfer programs should at least in part be performed
at the individual level and not at the household level.
Our cross-sectional results show that households most likely to become reliant on social
transfer programs are particularly affected by risk-sharing inefficiencies due to limited com-
mitment. It is well documented that the risk of poverty is higher for the impatient (e.g.,
Lawrance 1991) and for those more prone to divorce (e.g., McManus and DiPrete 2001, Pe-
terson 1996, Holden and Smock 1991). Our results show that these characteristics are also
associated with higher risk-sharing inefficiencies due to limited commitment.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
limited commitment in the household. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 describes the
numerical solution technique. Section 5 provides results regarding the aggregate risk-sharing




The majority of empirical studies on household decisions have considered collective models
under full commitment, see Browning et al. (2014) and Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017)
for surveys of the empirical literature. In this section, we survey the literature on limited
commitment. The theoretical basis of limited-commitment models was established in the
field of development economics, see Ligon et al. (2002). We give an overview of these studies
in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we review studies that have provided empirical evidence for
commitment problems between spouses. In Section 2.3, we give an overview of applications
of limited-commitment models in family economics.
While we focus on tests and applications of limited commitment in family economics, the
theoretical basis of limited commitment has proven useful in other fields of research. For
instance, similar theoretical frameworks have been used in the context of labor contracts, see
Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Oikonomou (2018); for the analysis of informal insurance
in village economies, see Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996),
Ligon et al. (2000,2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Dubois et al. (2008), Laczó (2014,
2015), and Morten (2019); for analyzing risk-sharing agreements between rather than within
households, see Attanasio and Rıos-Rull (2000) and Krueger and Perri (2006); in international
economics, see Kehoe and Perri (2002); in political economy, see Dixit et al. (2000), Aguiar
and Amador (2011), and Acemoglu et al. (2011); and for optimal taxation, see Park (2014).
2.1 Theoretical basis of limited commitment models
The theoretical basis of limited-commitment models stems from the field of development
economics, in particular, Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996)
and Ligon et al. (2002).1 These early limited-commitment models consider risk sharing
between inhabitants of village economies.
Kocherlakota (1996) provides first theoretical implications of limited commitment, e.g.,
1Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) were the first to consider commitment issues between
households in village economies. These early studies analyze the self-enforcing of insurance agreements where
households transfer resources to other households such that marginal utilities of consumption are equalized
across households. When this allocation rule of resources violates at least one participation constraint, the
transfers are adjusted such that all participation constraints are fulfilled. However, in contrast to subsequent
studies, transfers in the current period do not depend on previous period transfers. Thus, whenever possible,
marginal utilities of consumption of households are equal independent of previously made transfers.
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that commitment problems tend to decrease with the patience of agents.2 He also connects
limited-commitment models to non-cooperative dynamic games by showing that the prevalent
solutions of limited-commitment models are subgame-perfect.
A full characterization of the limited-commitment solution was provided by Ligon et al.
(2002). This paper has become the theoretical basis for almost all applications employing
models of limited commitment and in Sections 3 and 4, we will provide a more detailed discus-
sion how their results can be used to solve quantitative limited-commitment models. Ligon
et al. (2002) analyze risk-sharing in a limited-commitment environment where agents have
the opportunity to self-insure through private savings. They highlight that the opportunity
to save can increase or decrease welfare depending on the particular savings technology. Ad-
ditionally, they provide a first discussion about a numerical analysis of a limited-commitment
model. Ligon et al. (2002) test implications of their model by investigating risk-sharing
behavior in three Indian villages. While their model can explain the reaction of individual
consumption to individual income, it cannot explain the consumption distribution within the
villages.
In a different paper, Ligon (2002) connects the limited-commitment model of Ligon et al.
(2002) to more traditional bargaining procedures like the Nash solution. He shows that
the limited-commitment model fulfills two classical axioms of the Nash (1950) bargaining
solution: invariance (INV) and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). However, as
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the resulting allocation in a limited-commitment
model is ex-ante inefficient. Thus, the Pareto efficiency axiom of Nash is not fulfilled. Ligon
(2002) introduces two additional axioms: individual rationality (IR) and constrained Pareto
optimality (CPO). The latter axiom states that an allocation must be ex-post efficient. Ligon
(2002) shows that the limited-commitment model fulfills the four axioms, INV, IIA, IR, and
CPO. Thus, the solution to the limited-commitment model can be interpreted as the solution
to a dynamic bargaining problem. This result establishes the interpretation of re-bargaining
between spouses when the Pareto weight changes, see Mazzocco (2007). Furthermore, Ligon
(2002) shows that the solution of a limited-commitment model is Pareto superior to a sequence
of static Nash bargaining solutions.
Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) use a limited-commitment model to analyze the incentives of
spouses to save hiddenly.3 In the model, agents face perfectly negatively correlated income
shocks, aggregate household income is fixed, and all joint asset holdings are lost upon divorce.
2We replicate this result in the analysis in Section 6.1.
3They analyze a general model with two agents who share idiosyncratic risks so that their results can be
applied to the case of couple households.
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Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) show that agents have an incentive to save more under limited
commitment than under full commitment which is caused by the assumption that all joint
assets are lost upon divorce. Thus, welfare losses from divorce increase in asset holdings and
outside options become ceteris paribus less attractive the higher are joint asset holdings. In
the second part of their paper, Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) analyze a model where spouses can
additionally save in hidden private asset holdings. While the household-public asset holdings
get lost upon divorce, hidden private savings remain even upon divorce. Ábrahám and Laczó
(2018) show that hidden private savings do not occur in equilibrium. The reason is that the
household planner internalizes the incentives to save hiddenly. Thus, by saving in joint asset
holdings, any incentives to save in hidden private asset holdings are eliminated. However, due
to the opportunity to save in private asset holdings also in autarky, consumption is ceteris
paribus more dispersed since commitment issues increase due to ceteris paribus improved
outside options. Whether the opportunity to save is welfare increasing or not depends on the
return on savings. If the interest rate is sufficiently high, welfare is higher than in a model
version without any saving opportunities.
2.2 Empirical evidence on commitment problems
Browning et al. (2014) provide a detailed discussion of issues in empirical analyses of collective
household models. In general, the empirical analysis of commitment issues requires panel data
on individual income and, ideally, consumption of spouses in a household. With such data, one
can test whether intra-household risk sharing is perfect as predicted by the full commitment
model. Perfect intra-household risk sharing implies that the origin of a stochastic income
shock does not matter for the intra-household allocation of consumption. In a world of
full commitment, perfect intra-household risk sharing must hold due to the once and for all
decision on a particular intra-household allocation rule. By contrast, intra-household risk
sharing is imperfect in a world of limited commitment. Empirical studies use expenditures
on different consumption goods to test whether the use of household income depends on
individual income shocks of the spouses. However, most datasets that provide consumption
data at all only report consumption at the household level and not at the individual level. To
handle these data issues, econometricians frequently use a priori assumptions which goods
are consumed relatively more by men and women, respectively. To test for imperfect risk
sharing, one then tests hypotheses such as, for example, an increase of the income of the male
may increase expenditures on football tickets while an increase of the income of the female
may increase expenditures on theater tickets. If this is the case, one concludes that spouses
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cannot fully commit to a particular allocation rule.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) investigate risk-sharing behavior across and within house-
holds in villages in Ethiopia with respect to health risk. It is assumed that households share
risk to smooth the nutritional status across and within households over time and state of
natures of the world. They use data on food and nutrients consumption to proxy for the nu-
tritional status and find that risk sharing is rejected for poor households within the villages.
Furthermore, their empirical analysis shows that idiosyncratic health shocks are not shared
perfectly within households in some regions of Ethiopia. Especially health shocks of women
are less perfectly shared in couple households than mens’ ones.
Duflo and Udry (2004) use panel data from Côte d’Ivoire to test the perfect risk-sharing
prediction of the full commitment model. They reject perfect intra-household risk sharing
by showing that expenditures for different consumption goods depend on individual income
shocks.
Mazzocco (2007) uses U.S. data to estimate Euler equations of couple households, one for
goods that can be considered private consumption of the individual spouses such as food or
clothes and one for consumption of household-public goods such as housing or housekeeping
services. To identify commitment issues, spouses’ incomes are included in the Euler equation
as distribution factors. In both model types, full and limited commitment, incomes should
enter the Euler equations as a proxy for the probability distribution of incomes at marriage
formation. In the limited-commitment model, incomes should enter the Euler equation addi-
tionally as a proxy for a change in the Pareto weights, which captures time-variation in relative
intra-household decision power. Mazzocco (2007) develops a test of commitment by using
that, if spouses can fully commit, the distribution factors (the incomes of spouses) should
enter the Euler equation only as interaction terms with consumption. In contrast, if spouses
cannot commit, the distribution factors should additionally enter the Euler equation directly.
Mazzocco (2007) strongly rejects the full commitment model while the no-commitment model
cannot be rejected.
In an experimental study using data from Kenya, Robinson (2012) shows that an indi-
vidual spouse increases her consumption by more if she is hit by a positive shock to her
own income in comparison to a situation where the other spouse receives the positive income
shock. Thus, perfect intra-household risk sharing is rejected, which Robinson (2012) also
confirms using non-experimental data.
Blau and Goodstein (2016) investigate potential commitment issues of older couples using
U.S. data on individual inheritances. If spouses can fully commit, the labor supply of a
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particular spouse should not depend on the distribution of inheritances, i.e., on who obtains
an inheritance. The empirical analysis of Blau and Goodstein (2016) rejects perfect intra-
household risk sharing and thereby the ability of spouses to fully commit to a particular
allocation.
Cesarini et al. (2017) use panel data from Sweden to analyze the impact of lottery wins
on labor supply, both in single and couple households. They show that, in couple households,
the labor supply of the person who wins the lottery is reduced more strongly than the labor
supply of the spouse which contradicts full commitment. Cesarini et al. (2017) suggest
possible explanations for their result. For example, spouses may decide cooperatively but
cannot commit to an allocation rule once and for all. A second possible explanation is that
the behavior of couples can be characterized by the ”separate spheres” model of Lundberg
and Pollak (1993) where the outside option of the bargaining process is non-cooperative
behavior within the couple. Cesarini et al. (2017) favor this ”separate spheres” approach.
However, even if the bargaining procedure was of this type, the resulting allocation would be
determined once and for all at the household formation step if spouses can fully commit. Thus,
a separate spheres” model could only explain the empirical results of Cesarini et al. (2017)
if bargaining is repeated in every period, and, repeated bargaining effectively corresponds to
an (alternative) limited-commitment model.
Lise and Yamada (2019) estimate a full household-decision model allowing for potential
time-variation in the bargaining weights of spouses. They use a panel data set for Japan which
includes individual consumption data as well as individual data on time spent on leisure, hours
worked, and homework. In contrast to the majority of limited-commitment models, which
solve for the endogenous evolution of the Pareto weights, Lise and Yamada (2019) assume a
particular functional form for the Pareto weight, where full commitment is a nested case.4
The parameters of this functional form are estimated among other parameters. The results
show that the reactions of hours and consumption are not in line with a full commitment
model. In particular, the reaction of hours to unpredictable changes in the relative wage rate
is too small, while the reaction of consumption is too strong for a full-commitment model to
rationalize them. By contrast, these results are well in line with a limited-commitment model
since an unpredictable change in the relative wage rate may increase the Pareto weight of
this spouse. In consequence, this spouse consumes relatively more market goods and leisure
time. Importantly, the results of Lise and Yamada (2019) can help calibrating a limited-
commitment model with respect to a target value for the severity of commitment problems
4Strictly speaking, Lise and Yamada (2019) consider a no-commitment model where the Pareto weight
changes whenever the state of nature of the world changes.
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between spouses. Lise and Yamada (2019) show that initial differences in Pareto weights
account for roughly 80% of the total variance of Pareto weights. The remaining 20% are
due to changes in the Pareto weight over time. In a full-commitment model, these latter
changes do not occur and can hence be seen as a measure for the strength of problems due
to limited commitment. In our quantitative model evaluations in Section 5 and Section 6, we
will compare this statistic to the Lise and Yamada (2019) evidence.
While the studies discussed so far test for perfect intra-household risk sharing, Chiappori
et al. (2019) use the labor-supply behavior of couples to test whether couples can fully commit
or not. This study is among the first to test all three collective models, full commitment,
no-commitment, and limited commitment, against each other. In a full commitment model,
the Pareto weights do not depend on current or past wage shocks of the spouses. The
Pareto weights are fixed once and for all implying that the allocation rule is fixed once and
for all. In contrast, under limited commitment, Pareto weights do depend on both current
and past wage rate shocks of the spouses, reflecting the Markovian structure of a limited-
commitment model. Pareto weights change only when a spouse faces a binding participation
constraint, i.e., has an incentive to leave the couple given a particular allocation rule. Thus,
the allocation rule may change depending on previous and current wage shocks. In the no-
commitment model, spouses re-bargain in every period. In consequence, only current period
wage shocks matter since past wage shocks have no impact on the current bargaining. Using
the panel structure of the PSID, Chiappori et al. (2019) find that current period labor-supply
behavior of couples strongly depends on current and past wage shocks. Thus, their estimates
reject both, the full commitment and the no-commitment model, and provide support for the
limited-commitment model.
2.3 Applications of limited-commitment models in family economics
In general, there are two theoretical approaches which can explain the empirical evidence dis-
cussed in the last section, a collective model with limited commitment or a non-cooperative
couple model. Most papers on non-cooperative household models use deterministic frame-
works, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1994), Konrad and Lommerud (1995), and Doepke and
Tertilt (2019) among others. The incomplete markets framework considered in this chapter is
a dynamic stochastic framework though. There is only a small literature on non-cooperative
couple models in the context of dynamic stochastic models, see Hertzberg (2019) for an
example. Del Boca and Flinn (2012) test different models of couple behavior, such as effi-
cient cooperative behavior, constrained-efficient cooperative behavior, and non-cooperative
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behavior against each other, using the different implications of these behaviors derived from
theoretical models. Constrained-efficient cooperative behavior captures that none of the
spouses should have lower well-being with cooperative behavior than with non-cooperative
behavior. This situation is not ruled out in their efficient cooperative behavior model. Using
PSID data, Del Boca and Flinn (2012) find that three-fourth of all couple households behave
cooperatively. Furthermore, they find that ex-ante heterogeneity in Pareto weights is impor-
tant for a substantial part of couples in the data in line with limited-commitment models
of intra-household decision-making. Given the incomplete-markets framework of this chap-
ter and the results of Del Boca and Flinn (2012), our literature survey focuses on collective
household models with limited commitment.5
In the literature, there are both positive and normative papers taking into account lim-
ited commitment. Some papers study specific policy reforms while other papers study the
consequence of limited commitment for the behavior of spouses without referring to a specific
policy.
Divorce laws. Voena (2015), Bayot and Voena (2015), Ábrahám and Laczó (2016), and
Reynoso (2019) consider divorce laws. Voena (2015) analyzes the impact of divorce laws on
intra-household decision-making and the resulting allocations, including spousal welfare. She
analyzes a transition from a mutual consent divorce regime to an unilateral divorce regime.
A direct implication of the introduction of unilateral divorce is that it makes commitment
more difficult since both spouses can file for divorce if their outside option is more attractive
than their inside option. In contrast, in a regime of mutual consent, spouses can only file
for divorce if both spouses agree, so that the marriage continues as long as one spouse has
an incentive to maintain the marriage which makes commitment easier. Using an estimated
version of her model, Voena (2015) shows that the introduction of unilateral divorce increases
female decision power within the household. As a consequence, the female participation rate
decreases.6 After the introduction of unilateral divorce, couples save more on average. The
estimated model implies that risk sharing, or equivalently consumption insurance, is better
under a mutual consent regime than under an unilateral divorce regime. Additionally, Voena
(2015) analyzes different rules of property division upon divorce: A title-based regime, a
community property regime, and an equitable distribution regime. In a title-based regime,
5Up to our knowledge, there is only one paper in the context of family economics which uses a limited
commitment approach without considering couples. Mommaerts (2016) uses a limited-commitment model
to analyze intergenerational imperfect risk sharing where commitment between parents and their children is
limited.
6Voena (2015) only considers the extensive margin of labor supply and further assumes that men always
work so that a change in the divorce regime has no impact on the labor supply of men.
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both spouses receive their individual asset holdings upon divorce. This requires that all
assets are assigned individually to one of the spouses. In the community property regime, all
assets are divided equally upon divorce. In the equitable distribution regime, courts decide
over the distribution upon divorce to achieve equality in after-divorce environments. Voena
(2015) obtains similar results for the different rules of property division upon divorce. In
a mutual consent divorce regime, risk sharing is not affected by different property division
rules. However, consumption of spouses upon divorce depends strongly on the particular rule
of property division. For example, upon divorce, consumption of women decreases less in a
regime of community property division.
Bayot and Voena (2015) in their study for Italy analyze the impact of prenuptial contracts
on the behavior of married couples. Couples can choose between two regimes of property
rights over household resources, either community property, which is the default regime, or
separation of property. While all resources of the couple are joint property in the former
case, all household resources are assigned to one of the spouses in the latter case. This free
choice at the household formation implements a public prenuptial contract at low or no costs,
respectively. Using data from Italy, they show that most couples in Italy choose the separation
of property regime. Additionally, Bayot and Voena (2015) find that the community property
regime is predominantly used by couples with a higher number of children and a wife who
does not participate in the labor market. Using a limited-commitment model similar to
Voena (2015), Bayot and Voena (2015) highlight that this type of model cannot explain the
choice of community property of some couples. They find that the separation of property
regime is the constrained efficient choice under limited commitment. This is caused by the
fact that couples restrict their future choices to allocate assets between spouses in the case of
the community property regime. Bayot and Voena (2015) extend their model by a potential
non-cooperative period before divorce. Since spouses anticipate that they may not cooperate
preceeding divorce, they may have an incentive to restrict asset decisions in this case to
guarantee better consumption smoothing in the case of divorce. Bayot and Voena (2015) find
that the modified model is line with Italian data. Furthermore, they find that a separation
of property regime implies higher female labor-market participation, lower divorce rates, and
higher savings.
Ábrahám and Laczó (2016) consider a limited-commitment model with the opportunity
to divorce. Depending on the realization of a love shock, spouses have an incentive to divorce.
Upon divorce, a constant fraction of joint asset holdings gets lost. In their numerical analysis,
Ábrahám and Laczó (2016) investigate the size of this fraction and the size of the share of
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assets that spouses obtain who file for divorce. They highlight that optimal parameter values
exist where the total loss of assets is between zero and one-hundred percent and where the
asset share of the spouse, who files for divorce, is smaller than fifty percent.
Reynoso (2019) uses a limited-commitment model to analyze the impact of the intro-
duction of unilateral divorce on marriage market outcomes and the corresponding welfare
consequences. She shows that positive assortative mating in education occurs, that human
capital increases on average, that less people marry and that gains from marriage decrease
for most people. Spouses have an incentive to invest more in human capital since it increases
their outside options. This is beneficial for the particular spouse both in the case of divorce
and also within marriage when commitment is limited. However, this higher human capital
stock may be inefficient from an ex-ante perspective. While unilateral divorce is advanta-
geous for people who want to divorce, for example due to bad match quality shocks, it implies
limited commitment between spouses as shown by Voena (2015). Unilateral divorce and with
it limited commitment is disadvantageous for all (potential) couples which do not want to
divorce. Which effect dominates is in general not clear. Reynoso’s (2019) results suggest
that for most people the second effect dominates, resulting in a smaller advantage of being
married and lower marriage rates when there is unilateral divorce.
Family policies. Several papers study the effects of family policies under limited com-
mitment. Bronson (2015) analyzes gender gaps in education, in particular different choices
in college majors and the decision to attend college. Furthermore, she investigates how the
evolution of skill premia impact on commitment issues within households and on the mar-
riage market for potential couples. She then uses the estimated model to study the impact
of several policies such as maternity leave, part-time work, etc. Bronson (2015) finds that
part-time work entitlement policies are most efficient to narrow gender gaps in college majors
since women are encouraged to choose more frequently college majors which typically have
high wage penalties due to part-time work.
Foerster (2019) analyzes changes in existing alimony and child support laws in a limited-
commitment model. He finds that these policies can increase ex-ante household welfare in
the limited-commitment case. Alimonies and child support laws are examples for policies
that have an impact on the outside options of married couples to reduce commitment issues.
Family taxation. Bronson and Mazzocco (2018) consider three tax reforms in an estimated
limited-commitment model. First, a change from a joint to an individual tax basis. Second,
the introduction of a deduction for the secondary earner in a system of joint taxation. Third,
the introduction of child care subsidies in both a joint and an individual tax basis system.
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They find that secondary earners are affected most in all three policy reforms. All three
policies increase incentives for secondary earners to supply more labor. This implies that
secondary earners accumulate more human capital and improve their outside options which
increases their intra-household decision-power and thereby their welfare. However, Bronson
and Mazzocco (2018) do not discuss the consequences for total household welfare.
Oikonomou and Siegel (2015) use a general equilibrium limited-commitment model to
analyze a tax reform where a linear capital income tax is replaced by a linear labor in-
come tax. There are no match quality shocks and hence all commitment issues are driven
by idiosyncratic wage uncertainty. In the Oikonomou and Siegel (2015) framework, wealth
reduces commitment problems because spouses want to avoid loosing their wealth upon di-
vorce.7 Hence, incentivizing households to save can help them commit to more efficient
intra-household allocations and thereby raise welfare. Oikonomou and Siegel (2015) show
in their quantitative analysis that the tax reform replacing capital income taxes by labor
income taxes increases aggregate savings, aggregate hours worked, and aggregate welfare. In
welfare terms, single females profit most from the tax reform while single males even suffer
from the tax reform. Using partial equilibrium analyses, Oikonomou and Siegel (2015) show
that the severity of commitment issues is reduced by the reduction of capital taxes. Higher
labor income taxes strengthen commitment issues since lower household income increases the
incentives to leave the household. However, all of these effects are quantitatively relatively
small.8
Obermeier (2019) investigates the impacts of progressive labor income taxation on the
intra-household allocation and intra-household inequality under limited commitment. He
considers a progressive labor income tax system where spouses are taxed separately. He shows
that intra-household consumption inequality captures about one fourth of total consumption
variance in his calibrated economy. Then, he performs a tax experiment by increasing the
progressivity of the tax system. In line with previous literature, Obermeier (2019) finds that
the increased progressivity decreases the total consumption variance in the economy. He
shows that also intra-household consumption inequality decreases substantially after the tax
reform. A full commitment model could not capture this effect. Furthermore, Obermeier
(2019) shows that changes in marriages and divorces do not have a significant impact on
intra-household inequality.
7In a more general framework, this is a quantitative question, see Section 5.
8Already before the reform, commitment issues are relatively unimportant, with the welfare loss from
limited commitment amounting to only about 0.06% in consumption-equivalence terms.
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Labor supply. Mazzocco et al. (2013, 2014), Low et al. (2018), Theloudis (2018), Potoms
(2019), and Turon (2019) study the impact of limited commitment on (female) labor supply.
Mazzocco et al. (2013) use PSID data to show that couple household behavior such as
labor supply, home production, savings and marital decisions are linked. Their estimated
limited-commitment life-cycle model highlights the importance of a joint consideration when
analyzing policies. They use the estimated model to analyze the impacts of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) and other subsidy programs on household behavior and welfare.
In particular, Mazzocco et al. (2013) show that an elimination of EITC would increase
labor supply of singles, both men and women, while the impact on labor supply of spouses
is negligible. The elimination of EITC would reduce individual welfare. Mazzocco et al.
(2013) consider a replacement of EITC with another subsidy system as a second policy
experiment. The alternative subsidy system is build such that labor-supply disincentives
should be smaller than in the EITC. They find that labor-force participation increases sharply
after the replacement while average hours worked conditional on working decrease. However,
Mazzocco et al. (2013) do not discuss how much of the results of these policy experiments
depend on commitment issues between spouses and through which channels.
Mazzocco et al. (2014) use a limited-commitment model to analyze the labor-supply
behavior of spouses. While many changes in labor supply of married people in recent decades
can be exlained by changes in the intra-household distribution of human capital and the
presence of children, there remains a significant unexplained part. Mazzocco et al. (2014)
show that a limited-commitment model with uncertainty about match quality can explain
parts of this unexplained part of the labor-supply transition.
Low et al. (2018) use their estimated limited-commitment model to analyze the impacts of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
reform on intra-household allocations. PRWORA limits the time for which a person can
receive welfare payments during her lifetime. Thus, the reform of the welfare system increases
the insurance advantage of being married. Low et al. (2018) show the reform has the strongest
impact at the time of marriage while the reform has only a small impact on commitment
issues during marriage in line with an increased gain from marriage. Further, they show that
the reform reduces divorces and increases marriages due to higher gains from marriage in the
form of increased insurance gains.
Theloudis (2018) uses an estimated limited-commitment model and shows that female
bargaining power has increased over time due to a narrowing of the gender wage gap.9 The
9Strictly speaking, Theloudis (2018) considers a no-commitment model where the Pareto weights change
whenever the state of the world changes.
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model can explain a substitution of female time through male time in homework observed
by several studies, see Aguiar and Hurst (2016) for empirical evidence. Although Theloudis
(2018) includes limited commitment between spouses in his model, the impact of commitment
issues on the results is not discussed.
Potoms (2019) uses an estimated limited-commitment model to analyze the impact of en-
dogenous borrowing constraints on labor supply of secondary earners. Borrowing constraints
become endogenous since housing is used as collateral for debt. He uses the primary loan-
to-income (p-LTI) ratio to discriminate between couple households. Couples with a high
p-LTI have a higher probability of binding borrowing constraints, especially if the primary
earner faces a negative income shock. In a counterfactual analysis, Potoms (2019) investi-
gates the impact of a loosening of the endogenous borrowing constraint. Home ownership
then increases and the new home owners use labor supply, and especially the labor supply of
secondary earners, to finance their house. Thus, average labor supply of secondary earners
increases. Potoms (2019) shows that especially households with a low p-LTI ratio are af-
fected by the policy. The bargaining power of the household head is relatively high in these
households implying a larger increase of labor supply of the secondary earner under limited
commitment than under full commitment.
Turon (2019) analyzes childcare in a limited-commitment model. Using an estimated
version of her model, she shows that standard childcare policies, such as subsidies or free
public childcare, have almost no impact on a substantial fraction of households with young
children. She shows that almost the same impact could be accomplished by changing the
parental-childcare-taste distribution due to higher quality of market childcare. Additionally,
she analyzes the impact of part-time work and thereby depreciating human capital on future
commitment issues. While the decision to work part time has no impact on future alloca-
tions, Turon (2019) finds that these additional costs of home-produced childcare cannot be
internalized by the households in the presence of limited commitment. Thus, labor-supply
decisions of couples become even more distorted and inefficient.
Marriage market. Gemici and Laufer (2014), Devereux and Turner (2016), Gierlinger
and Laczó (2017), and Shephard (2019) study the impact of limited commitment between
spouses on the marriage market. Gemici and Laufer (2014) analyze the behavior of cohab-
itating couples. Since cohabitators do not have to file for divorce if they want to break up,
commitment issues are expected to be stronger than in a married couple. Using PSID data,
Gemici and Laufer (2014) find empirical evidence that typical couple advantages such as
risk sharing and specialization are observed less for cohabitating couples. They use their
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estimated limited-commitment model to analyze a counterfactual increase of divorce costs.
Higher divorce costs cause lower marriage rates and a higher number of cohabitating cou-
ples. Since divorce becomes less attractive, only the couples with the highest gains marry
resulting in less severe commitment issues of married couples and thereby a higher degree of
specialization of married couples. The welfare consequence are highest for couples who would
be married under the baseline divorce costs while they cohabitate under the counterfactual
divorce costs.
Devereux and Turner (2016) investigate the impact of the opportunity to search for a new
partner during marriage (on-the-marriage partner search) on commitment issues and welfare
of spouses. In general, commitment issues become more severe due to on-the-marriage search
since outside options become more attractive. This induces welfare losses. However, Devereux
and Turner (2016) highlight an additional welfare improving channel. Spouses within a bad
marriage, a marriage with a bad match quality shock, have better opportunities in welfare
terms to leave the couple. Thus, the aggregate welfare effects of on-the-marriage search are
ambiguous. Using an estimated version of their model, Devereux and Turner (2016) find
that a limited-commitment model with on-the-marriage search explains empirical patterns of
re-marriage better than a limited-commitment model without on-the-marriage search.
Gierlinger and Laczó (2017) analyze the effects of limited commitment on assortative
matching in a frictionless matching market. In their model, the gain from marriage is risk
sharing. Spouses are heterogeneous with respect to risk aversion. The model replicates the
result known from the literature that, if spouses can fully commit in such an environment, the
optimal result is perfect negative assortative matching. Gierlinger and Laczó (2017) begin
with considering static risk-sharing agreements. In contrast to the full commitment case, the
correlation of incomes matters in the limited-commitment model. They show that, if incomes
are negatively correlated, all matchings are perfectly positive assortative when commitment
issues are sufficiently severe. If incomes are non-negatively correlated, the assortativeness
of matchings is always negative. These results can be explained by differential risk-aversion
among spouses. If incomes are negatively correlated, both spouses can reduce their consump-
tion risk. Spouses with higher risk aversion commit to higher transfers in exchange for more
insurance. If commitment issues are sufficiently severe, caused by a discount factor which is
sufficiently low, this positive effect of equal risk-aversion dominates the effect of more efficient
risk sharing among spouses with unequal risk-aversion. If incomes are positively correlated,
the consumption risk of one spouse can only be reduced by increasing the consumption risk
of the other spouse. Thus, stronger risk aversion increases commitment issues in this case.
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In consequence, the amount of insurance increases in the difference of risk aversion among
spouses, making a negative assortative matching more attractive. In a second step of the
analysis, Gierlinger and Laczó (2017) confirm that positive assortative matching also occurs
in a dynamic environment.
Shephard (2019) considers a limited-commitment model with search frictions in the mar-
riage market allowing for age differences within the couple. The model can replicate the
bivariate age distribution of married couples and several life-cycle patterns of married cou-
ples. The model is used to quantify implications of the narrowing of the gender wage gap:
an increase in female employment, a decrease in male employment, delayed marriages, and
a decrease in the marital age gap. Shephard (2019) finds that the narrowed gender wage
gap accounts for roughly one-third of the decreased marital age gap. While Shephard (2019)
includes limited commitment between spouses in his model, the impact of commitment issues
on results is not discussed.
Household finance. Addoum et al. (2016) analyze the impact of limited commitment
between spouses on the structure of household portfolios. They assume that women are more
risk averse than men. In their model, changes in Pareto weights imply changes in the risk
aversion of the couple, implying adjustments in the risk composition of the household asset
portfolio. Since women are more risk averse, they prefer less risky assets than men. Thus, if
a positive income shock increases the bargaining power of the wife, the portfolio of the couple
becomes less risky.
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3 A stochastic endowment economy
In this section, we present a simple limited-commitment model in the context of family
economics. It is an incomplete markets model where spouses face idiosyncratic income risks
and have no opportunity to save. The only way to insure against bad income realizations
is to share risk within the couple. But this is done in an imperfect way in presence of
limited commitment. In the full commitment case, there is no non-trivial decision within the
household after the household formation. In the limited-commitment model, rebargaining
upon binding participation constraints is the sole ”decision”.
3.1 Model set-up
The economy is populated by couple households consisting of two spouses, a male and a
female, m and f , respectively, who are assumed to decide cooperatively. Couples discount
future utility by the discount factor β. Spouses receive utility from private individual con-
sumption, cit, with i = m, f . The individual concave period felicity function is denoted
by ui (cit). Each spouse receives a constant period utility gain from marriage, denoted by
Ψ. This constant utility gain captures all gains from marriage not explicitly modeled such





βt · [ui (cit) + Ψ] , for i = m, f .
Spouses face idiosyncratic income, yit, which follows a Markov process. yt is the vector of
joint income realizations, yt = (ymt, yft). At the household formation step, potential spouses
decide whether to enter the household. They do so only when their expected lifetime utility
within the couple is at least as high as their expected lifetime utility as a single. Thus, to
state the maximization problem of the couple, we have to define the expected lifetime utility
of a single (=bachelor) household.
3.2 Bachelor households
The maximization problem of a bachelor household with gender i in recursive formulation is
Si (yi) = max
ci








where a prime (′) denotes next period values, subject to the period budget constraint
ci ≤ yi, (55)
where E denotes the expectation operator which includes all information in the particular
period. In particular, expectations about next period incomes are conditioned on current
period income realizations. As singles can only consume their period income, the optimal
consumption policy function is CSi (yi) = yi.
The lifetime utility of the bachelor household results from the Bellman equation (54)
using the optimal consumption policy:











These lifetime utilities are used as outside options in the participation constraints of couple
households.
3.3 Couple households
Household preferences are characterized following the collective approach of Chiappori (1988).
In this approach, household preferences can be stated as a weighted sum of individual pref-
erences
v (cm, cf , µm, µf ) = µm · um (cm) + µf · uf (cf ) + (µm + µf ) ·Ψ,
where the weights, µm and µf , depend on prices, incomes, and distribution factors.
The collective approach is only feasible if intra-household decisions are efficient. Limited
commitment implies that the intra-household allocation is ex-ante inefficient (see Ligon et al.
2002). However, Ligon et al. 2002 show that the resulting allocations are ex-post efficient.
Thus, a weighted sum approach is feasible to characterize preferences of couple households
even under limited commitment. Using the results of Marcet and Marimon (2019), one can
show that the weighted sum approach can be used in a limited-commitment model when
the Pareto weights become additional state variables that are allowed to change over time.1
Before we consider the maximization problem of couples under full and limited commitment
in detail, we discuss commitment issues between spouses in this environment.
Commitment issues. Full and limited-commitment models differ with respect to the oc-
currence of the participation constraint. If spouses can fully commit, the participation con-
1The derivation can be found in Appendix A.1.
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straints of spouses need only be fulfilled at the household formation step. Thus, if both
spouses have an incentive to enter the couple household at the household formation step,
they decide how to allocate consumption once and for all. In deciding over the consumption
allocation, spouses determine their particular weights in the preferences of the couple house-
hold. In terms of the Pareto weights, full commitment implies that the weights do not change
over time.
In contrast, if spouses cannot fully commit, the participation constraints must be fulfilled
in every period and after any history of income shocks. Thus, there must be an incentive
for both spouses to remain in the couple household in any situation. Ligon et al. (2002)
characterize the behavior in such an environment.2 If one spouse has an incentive to leave
the couple household, i.e. a binding participation constraint, the couple changes the intra-
couple allocation such that both spouses again have an incentive to remain within the couple.3
In particular, Ligon et al. (2002) show that the allocation is changed as little as possible such
that the participation constraint of the spouse with an incentive to leave holds with equality.
This behavior of couples can be re-interpreted in terms of the Pareto weights. In the
limited-commitment model, the Pareto weights become additional time-varying state vari-
ables. If the participation constraint of one spouse is binding, the couple changes the Pareto
weights so that the participation constraint of the particular spouse holds with equality. It
is optimal for the household to change the Pareto weight µ as little as possible to fulfill the
participation constraints. Marcet and Marimon (2019) show that the current period Pareto
weight of a spouse is her previous period Pareto weight plus the current period Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier on her participation constraint.4 Thus, if her participation constraint is not bind-
ing in a particular period, her Pareto weight does not change. In general, however, Pareto
weights may grow over time and are unbounded in an infinite-horizon model. Thus, the
Pareto weights do not add up to one in the general case. The implication is that not all peri-
ods have the same weight for the households. Whenever a participation constraint is binding,
this period is more important for households and first-order gains could be achieved by trans-
ferring resources in this period such that the participation would not be binding. Intuitively,
if spouses knew that a participation constraint was binding next year, they have an incentive
to transfer resources from this or future periods to the next period to avoid this binding par-
ticipation constraint. Therefore, it is important for intertemporal decisions to consider the
2Ligon et al. (2002) consider risk-sharing agreements in village economies. Their approach has been applied
to couple households by several studies such as Mazzocco (2007) and Voena (2015).
3If such rearrangement of the intra-couple allocation is not possible, spouses divorce. In the calibrated
models studies in Section 5, divorces do not occur in equilibrium.
4A derivation of this result can be found in Appendix A.1.
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more general case of Pareto weights which do not add up to one. However, when there are no
intertemporal decisions, couples have no opportunity to transfer resources in these periods.
Thus, when there are no intertemporal decisions, the Marcet and Marimon (2019) approach
yields the same allocations compared to an approach where time-varying Pareto weights of
spouses are assumed to sum up to one. When only the relative Pareto weights matter for the
final allocations, one can assume without biasing the results that Pareto weights sum up to
one. This approach is not feasible in the case of intertemporal decisions, see Chapter V for
a detailed discussion. In models without intertemporal decisions, we denote the male Pareto
weight by µ and the female Pareto weight by (1 − µ) so that the household target function
is given by
v (cm, cf , µ) = µ · um (cm) + (1− µ) · uf (cf ) + Ψ.
Under limited commitment, the Pareto weight is a function of the current period stochastic
state, here the income realizations, and the previous period Pareto weight. In this set-up,
the influence of commitment issues on the Pareto weight implies the following updating rule
for the Pareto weight, see Ligon et al. (2002):
µ′ = argminµ̃ |µ̃− µ| such that (57)













≥ Sf (yf ) ,
where Vm and Vf denote the lifetime utilities of married men and women and Sm and Sf
denote the outside options.
Ligon et al. (2002) show that the solution of a limited-commitment problem can be
characterized in an equivalent way by a set of optimal intervals for the Pareto weight. These
intervals depend on the realizations of state variables, here, income shocks. Recall that µ
denotes the Pareto weight of the husband. The upper bounds of the intervals at a particular
income combination y, µ′ (y), are defined such that the wife’s participation constraint holds
with equality






= Sf (yf ) .
The male Pareto weight cannot become larger than µ′ (y) as the wife’s share would then
become too small to make her remain in the household. The lower bound, µ′ (y), is defined
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analogously for the husband






= Sm (ym) .






if µ < µ′ (y) ,
if µ ∈
[
µ′ (y) , µ′ (y)
]
,
if µ > µ′ (y) .
(58)
In the numerical solution of limited-commitment models, we use these intervals to update
the Pareto weights.
Full-commitment couple. Chiappori (1988) highlights that any allocation resulting from
a maximization problem of a couple under full commitment is Pareto efficient. Thus, all
deviations in the limited-commitment model from the full-commitment benchmark result in
welfare losses caused by commitment issues.
When spouses can fully commit, the Pareto weight is fixed once and for all in the house-
hold formation step, µfc0 .
5 Then, following the approach of Chiappori (1988), household
preferences can be characterized as the weighted sum of individual preferences
v
(








· uf (cf ) + Ψ. (59)
Spouses can share idiosyncratic income risks and consume their joint income. The period
budget constraint is
cm + cf ≤ ym + yf . (60)





















subject to the period budget constraint (60).
5For now, we assume that the Pareto weight is exogenously given. Strictly speaking, a model version with
an exogenously given Pareto weight is a unitary model since the Pareto weight is not a function of prices,
incomes and distribution factors. In Appendix A.3, we consider the endogenous determination of the Pareto
weight in the household formation step. The exact determination method has no impact on the general
risk-sharing implications under full commitment.
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together with the budget constraint (60), given the exogenous income vectors y, and the
constant Pareto weight µfc0 .
6 λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
Condition (62) implies that spouses achieve perfect risk sharing within the household, as the
ratio of marginal utilities of consumption is constant over time and states of the world, and
fulfills
∂um (cm) /∂cm





Aggregate income of spouses, ym + yf , may change over time depending on income shocks
and couples cannot insure against aggregate fluctuations. However, to reduce individual
consumption volatility as much as possible, the couple fixes the ratio of marginal utilities of
consumption of the spouses.
Limited-commitment couple. In the limited-commitment model, the Pareto weight may
change over time depending on the particular values of the state variables. As before, house-
hold preferences can be characterized as the weighted sum of individual preferences
v
(
cm, cf , µ
′) = µ′ · um (cm) + (1− µ′) · uf (cf ) + Ψ, (64)
but in this case µ′ follows the updating rule (57). The initial value of the Pareto weight, µ0,
is determined at the household formation step.7 When forming expectations, spouses take
potential changes in the Pareto weights into account.
The maximization problem of a couple household under limited commitment is




cm, cf , µ
′)+ β · E [V (y′, µ′)] , (65)
subject to the period budget constraints (60), and the updating rule for the Pareto weight
(57). The timing convention in the maximization problem is as follows. Spouses enter the
period with the previous period Pareto weight µ. Then, income shocks realize. If one of
the participation constraints is violated, spouses re-bargain and the Pareto weight is up-
dated following condition (57). If no participation constraint is binding, the Pareto weight is
unchanged. The particular allocation in a period depends on the updated Pareto weight, µ′.
6The derivation of the first-order conditions can be found in Appendix A.2.
7Again, we assume for now that the initial value of the Pareto weight is exogenously given. In Appendix
A.3, we discuss how the initial Pareto weight can be determined.
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The resulting first-order conditions are8










together with the budget constraint (60), given the exogenous income vectors y, and the
updating rule for the Pareto weight (57). λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint. Importantly, condition (66) implies that intra-household risk-sharing is imperfect
when commitment is limited:
∂um (cm) /∂cm





The right-hand side of (67) may vary over time and over states. In consequence, individual
consumption volatilities may differ between spouses. In contrast, the right-hand side of the
corresponding full-commitment condition (63) is fixed. Thus, the limited-commitment con-
sumption allocation differs from the Pareto efficient full-commitment counterpart, implying
a welfare loss. In this simple model, the sole source of inefficiency is imperfect risk-sharing
due to potential time-variation and state-variation in the ratio of marginal utilities of con-
sumption.
Individual value functions of the spouses are given by







using the optimal consumption policy functions Ci (y, µ). These individual lifetime utilities
are used when evaluating the participation constraints in the updating rule (57).
8The derivation of the first-order conditions can be found in Appendix A.2.
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4 Numerical solution
To solve the model, we use standard computational techniques from dynamic economics, see
Heer and Maussner (2009) for an overview.1
The general solution method follows a recursive approach. Since there are no savings
opportunities, there is no intertemporal decision and the maximization problem simplifies to
a sequence of static problems. Given the state variables, the solution can be found by solving
the set of potentially non-linear first-order conditions.
In the stochastic endowment economy, individual incomes are the individual stochastic
state variables. Incomes are assumed to follow first-order autoregressive processes and are
discretized using the algorithm of Tauchen (1986).
We combine the exogenous stochastic state variables to one variable, y, which captures
the combination of husbands’ and wives’ incomes. The joint transition matrix of the husband-
wife income combinations, P , follows from the transition matrices of the individual stochastic
processes, Pm and Pf , by P = Pf ⊗ Pm. The number of grid points of the joint income grid
is Ny = Nym × Nyf , where Nyg denotes the number of grid points of the individual income
process of a spouse with gender g. Throughout, we assume the same Thus, in a couple model,
the number of grid points of the stochastic state variable is squared compared to a model
with bachelor households which increases the computation time substantially.
Both in the collective model with full commitment and in the collective model with
limited commitment, the Pareto weight is endogenous. Therefore, an additional grid for the
Pareto weight is needed in the computation. While the Pareto weight is fixed over time
and states in a full-commitment model, and hence strictly speaking not a state variable,
a grid is needed to find the optimal Pareto weight in the household formation step.2 In
the case of limited commitment, a grid for the Pareto weight is needed since the weight is
state-dependent. As discussed before, in the limited-commitment model, the participation
constraints must be fulfilled in every period, in any stochastic state, and after any history of
stochastic realizations. In the numerical computation, this can be implemented by including
the Pareto weight as an additional state variable. The Markovian structure of the model
makes this approach feasible since the history is summarized in the current state variables.
In the numerical implementation, we build three-dimensional meshgrids. The first dimen-
1We use MATLAB for the numerical implementation.
2See Appendix A.3 for details.
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sion is the stochastic income of the husband, the second dimension is the stochastic income
of the wife, and the third dimension is the Pareto weight. The state space of the couple
maximization problem is N = Nym ×Nyf ×Nµ, where Nµ denotes the number of grid points
for the Pareto weight. We solve for continuous solutions for the choice variables using the
first-order conditions of the maximization problem.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the numerical solution of the full-commitment maximization
problem.3
Algorithm 1 (Full commitment) The algorithm consists of the following three steps:
1: Set a convergence criterion ζ. Discretize the exogenous income processes using the ap-
proach of Tauchen (1986). Build an equi-distant grid for the Pareto weight {µ1, ..., µNµ}.
2: Solve the potentially non-linear first-order conditions (60) and (62) given the grids from




, i ∈ {m, f}.














































∣∣∣V fcm,j+1 (y, µfc0 )− V fcm,j (y, µfc0 )∣∣∣ < ζ, and sup ∣∣∣V fcf,j+1 (y, µfc0 )− V fcf,j (y, µfc0 )∣∣∣ <
ζ stop. Otherwise set j = j + 1 and go back to Step 3a. Iterate until convergence.
The static nature of Step 2 of Algorithm 1 implies that the potentially time-consuming
root-finding to obtain the consumption policy functions has only to be done once which speeds
up the numerical solution substantially (this however is not possible in more general models).
To determine the policy functions in Step 2, we use a fast vectorized bisection root-finding
routine. Lifetime utilities can then be determined by iterating the Bellman equation (61)
until convergence, see Step 3 of the algorithm, starting with an initial guess.
A special case. If spouses have identical risk aversion, σm = σf , the consumption policy





, for i = {m, f},
3The corresponding algorithm for the Bachelor household can be found in Appendix A.4.
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the first-order conditions of the full-commitment couple maximization problem are








If spouses are heterogeneous with respect to σi, no closed-form solution of the first-order





















)−1/σ−1 · (ym + yf ) .
Limited commitment. As in the full-commitment model, the consumption policy func-
tions have to be determined only once in this model (for the grid of possible Pareto weights)
since there are no intertemporal decisions. However, under limited commitment, the par-
ticipation constraints have to be checked in each iteration of the algorithm. The converged
state-dependent grid of the Pareto weight, Θ (y, µ), is the set of optimal intervals of the
Pareto weight from the updating rule (58). Algorithm 2 summarizes the numerical solution
of the limited-commitment maximization problem.
Algorithm 2 (Limited commitment) The algorithm consists of the following eight steps:
1: Set convergence criteria ζ1 and ζ2. Discretize the exogenous income processes using
the approach of Tauchen (1986). Build an equi-distant grid for the Pareto weight
{µ1, ..., µNµ}.
2: Bachelor household solution (see Appendix A.4)
3: Full-commitment solution.
3a: Perform Step 2 of Algorithm 1.
3b: Perform Step 3 of Algorithm 1.
4: Initialization limited-commitment solution.
4a: Guess initial value functions Vm,0 (y, µ), and Vf,0 (y, µ).
4b: Guess initial values for a state-dependent Pareto weight grid Θ0 (y, µ).
4c: Construct a state-independent Pareto weight grid Θ̃ for the unconstrained case.
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5: Unconstrained solution (ignoring participation constraints). Given that you are in iter-
ation step j, use the Bellman equation to get:






















6: Check participation constraints.
6a: Find values of the Pareto weight µ such that the participation constraints hold with
equality, using the value functions V unconm (y, µ), and V
uncon
f (y, µ) from Step 5. To
do so, solve for the roots of
V unconm (y, µ)− Sm (ym) = 0,
V unconf (y, µ)− Sf (yf ) = 0,
where Si (yi) denotes the outside option of spouse i. ν (y) denotes the Pareto
weight such that the participation constraint of the husband holds with equality.
ν (y) denotes the Pareto weight such that the participation constraint of the wife
holds with equality.
6b: Build a new grid Θj+1 (y, µ) = Θ̃. Replace all values for a particular state combi-
nation y which are smaller than ν (y) by ν (y). Replace all values for a particular
y which are larger than ν (y) by ν (y).
7: Constrained case (respecting participation constraints). Set Vm,j+1 (y, µ) = V
uncon
m (y, µ)
and Vf,j+1 (y, µ) = V
uncon
f (y, µ). Find all values of Vm,j+1 (y, µ) smaller than Sm (ym).
Replace these values by Sm (ym). Adjust the corresponding values of Vf,j+1 (y, µ) by in-
terpolating V unconf (y, µ) on the corresponding relative Pareto weight values.
Find all values of Vf,j+1 (y, µ) smaller than Sf (yf ). Replace these values by Sf (yf ).
Adjust the corresponding values of Vf,j+1 (y, µ) by interpolating V
uncon
f (y, µ) on the
corresponding relative Pareto weight values.
8: If sup |Vm,j+1 (y, µ)− Vm,j (y, µ)| < ζ1, sup |Vf,j+1 (y, µ)− Vf,j (y, µ)| < ζ1, and sup |Θj+1 (y, µ)−Θj (y, µ)| <
ζ2 stop. Otherwise set j = j + 1 and go back to Step 5. Iterate until convergence.
The first three steps of Algorithm 2 follow directly from Algorithm 1 and Appendix A.4.
The solution of the bachelor problem in Step 2 is used to check the participation constraints
in Step 6. We use the lifetime utilities of the full-commitment couple as initial guesses for
the value functions in the limited-commitment solution.4 For the initialization of the set
of optimal intervals, Θ (y, µ), we use the Pareto weight grid from Step 1, {µ1, ..., µNµ}. A
natural choice for the state-independent grid of the Pareto weight, Θ̃, in Step 4c is the Pareto
weight grid {µ1, ..., µNµ}.
4Other initial guesses are possible. However, one should not use initial values which lead to situations
where both participation constraints are binding. Alternative good initial guesses are values for the value
functions which are much larger than the corresponding lifetime utilities of bachelor households.
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The solution algorithm for the limited-commitment model is based on the idea that, be-
ginning with the next period, commitment between spouses is limited. In Step 5, where
the unconstrained solution is determined, the lifetime utilities on the right-hand side of the
Bellman equations are lifetime utilities of households/spouses who cannot fully commit. How-
ever, for the solution of the current period (given current state variables (y, µ)) it is assumed
that spouses can fully commit. Thus, in Step 5, the participation constraints for the current
period are ignored. The resulting solutions are the optimal consumption policy functions of
the full-commitment problem, Cfcm (y, µ) and Cfcf (y, µ), since there are no intertemporal de-
cisions in this model. Given these solutions to the first-order conditions, the lifetime utilities
calculated in Step 5 are the lifetime utilities of a couple household where spouses can fully
commit until the end of the current period and thereafter commitment between spouses is
limited.
These lifetime utilities are then used in Step 6a to check the participation constraints.
In particular, one searches for the values of the Pareto weight such that, given a particular
state combination y, the participation constraints hold with equality. To do so, we use a fast
vectorized bisection root-finding routine. The idea is to determine the value of the Pareto
weight the couple has to start with in the period to fulfill both participation constraints.
These values are denoted by ν (y) and ν (y) and build an interval of the Pareto weight where
no participation constraint is violated. In Step 6b, a new state-dependent grid for the Pareto
weight is built (initialized by the grid Θ̃) where all values which are smaller than ν (y) are
replaced by ν (y). All values which are larger than ν (y) are replaced by ν (y).
In Step 7, all values of the value functions Vm,j+1 (y, µ) and Vf,j+1 (y, µ) which are smaller
than the outside options are replaced by the values of the outside option. One also has to
adjust the particular values of the value function of the spouse whose participation constraint
is not binding. We interpolate both value functions on the new Pareto weight grid Θj+1 (y, µ).
This guarantees that both participation constraints are always fulfilled and that the lifetime
utilities of spouses with non-binding participations constraints correspond to the correct
Pareto weight value. These interpolated value functions become the initial guesses in a
potential new iteration of the algorithm.
Finally, in Step 8, the convergence of all lifetime utilities and the state-dependent Pareto
weight grid is checked. Until convergence, one uses the newly calculated values from Step 6b
and Step 7 as new initial guesses and goes back to Step 5. The algorithm guarantees that
eventually one has found lifetime utilities of both spouses and the couple household which
respect the participation constraints in all periods, i.e., lifetime utilities of spouses under
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limited commitment.
The converged state-dependent grids of the Pareto weight are the optimal intervals of
the Pareto weight from the updating rule (58). These intervals and (58) are used in the
simulation of the model. At the beginning of a period, each simulated couple household has
state variables y and the previous period Pareto weight µ. Then, the updating rule (58) is
used to check whether an update of the Pareto weight is required or not.
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5 Aggregate risk-sharing effects of limited commitment
We now describe the results of our quantitative analysis. We start with the aggregate effects
of limited commitment on the risk-sharing behavior of married couples. To this end, we first
consider a model version that has little heterogeneity across households. In Section 6, we take
into account heterogeneity in a number of dimensions to study cross-sectional implications.
5.1 Functional forms and parameterization
Table 18 summarizes the parameter values for the baseline parameterization of the model.





where 1/σ measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption. To highlight
endogenous commitment issues in a transparent way, we abstract from gender heterogeneity
in parameter values in the baseline parameterization. We assume σ → 1 in the baseline
parameterization, such that (69) becomes
u (ci) = log (ci) . (70)
The discount factor β is set to 0.96, which is a standard value for a yearly calibration of an
incomplete-markets model.
We assume that individual log income consists of two elements, a fixed effect, ψ, and a
stochastic component, z:
log yi = ψi + zi. (71)
We account for a fixed-effect component to induce heterogeneity across households which is
needed to calibrate the amount of commitment issues in the economy, see below. The fixed-
effect component is determined once and for all before spouses marry. We follow Conesa
and Krueger (2006) and assume that ψ can take two values for each spouse, so that there
are four types of households with different combinations of the fixed effects for husband and
wife, respectively. ψ is assumed to be log-normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2ψ and, following Conesa and Krueger (2006), we set the two values to ψi,1 = −σψ and
ψi,2 = σψ and assume equal population shares for both types. The value for σ
2
ψ is taken from
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Table 18: Parameter values, stochastic endowment economy
Description Parameter Value Source
CRRA parameter σ 1 set
Discount factor β 0.96 set
Marriage utility gain Ψ 0.002 calibrated
Variance fixed effect σ2ψ 0.4472 Storesletten et al. (2004)
Autocorrelation income shock ρ 0.9 Aiyagari (1994)
Standard deviation income shock σε 0.0872 Aiyagari (1994)
NOTE.–There are four household types. In the simulated economy, income fixed effects are positively
correlated between spouses with a correlation coefficient of 0.5, see main text.
Storesletten et al. (2004), see Table 18. Hyslop (2001) finds that the correlation between
fixed effects of spouses is 0.5. To achieve this, we set the share of the two couple types where
both partners have the same fixed effect to 37.5% each.1 The share of couples where partners
differ with respect to their fixed effects is set to 12.5% each.2
In line with large parts of the infinite-horizon incomplete-markets literature, we assume
that the stochastic income component follows a first-order autoregressive process with auto-
correlation ρ and variance σ2ε :
z′i = ρ · zi + εi, (72)




. In the baseline model, we assume that incomes are uncorrelated between
spouses but we consider the case of correlated income shocks in Section 6.5. The values for
ρ and σ2ε are taken from Aiyagari (1994), see Table 18.
A main target of the calibration is to generate a realistic extent of commitment problems.
Technically, commitment problems can be strengthened or weakened by adjusting the param-
eter for the utility gains from marriage, Ψ. This parameter can be interpreted as all gains
from marriage not directly modeled such as home production, children, etc. we calibrate Ψ
using an empirical target provided by Lise and Yamada (2019).
Lise and Yamada (2019) decompose the total variance of the (logged) male Pareto weight
as the sum of the variance of the (logged) male Pareto weight across households and the
variance of the (logged) male Pareto weight within households over time. Thus, the Lise-
1When both spouses have the same fixed effect, the correlation is 1, and when spouses have different
fixed effects, the correlation is −1. The average correlation of fixed effects in the whole economy then is
2 · 0.375 − 2 · 0.125 = 0.5.
2The fixed-effect combinations are ψm = ψf = σψ in household type I, ψm = σψ and ψf = −σψ in
household type II, ψm = −σψ and ψf = σψ in household type III, and ψm = ψf = −σψ in household type IV.
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Yamada-decomposition is given by:
Var (log µjt) = Var (E (logµjt)| j) + E (Var (logµjt)| j) , (73)
where j denotes the household and t time. The first term in the Lise-Yamada-decomposition
stems from heterogeneity between couples, Var (E µjt| j), and the second term from within-
household rebargaining over time due to binding participation constraints, E (Var µjt| j).
If spouses could fully commit, the within-household variance would be zero. Any positive
within-household variance of the Pareto weights over time is caused by commitment issues
between spouses. Any positive across-household variance of the Pareto weight is caused by
heterogeneity across households, in this model by heterogeneous long-run incomes of spouses
due to income fixed effects. To measure the strength of commitment issues, we use the ratio
Υ =
E (Var (logµjt)| j)
Var (E (logµjt)| j)
. (74)
Lise and Yamada (2019) use panel data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC)
to analyze the extent of limited commitment in intra-household decision-making and the re-
sulting impact on intra-household allocation rules. They document that the within-household
variance is about one-fourth of the across-household variance, implying Υ = 0.25. Thus,
about 25% of the heterogeneity in Pareto weights is due to rebargaining over time. We
calibrate Ψ in our model to match this empirical target.3
In the numerical solution, we use 21 income grid points per spouse and 501 grid points
for the Pareto weight grid, resulting in a total of 220, 941 grid points. After having solved
the model, we simulate a panel of 5, 000 couple households, both under full and limited com-
mitment, using the same stochastic shocks. We also simulate 5, 000 singles of each gender.4
We simulate 1, 500 periods and discard the first 500 periods to avoid dependence on initial
conditions. Initial Pareto weights are determined using a Nash bargaining approach.5 The
resulting initial male Pareto weights are 0.5 (household types I and IV), 0.68 (household type
II), and 0.32 (household type III).
5.2 Policy functions
The left panel in Figure 2 shows the Pareto weight of the wife, 1 − µ, as a function of her
income. The right panel of Figure 2 shows consumption of the wife as a function of her
3In the U.S., divorce rates are even higher than in Japan, see OECD (2019). Thus, the calibration target
seems a lower bound for the extent of commitment issues in the United States.
4We compare single households to couple households in our analysis below.
5See Appendix A.3 for details.
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Figure 2: Policy functions for the female Pareto weight and female consumption.
(a) Female Pareto weight
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NOTE.– Policy functions for the household type where both spouses have the low fixed effect. Thus, there
are no long-run income differences. In both panels, male income is at its mean value. Solid lines refer to a
full-commitment couple, dashed lines refer to a limited-commitment couple.
income. In both panels, the policy functions refer to a situation where male income is at
its mean level. Solid lines refer to the full-commitment model version and dashed lines refer
to the limited-commitment model. For the figures, we consider household type IV which is
the household type where both spouses have the low income fixed effect implying that there
are no long-run income differences between spouses.6 For plotting the policy functions of the
limited-commitment model, we assume that the previous period female Pareto weight, 1−µ,
is given by the long-run mean which is 0.5 for household type IV.7
In the full-commitment model, the Pareto weight is fixed once and for all and does
not depend on income shocks, see the solid line in the left panel of Figure 2. In the
limited-commitment model, however, the current period Pareto weight depends on the intra-
household distribution of incomes. The dashed line shows that the female Pareto weight in-
creases when the relative income of the wife increases (recall that the income of the husband
is held constant). These changes in the Pareto weights translate into changes in individual
consumption shown in the right panel of Figure 2. A higher female income implies higher
household income since male income is fixed at its mean value. Thus, independent of whether
spouses can fully commit or commitment is limited, female consumption is increasing in her
6Policy functions for the other household types show the same general pattern.
7After shocks have realized, the new value of the Pareto weight is determined through the updating rule
(58).
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Table 19: Rebargaining frequency
household type
Average I II III IV
Rebargaining frequency in % 37.23 37.32 36.95 36.95 37.32
NOTE.–The column ’Average’ shows type-weighted averages. The other columns show household-type-
specific averages. I: Both spouses have high income fixed effects. II: Male high income fixed effect, female
low income fixed effect. III: Male low income fixed effect, female high income fixed effect. IV: Both spouses
have low income fixed effects.
income. However, as shown by the dashed line, the slope of female consumption as a function
of her income is larger in the limited commitment case compared to the full-commitment case.
When relative female income is low, she receives less consumption in the limited-commitment
case than under full commitment. When relative female income is high, however, she receives
even higher consumption under limited commitment. These effects are driven by the change
in the female bargaining position in response to her income shocks. Thus, the policy functions
show that individual consumption is more volatile under limited commitment than under full
commitment (analogous results hold for male individual consumption). This means that full
commitment provides better consumption insurance than limited commitment and limited
commitment is hence associated with a welfare loss.
5.3 Simulation results
Recall that the model is calibrated to match the statistic reported by Lise and Yamada
(2019) for the variance in Pareto weights within households relative to the variance of Pareto
weights across households, Υ = 0.25. As a second measure of the strength of commitment
issues, we calculate the frequency of changes in the Pareto weight in the simulated data. Any
change in the Pareto weight can be interpreted as a rebargaining of spouses. Thus, higher
rebargaining frequencies tend to represent more commitment issues. Table 19 summarizes
the results, overall and separately for all four households types. The overall rebargaining
frequency is about 37% and relatively similar across household types. Thus, on average, a
couple renegotiates over the Pareto weights every 2.7 periods.
We now analyze the risk-sharing impact of limited commitment in the simulated data. In
the full-commitment case, the within-household variances of individual consumption growth
are identical for spouses. Further, these variances are equal to the within variance of
household-aggregate consumption growth since individual consumption is proportional to
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Table 20: Risk sharing
(1) (2) (3)
Measure Bachelor Full commitment Limited commitment
Variance of consumption growth
household, Ξ – 0.44 0.44
men, Ξm 0.83 0.44 0.53
women, Ξf 0.83 0.44 0.53
Kaplan-Violante coefficients
household, φ – 0 0
men, φm 0 0.50 0.32
women, φf 0 0.50 0.32
NOTE.–Ξ denotes the variance of consumption growth at the couple level and Ξi denotes the variance of
individual consumption growth for spouse i, Ξi = var(log c
′
i− log ci). φi is the Kaplan and Violante (2010)

















The Pareto weights on the right-hand side of the limited-commitment risk-sharing condition
change in response to sufficiently strong income shocks, implying that individual consumption
growth is in general not equal to household-aggregate consumption growth.





















where ∆ is the first-difference operator, i.e., for a generic variable b, ∆b′ = b′ − b. The
advantage of considering consumption growth rates is that they take out variation in mean
consumption across households and thus isolate individual consumption risk, i.e., volatility
of individuals’ consumption over time.
The upper part of Table 20 summarizes the results. In the simulated economy, the
109
variances of individual consumption growth, Ξm and Ξf , are highest in bachelor households
and lowest in full-commitment couple households. Bachelor households cannot share risk
and have to consume their period income so that the variance of consumption growth (see
column (1) is equal to the variance of income growth. Being a member of a couple household
provides better insurance against income shocks than being a single even when commitment
in the couple is limited (see column (3)). However, under limited commitment, there is less
intra-household risk-sharing compared to a situation of full commitment (see column (2)).
The full-commitment situation achieves perfect risk sharing and the variance of consumption
growth is reduced by 39 percentage points compared to the bachelor situation. Limited
commitment between spouses reduces the insurance value of marriage by about one fourth as
entering a limited-commitment couple reduces the variance of consumption growth by only
30 percentage points.
As a second measure of risk sharing, we calculate the insurance coefficients suggested by
Kaplan and Violante (2010),





The insurance coefficient measures the share of the variance of the shock that does not
translate into consumption growth, see Kaplan and Violante (2010, page 57). We consider
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The insurance coefficient for the household, (79), measures the share of the aggregate house-
hold income variance which does not translate into aggregate household consumption growth.
In models where the only source of insurance is intra-household risk-sharing, this coefficient
is zero. The second and third coefficient (80) and (81) measure the share of individual income
variance that does not translate into individual consumption growth. In couple households,
these coefficients will differ from zero as some insurance is achieved through intra-household
risk sharing.
The lower part of Table 20 summarizes the results for the Kaplan and Violante (2010)
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Table 21: Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficients, household types
household type
I II III IV
Full commitment
φ 0 0 0 0
φm 0.50 0.29 0.71 0.50
φf 0.50 0.71 0.29 0.50
Limited commitment
φ 0 0 0 0
φm 0.32 0.19 0.47 0.32
φf 0.32 0.47 0.19 0.32
Reduction due to limited commitment (%)
Men 36 34 34 36
Women 36 34 34 36
NOTE.–φ denotes the couple Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficient and φi denotes the insur-
ance coefficient of spouse i. I: Both spouses have a high income fixed effect. II: Male high income fixed
effect, female low income fixed effect. III: Male low income fixed effect, female high income fixed effect. IV:
Both spouses have a low income fixed effect.
insurance coefficients. Bachelor households have no insurance opportunities in this model
and consume their period income. Thus, any income shock translates directly into consump-
tion growth and the insurance coefficients are zero, see the first column of Table 20. Also
the couple household as a whole cannot insure against aggregate income fluctuations and
hence all changes in aggregate household income directly translate into household consump-
tion growth, see the fourth row of Table 20. However, couples do achieve (imperfect) risk
sharing with respect to individual income growth, as the transmission of individual income
shocks into individual consumption growth is muted. Since, under full commitment, individ-
ual consumption is proportional to the sum of the uncorrelated incomes of both spouses, only
50% of the individual income variance translates into individual consumption growth in the
full-commitment household, see column (2) of Table 20. Under limited commitment, individ-
ual consumption is less than perfectly proportional to household income and depends more
strongly on individual income due to changes in Pareto weights. Quantitatively, the insur-
ance coefficient under full commitment is 0.32. Hence, 100%− 32% = 68% of the individual
income variance translates into individual consumption growth. Under limited commitment,
marriage increases the insurance coefficient by only about two thirds as much as under full
commitment, implying a similar reduction in the insurance value of marriage as suggested by
the consumption-variance measure.
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Table 21 reports insurance coefficients separately by household type. Insurance coefficients
of spouses differ in household types II and III where spouses have different long-run incomes
(different income fixed effects). Recall that spouses are homogeneous in all parameters except
income fixed effects. Thus, the long-run variance of income shocks is smaller for the spouse
with the lower fixed effect implying that it is easier for the couple to insure against income
shocks of this spouse because they are less important for total household income. Since the
insurance coefficient of spouse i, φi, measures her insurance with respect to her income shock,
φm is smaller than φf in household type II where the husband has a high fixed effect and the
wife has a low fixed effect. In contrast, in household type III φm > φf holds.
Most important for our purposes is to compare insurance coefficients under limited com-
mitment to those under full commitment. For all types of households and both genders,
limited commitment reduces insurance coefficients by between 34 and 36%. Hence, as al-
ready suggested by the rebargaining frequencies reported in Table 19, the effect of limited
commitment on intra-household risk sharing does not differ substantially by mean income of
households or individuals.
We now quantify welfare losses that result from imperfect risk sharing under limited































ζi denotes the percentage increase in consumption under limited commitment that is needed
to make spouse i indifferent to the full-commitment case.
We find that, on average, one needs to give households about 0.6% more consumption
under limited commitment to achieve the lifetime utility under full commitment. To put this
number into perspective, recall that the welfare costs of business cycles in an incomplete-
markets environment are typically estimated to be between 0.08% (Imrohoroğlu 1989) and
1% (Krusell et al. 2009) of consumption.8 Thus, limited commitment causes a quantitatively
important welfare loss.
8Storesletten et al. (2001) and Krebs (2007) are further studies determining the welfare costs of business
cycles. Although both studies find higher welfare costs from business cycles than 1% in some parameteriza-
tions, the results in environments most similar to our baseline parameterization are below 1%. In particular,
Storesletten et al. (2001) find welfare costs of 0.82% and Krebs (2007) finds welfare costs of 0.5% in environ-
ments most similar to our baseline model.
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6 Cross-sectional implications
We now analyze how the risk-sharing effects of limited commitment differ across the popu-
lation. To this end, we account for heterogeneity in several dimensions. One after another,
we vary the parameters governing time preferences, risk aversion, and utility gains from mar-
riage, as well as the variance and correlation of income shocks in the household. In each
model extension, we refrain from heterogeneity in all other parameters except for mean wage
levels (which we have seen in Section 5 to have very limited impact on the effects of lim-
ited commitment.) In an additional experiment, we introduce altruism between spouses in a
marriage and allow for heterogeneity in altruism across couples.
The motivation for this analysis is twofold. First, a quantitative analysis of the cross-
sectional distribution of the effects of limited commitment can inform economic policies, e.g.,
when limited commitment impacts particularly on already otherwise vulnerable households.
When policy makers want to support specific households particularly, understanding how
they are affected by limited commitment allows a better design of the respective policies.
Second, in empirical tests of limited-commitment models, it can be helpful to identify cross-
sectional variation in the extent to which households are subject to limited commitment. Our
analysis delivers important insights in this respect as the preference parameters considered
in our analysis can in principle be recovered, e.g., from survey data or experiments. For
example, the Health and Retirement Study of the University of Michigan includes questions
about behavior in hypothetical situations constructed to deduce respondents’ time preference
and risk aversion (see, e.g., Barsky et al. 1997, for an application. Further, economists have
developed methods to deduce preference parameters such as the rates of time preference or
risk aversion from observable behavior such as exercising, drug consumption, gambling, or
risky asset holding (e.g., Brown et al. (2006), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008); Chiappori
and Paiella (2011); Finke and Huston (2013)).
6.1 Discount factor
We first incorporate heterogeneity in time preferences into the model. We include some agents
whose discount factor β is below the baseline value of 0.96 and some agents whose discount
factor is larger.
Kocherlakota (1996) has shown in the context of development economics that commitment
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Figure 3: Heterogeneity in household discount factors.
(a) Strength of commitment issues
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NOTE.–The solid line in the left panel shows the variance ratio (see main text for details). The dashed
line in the left panel shows the rebargaining frequency. The right panel shows the individual insurance
coefficient under full commitment (solid line) and under limited commitment (dashed line). Average insur-
ance coefficients are identical for men and women since there is no gender heterogeneity in the model. The
vertical dotted line indicates the parameter value in the baseline parameterization.
problems between risk-averse agents decrease with their patience. Spouses who are more
patient (i.e., who have a higher discount factor β) weigh future gains from marriage more
strongly. To understand how this affects commitment problems, consider the case where
both spouses have the same Pareto weight. Assume that current income of the wife is above
average and current income of the husband is below average. In this situation, the wife
expects that her income will decrease in the future while the husband expects an increase in
income. If both spouses are impatient, relatively much weight is given to short-run effects
and the wife has a relatively strong incentive to leave the household so that the likelihood of
rebargaining is relatively high. By contrast, if both spouses are relatively patient, they take
into account more strongly future advantages from a risk-sharing agreement. This makes
marriage more attractive, resulting in less severe commitment problems.
Figure 3 shows measures of the strength of commitment problems and the Kaplan-Violante
insurance coefficient for individual consumption as a function of the household discount fac-
tor.1 The left panel shows that both measures of the importance of commitment problems
are smaller for households with a higher discount factor, which corresponds to Kocherlakota
(1996)’s result that commitment issues decrease with the patience of spouses. In line with
1Average insurance coefficients are identical for men and women since there is no gender heterogeneity in
the model.
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Figure 4: Impact of higher utility gains from marriage.
(a) Commitment issues














(b) Female insurance coefficient
























NOTE.–The left panel shows commitment issues measured by the variance ratio and the rebargaining fre-
quency, depending on the direct utility gains from marriage. The right panel shows the female insurance
coefficient under full commitment (solid line) and under limited commitment (dashed line). The vertical
dotted line indicates the parameter value in the baseline parameterization.
this, the right panel of Figure 3 shows that the insurance coefficient under limited commit-
ment increases is larger in more patient households (dashed line). When agents are very
patient, the insurance coefficient under limited commitment gets closer to the full commit-
ment counterpart (solid line).
Note that the lines in Figure 3 are steep, especially around the baseline value of β = 0.96.
Households whose discount factor is only one percentage point larger than those of the baseline
household have a rebargaining frequency which is seven percentage points (or 19%) lower and
an insurance coefficient which is five percentage points (or 16%) larger.2
6.2 Utility gain from marriage
We now consider heterogeneity in terms of the direct utility gains from marriage, Ψ. The
direct utility gains from marriage can be expected to vary substantially across married cou-
2Falk et al. (2018) find that women are on average less patient than men. We do not analyze heterogeneous
discount factors in our infinite horizon model since the maximization problem would become non-stationary
when discount factors differ between household members, which makes a numerical solution infeasible in this
case. In particular, it would be optimal to have a decreasing consumption path for the impatient spouse and
an increasing consumption path for the patient spouse. If spouses could fully commit, this would imply that
the consumption share of the impatient spouse converges to zero in the long-run and the consumption share of
the patient spouse would converge to one. If spouses cannot fully commit, the impatient spouse would charge
for the consumption in every period such that she is indifferent between staying within and leaving the couple.
This would induce a further source of inefficiency due to time-inconsistent behavior of spouses under limited
commitment.
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ples since they capture all gains which are not directly modeled such as home production,
love, children, etc. In our baseline parameterization, we used Ψ to calibrate the strength
of commitment issues to an empirical target. We now incorporate heterogeneity around the
value that results from this calibration.
The left panel in Figure 4 shows that there are smaller commitment problems in house-
holds where direct utility gains from marriage are larger. The right panel shows that, in
couples where Ψ is sufficiently large, the insurance coefficients under limited commitment
converge to the corresponding values under full commitment. Quantitatively, risk sharing
is close to perfect only in couples where direct utility gains from marriage are about 20
times larger than in the baseline couple (indicated by the dotted vertical line in the figure).
However, the lines in Figure 4 are steep in the neighborhood of the baseline which implies
that, in couples, where direct utility gains are moderately larger than in the baseline couple,
commitment problems are substantially smaller.
6.3 Risk aversion
We now highlight the impact of different degrees of risk aversion on the severity of com-
mitment issues. The incentives to share risk within the household are directly related to the
concept of risk aversion. The more risk averse an individual is, the higher is her gain from risk
sharing. Thus, commitment issues should be less severe where the risk aversion of spouses is
high since total gains from marriage increase in risk aversion.3
Figure 5 shows measures of commitment issues and the insurance coefficient as a function
of the degree of risk aversion in the household for a model where the latter varies across
households. In this figure, risk aversion is assumed to be homogenous within household, i.e.,
every husband has the same degree of risk aversion than his wife but a different degree of risk
aversion than other husbands and wives. Both, the rebargaining frequency (dashed line) and
the variance ratio (solid line) are smaller in more risk averse households, see the left panel of
Figure 5. In line with smaller commitment problems, the right panel in Figure 5 shows that
intra-household risk sharing is better where risk aversion is higher.
Differences in risk aversion within the household. We now consider the case of het-
erogeneity in risk aversion within a household. This is motivated by the evidence that women
are on average more risk averse than men, see Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey of the
literature and Falk et al. (2018) for a recent study.
3If spouses are not risk averse, there are no additional utility gains from marriage next to the direct utility
gains Ψ. In our model, risk-neutral spouses would have no incentive to enter and to remain in the household
if Ψ = 0.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity in risk aversion (homogeneous risk aversion in the couple).
(a) Commitment issues
















(b) Individual insurance coefficient
























NOTE.–The left panel shows commitment issues measured by the the variance ratio (solid line), Υ, and
the rebargaining frequency (dashed line). The right panel shows the female insurance coefficient under full
commitment (solid line) and under limited commitment (dashed line). Both spouses have the same con-
stant relative risk aversion. Average insurance coefficients are identical for men and women since there is
no gender heterogeneity in the model. The vertical dotted line indicates the parameter value in the baseline
parameterization.
Independent of whether commitment is full or limited, within-household differences in
risk aversion lead to differences in the insurance coefficients of members of a household.
With gender-specific parameters σm and σf , the risk-sharing condition becomes µ
′ · c−σmm =
(1 − µ′) · c−σff which implies that consumption of the less risk-averse spouse will vary more
strongly with household income. Hence, the insurance coefficient will be larger for the more
risk-averse spouse under both full commitment and limited commitment. Under limited
commitment, risk aversion exerts an additional effect on insurance coefficients. When one
spouse has high risk aversion, he or she values the insurance provided through the marriage
strongly which reduces the attractiveness of the outside option and makes it relatively unlikely
that this spouse’s participation constraint binds. Hence, commitment problems are smaller
where risk aversion is higher even when this concerns even only spouse’s risk aversion. In
Appendix A.5, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of within-household heterogeneity
on insurance coefficients under both full commitment and limited commitment.
Figure 6 compares insurance coefficients between households that differ in the degree of
risk aversion of the wife (while risk aversion of the husband is held constant at its baseline
level). The left panel refers to the case of full commitment. The dashed line shows that the
female insurance coefficient is increasing in her risk aversion, holding constant risk aversion
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity in risk aversion across and within households.
(a) Full commitment























































NOTE.–The figure shows male and female insurance coefficients under full commitment (left panel) and
limited commitment (right). Female risk aversion is varied and male risk aversion is held constant. The
vertical dotted line indicates the baseline parameter value.
of the husband. The solid line shows that the male insurance coefficient is decreasing in
female risk aversion. Insurance coefficients are equal when risk aversion is identical for both
household members. The average insurance coefficient (represented by the dashed line) under
full commitment is constant, indicating that efficient risk sharing is achieved but less risk
averse spouses efficiently accept a larger share of the household’s income risk.
The right panel of Figure 6 refers to the case of limited commitment. Here, risk aversion
affects the strength of commitment problems such that the average degree of consumption
insurance is larger in households with more risk averse wives. As under full commitment,
households share income risk unevenly with the less risk averse spouse accepting the larger
share of the risk. As a consequence, one’s own risk aversion has two reinforcing effects on
one’s insurance coefficient: the household’s commitment problems are ameliorated and one
has to carry a smaller share of the household’s income risk. Quantitatively, the slope of the
female insurance coefficient plotted against female risk aversion is larger than in Figure 5
where both spouses’ risk aversion was varied. Hence, individuals achieve particularly weak
consumption smoothing against income shocks when they live in households with low risk
aversion and themselves are even less risk averse than their partners.
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6.4 Altruism
We now take into account altruism between spouses and allow for heterogeneity in altruism
across couples. Altruism means that individuals receive utility not only from consumption
and leisure but also from the well-being of others, in this case, their spouses. Becker (1974a,
1974b) was the first to consider caring about spouses and several other studies have used
similar approaches since, see Becker (1991, Chapter 8) and Browning et al. (2014, Chapter
3) for a detailed discussion. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) consider a limited-commitment
model in the context of development economics where households care about other households
in the same village. They find empirically that, while altruism alleviates the strength of
commitment issues, altruism is not strong enough to remove all commitment issues.
Including altruism requires an extension of the baseline model. Specifically, the household
target function (64) in the limited-commitment model becomes
v
(
cm, cf , µ
′) = µ′ · (um (cm) + %m · uf (cf )) + (1− µ′) · (uf (cf ) + %f · um (cm)) + Ψ,
=
(




· um (cm) +
(
1− µ′ + %m · µ′
)
· uf (cf ) + Ψ, (82)
where %i denotes the degree of altruism of spouse i. In the corresponding full-commitment
model, the Pareto weights in (82) are replaced by the constants µfc0 . The baseline stochastic
endowment economy discussed before assumed the special case %m = %f = 0, thus no altruism
towards the partner. In both cases, full and limited commitment, we assume that spouses do
not care about each other in the outside option. A derivation of the first-order conditions of
the model with altruism can be found in Appendix A.6.
One can show analytically that commitment issues become less severe with higher degrees
of altruism. Consider, for example, the case where the wife faces low income in this period
while the husband has high income. Commitment becomes more credible in this period if the
husband knows that his wife is an altruist and therefore will compensate him in the future
for his support in this period. To see this formally, consider the case %m = %f = 1. In this
case, the household target function (82) becomes:
v
(
cm, cf , µ
′) = (µ′ + 1− µ′) · um (cm) + (1− µ′ + µ′) · uf (cf ) + Ψ,
= um (cm) + uf (cf ) + Ψ.
and is independent of the Pareto weight. If spouses are ex-ante identical, they will receive
the same consumption and the same utility in every period and all potential commitment
issues are solved by altruism.
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Figure 7: Heterogeneity in the degree of altruism in the couple.
(a) Commitment issues

















(b) Individual insurance coefficient



























NOTE.–The left panel shows commitment issues measured by the variance ratio (solid line) and the rebar-
gaining frequency (dashed line), depending on the degree of altruism. The right panel shows the individual
insurance coefficient under full commitment (solid line) and under limited commitment (dashed line).
We now discuss our quantitative results for commitment problems and risk sharing in a
cross-section of couples that differ from one another in terms of altruism. In Figure 7, we
vary the altruism parameter % around its baseline value of zero. Recall that the extent of
commitment issues is calibrated in the baseline model. Hence, the value of zero should not
be understood literally as a couple where spouses do not care about each other but as a
normalization indicating the average degree of altruism between spouses. Put differently, the
values for % in the figure have no absolute interpretation but measure the deviation from the
average degree of altruism. For example, one can interpret positive values of the altruism
parameter as referring to a couple with above-average altruism.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that both measures of commitment issues, the rebargain-
ing frequency and the variance ratio, are smaller in households with more altruistic spouses.
Even small increases in the degree of altruism compared to the baseline couple reduce com-
mitment issues significantly. Further, couples with sufficiently high altruism can achieve close
to perfect intra-household risk sharing.
6.5 Correlation of income shocks
In the baseline parameterization in Section 5.1, it is assumed that income shocks are uncorre-
lated among spouses. In reality, this within-household correlation differs across households-
Some individuals work in the same industry or even the same firm as their respective spouses
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Figure 8: Variation of the correlation of income shocks.
(a) Variance ratio Υ
















(b) Individual insurance coefficient
























NOTE.–Panel (a) shows the variance ratio Υ as a measure of commitment problems. Panel (b) shows the
individual insurance coefficient under full (solid line) and limited commitment (dashed line). Average in-
surance coefficients are identical for men and women since there is no gender heterogeneity in the model.
The vertical dotted line indicates the parameter value in the baseline parameterization.
such that their income shocks will be positively correlated. In other couples, spouses’ jobs
are more different implying a lower correlation of idiosyncratic income shocks. Taking this
into account, we now consider a model populated by couples who differ in terms of the
within-household correlation of income shocks.4
A positive correlation of income shocks of spouses in a household implies that it becomes
more difficult for spouses to insure each other since the probability that both spouses have
similar income realizations increases. This tends to induce stronger commitment problems
because the value of marriage is smaller and the outside option relatively more attractive.
However, there is a second effect. A positive correlation of income shocks implies that the
probability of large income differences between spouses is relatively small. Thus, this ef-
fect makes participation constraints bind less often which implies less severe commitment
problems when shocks are positively correlated. Which effect dominates is a quantitative
question.5
Figure 8 plots the measures of commitment problems and the insurance coefficient against
the within-household correlation of income shocks. Recall that the model is calibrated to
4Hyslop (2001) estimates couple income processes taking into account within-household correlation.
5There are analogous effects when income shocks are negatively correlated. One the one hand, negatively
correlated shocks can be insured more easily, which tends to reduce commitment issues. On the other hand,
the probability of large income differences between spouses increases, which tends to strengthen commitment
problems.
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generate commitment issues at a correlation of zero. Hence, the numbers on the horizontal
axis are to be interpreted as a deviation from the average within-household correlation of
income shocks in a household.
Panel (a) in Figure 8 shows that the strength of commitment issues as measured by the
variance ratio is smaller where the correlation of income shocks is larger. This implies that the
effect of a higher likelihood of binding participation constraints dominates the effect of better
insurance opportunities within the couple when income shocks are negatively correlated. This
can be seen from panel (b) which shows a comparison of the insurance coefficients under full
(solid line) and limited commitment (dashed line). In both cases, insurance is higher when
income shocks correlate negatively because a higher correlation implies that one’s spouse’s
income is a worse hedge to one’s own income. However, the difference between full and
limited commitment is smaller where the correlation of income shocks is low. Hence, couples
with a rather high correlation of spouses’ incomes are less affected by limited commitment.
6.6 Variance of income shocks
We now consider differences in income volatility across the population, i.e., we distinguish
between households that face substantial income risk and household where income risk is
moderate.
Higher income volatility has two opposing effects on the strength of commitment issues.
Since spouses are risk averse, higher income risks increase the insurance gains from marriage
such that intra-household risk-sharing becomes more attractive. Thus, this channel tends to
imply less severe commitment issues. A second effect is that, when incomes are more volatile,
there are more often situations where spouses have large differences in income. In conse-
quence, participation constraints tend to bind more often resulting in stronger commitment
issues. Which of these two channels dominates is a quantitative question.
The left panel in Figure 9 shows that the two measures of commitment problems indicate
opposite effects of income risk. The variance-ratio measure of commitment problems is larger
where income risk is larger. However, the rebargaining frequency is found to be small where
income volatility is large. The Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficient is larger
where income risk is higher, see the right panel of Figure 9. Hence, limited commitment
affects intra-household risk sharing most strongly in couples that face rather little income
risk. However, the differences are relatively small quantitatively.
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Figure 9: Impact of higher shock volatility.
(a) Commitment issues

















(b) Female insurance coefficient


























NOTE.–The left panel shows commitment issues, measured by the variance ratio Υ (solid line) and the re-
bargaining frequency (dashed line), for different values of the standard deviation of income shocks. The right
panel shows the female insurance coefficient under full commitment (solid line) and under limited commit-
ment (dashed line). The vertical dotted line indicates the parameter value in the baseline parameterization.
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7 Conclusion
Intra-household risk sharing is an important means of insurance against idiosyncratic income
shocks when there is full commitment between household members. Limited commitment
between household members reduces their ability to insure each other. In this paper, we
have quantified how strongly empirically reasonable degrees of limited commitment reduce
individuals’ possibilities to share risk within the household. To this end, we have developed
and calibrated an incomplete-markets model with limited commitment in dual-earner house-
holds. Our results show that limited commitment reduces the insurance value of marriage by
one fourth to one third. This is associated with a welfare loss equivalent to 0.6% of lifetime
consumption.
We have also identified for which types of agents intra-household risk sharing is partic-
ularly aggravated by limited commitment. In the cross-section, risk-sharing possibilities are
particularly reduced for individuals whose patience or risk aversion is below average while
individuals with strong gains from marriage or high degrees of altruism are less affected.
As policy implications, our results suggest an increased need for other forms of insurance




A.1 The Marcet and Marimon (2019) approach
Marcet and Marimon (2019) provide an approach to rewrite general models with forward-
looking constraints in recursive formulation. In general, the occurrence of forward-looking
constraints prohibits a recursive formulation since the Bellman equation would become non-
stationary. Marcet and Marimon (2019) show that a recursive formulation is nevertheless
feasible under fairly standard conditions by introducing additional co-state variables, one for
each forward-looking constraint. These co-state variables include information about previous
binding forward-looking constraints. A similar approach has been used in the literature to
solve models with limited commitment, including the literature on family economics with
limited commitment discussed in Section 2. In this Appendix, we show that the recursive
formulation of the couple household maximization problem under limited commitment pre-
sented in Section 3 can be derived from a more standard formulation of the same problem
using the approach of Marcet and Marimon (2019).
To derive the recursive formulation, we start with a more standard notation of the prob-
lem. Index t denotes time. The current state is denoted by st and implies an income pair
y (st) = (ym (st) , yf (st)). The unconditional probability of a particular state is given by
π (st). The history of events until time t is s
t = (s0, ..., st). The unconditional probability of




. The conditional probability of a particular history of







∣∣ st) = 1.



















, for i = m, f .
Given initial Pareto weights1 µm0 = µ0 and µf0 = 1− µ0 for husband and wife, respectively,


























In both model versions, full commitment and limited commitment, Pareto weights must be
1We fix initial Pareto weights for now since the exact determination does not matter for the analysis.
However, a derivation of initial Pareto weights can be found in Appendix A.3.
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∣∣ s0) = 1. Thus, initial expected lifetime utility for both spouses must be at least
as high within the couple than as a single.
Under limited commitment, there are additional participation constraints, as expected
lifetime utility of both spouses must be at least as high within the couple as in the outside


















































∣∣ st) = 1.









≤ ym (st) + yf (st) ,






















































































denotes the multiplier on the budget constraint. The Kuhn-Tucker multipliers νm and
νm are zero whenever the corresponding participation constraint does not bind. In all other
cases, the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers are growing over time since even higher multipliers are
needed such that participation constraints are fulfilled. In consequence, the Lagrangian is
non-stationary.
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The main idea of Marcet and Marimon (2019) is to combine elements of this Lagrangian
approach in a way such that the maximization problem becomes stationary. The left-hand
sides of the participation constraints (the inside options), which are the first term in the
brackets in the second and third line of the Lagrangian, can be combined with the weighted
utility of the particular spouse in the household target function. Marcet and Marimon (2019)
show that the introduction of additional state variables transforms the problem to a station-





















= 1− µ0, station-





> 0, his or her weight in the household target function is increased as little as possible
such that the participation constraint holds with equality. Marcet and Marimon (2019) show
that the transformed maximization problem has the same solution as the original problem.






















































































































































































Since in this model, the outside options do not depend on any decision variables of the
couple household, they can be skipped from the Lagrangian and the recursive formulation
as long as they are considered for the determination of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Thus,
the recursive formulation of the maximization problem is finally (the budget constraint is
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∣∣ st) · V (y (st+1) , µm (st) , µf (st)) .
Simplifying notation by omitting the state of nature notation, the recursive formulation
becomes
V (y, µm, µf ) = µ
′



















= µ′m is notational convention.
Since the optimal allocation in this model depends only on relative Pareto weights and
couple households do not face any intertemporal decisions, it is possible to normalize Pareto
weights such that they sum up to one. In this case, the Bellman equation becomes











which is identical to (65) in the main text.
A.2 Derivation of the risk-sharing conditions
Full commitment couple household




















subject to the period budget constraints
cm + cf = ym + yf ,
given the household target function
v
(






















+ λ · (ym + yf − cm − cf ) .
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− λ = µfc0 ·
∂um (cm)
∂cm


















− λ = 0,
∂L
∂λ
= ym + yf − cm − cf = 0.
Combining the first two first-order conditions yields the risk-sharing condition (63).
Limited commitment couple household
The limited commitment couple household maximization problem is




cm, cf , µ
′)+ β · E [V (y′, µ′)] ,
subject to the period budget constraints
cm + cf = ym + yf ,
given the household target function
v
(
cm, cf , µ
′) = µ′ · um (cm) + (1− µ′) · uf (cf ) + Ψ,
and the updating rule for the Pareto weights
µ′ = argminµ̃ |µ̃− µ| such that













≥ Sf (yf ) .
The Lagrangian of the problem is
L = v
(
cm, cf , µ
′)+ β · E [V (y′, µ′)]+ λ · (ym + yf − cm − cf ) .




∂v (cm, cf , µ
′)
∂cm
− λ = µ′ · ∂um (cm)
∂cm














− λ = 0,
∂L
∂λ
= ym + yf − cm − cf = 0,
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given the updating-rule of the Pareto weight. Combining the first two first-order conditions
yields the risk-sharing condition (67):
∂um (cm) /∂cm






We have assumed (initial) Pareto weights, µfc0 and µ0, for the analysis of the full commitment
and limited commitment couple models in Section 3 which were exogenously given. Thus,
the full commitment model was strictly speaking not a collective model but rather a unitary
model since the Pareto weight was a parameter and not endogenous. The initial Pareto
weights can be endogenized in a household formation step. Household formation takes place
before shock in the first period realize. To highlight this, we use the time index 0 for the
household formation in the following.
Spouses would only enter in the household if their expected lifetime utility from being
married is higher than their corresponding value as a single. Thus, initial Pareto weights
µ̌ = {µfc0 , µ0} are determined such that the initial participation constraints
E0Vm (y, µ̌) ≥ E0Sm (ym) , (84)
E0Vf (y, µ̌) ≥ E0Sf (yf ) , (85)
with Vi (y, µ̌) =
{
V fci (y, µ̌) , Vi (y, µ̌)
}
, are fulfilled.
Several approaches are used in the literature to determine initial Pareto weights (see
Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss 2014). While the collective approach of Chiappori (1988)
does not require a particular bargaining solution, several studies use a bargaining approach
to determine the initial weights, starting with Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and
Horney (1981). The vast majority of these studies use the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.2
We follow this literature and determine µ̌ using the symmetric Nash program
NP = argmaxµ̌ [E0 (Vm (y, µ̌)− Sm (ym))]
0.5 · [E0 (Vf (y, µ̌)− Sf (yf ))]0.5 , (86)
The resulting first-order condition is
E0 (Vm (y, µ̌)− Sm (ym))
E0 (Vf (y, µ̌)− Sf (yf ))
= −E0 (∂Vm (y, µ̌) /∂µ̌)
E0 (∂Vf (y, µ̌) /∂µ̌)
. (87)
2The Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution and the Egalitarian bargaining solution of Kalai
(1977) are alternatives but have been used rarely.
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Equations (86) and (87) can be used to determine µ̌ numerically.
A.4 Solution algorithm bachelor household
Solving the limited commitment household model requires in Step 2 of Algorithm 2 the solu-
tion of the bachelor household model to check the participation constraints in Step 6. Algo-
rithm 3 summarizes the numerical solution of the bachelor household maximization problem.
Algorithm 3 (Bachelor households) The algorithm consists of the following two steps:
1: Set a convergence criterion ζ. Discretize the exogenous income processes using the
approach of Tauchen (1986).
2: Choose initial guesses for the value functions Sm,0 (ym), and Sf,0 (yf ). The optimal
policy functions are CSi (yi) = yi, i = m, f .
2a: Given that you are in iteration step j, use the Bellman equation (54) to get:














2b: If sup |Sm,j+1 (ym)− Sm,j (ym)| < ζ, and sup |Sf,j+1 (yf )− Sf,j (yf )| < ζ stop.
Otherwise set j = j + 1 and go back to Step 21a. Iterate until convergence.
A.5 Heterogeneous risk aversion
In this appendix, we investigate analytically how the Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance
coefficients depend on individuals’ risk aversion. This is helpful to isolate the effects that
result from the efficient allocation of risk between spouses on the one hand and from changes
in the strength of commitment problems on the other hand.
The starting point is the risk-sharing condition (67):
∂um (cm) /∂cm




















with i = {m, f}. −i denotes the spouse of person i. The Pareto weights are given by µ′m = µ′
and µ′f = 1− µ′.
Insurance coefficients. We now derive the Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coeffi-
cients from the risk-sharing condition. Taking logs, one obtains

















the risk-sharing condition is
















Consumption growth of person i is then given by
∆ log c′i =
σ−i
σi
·∆ log c′−i +
1
σi
·∆ log log x′′i .
The case of full commitment is nested and corresponds to the case where Pareto weights are
fixed over time:









Inserting the expression for consumption growth in the definition of the Kaplan and
Violante (2010) insurance coefficients yields
φi = 1−










































Full commitment. In the case of full commitment, the growth rate of the relative Pareto
weight of person i, ∆ log x′i, is equal to zero. Thus, cov(∆ log x
′′












If both partners have identical degrees of risk aversion, σm = σf , the insurance coefficients
are independent of risk aversion, since cov
(
∆ log c′−i, εi
)
/var(εi) is symmetric across gender.
If spouses differ with respect to risk aversion, insurance coefficients will depend on risk
aversion also under full commitment. The reaction of the insurance coefficient to changes in













Note that, under full commitment, cov
(
∆ log c′−i, εi
)
> 0, since an increase (decrease) of
household income implies that both spouses consume more (less). Thus, the insurance coef-
ficient of person i is strictly increasing in person i’s risk aversion. Moreover, the insurance












Limited commitment. Under limited commitment, the insurance coefficient is given by
the complete expression in (88). Hence, the reaction of the insurance coefficient to changes













































The insurance coefficient of person i decreases in σ−i as long as cov
(
∆ log c′−i, εi
)
> 0.
Thus, under limited commitment, there can be additional effects that weaken the relation
between person i’s risk aversion and person i’s insurance coefficient. To understand these
effects, consider for example the female insurance coefficient, i = f . There are, in general,
three scenarios for the covariance between male consumption growth and the female income
shock. First, cov (∆ log c′m, εf ) < 0 implies that a positive (negative) female income shock
decreases (increases) male consumption. Under limited commitment, female intra-household
decision power increases weakly with her income. Thus, if there is a positive income shock,
her Pareto weight tends to increase (or remain unchanged) and the male Pareto weight should
thus tend to decrease. The first scenario occurs when, on average, income shocks are in a
range such that, after a positive (negative) female income shock, the male Pareto weight
changes in a way that the husband receives on average less (more) consumption than before.
Second, cov (∆ log c′m, εf ) > 0 implies that a positive (negative) female income shock tends to
increase (decrease) male consumption. This can only occur when, on average, income shocks
are in a range such that both spouses receive higher consumption independent of a potential
rebargaining. In the third scenario, cov (∆ log c′m, εf ) = 0, female income shocks and male
consumption growth do not co-vary as both effects cancel out.
Now consider the second term on the left-hand side of (89). The covariance between
growth of the female relative Pareto weight and the female income shock is larger than or
equal to zero. In a limited-commitment model, the female relative Pareto weight x may
either increase after a female income shock, holding male income fixed, or may remain at
its previous period value. The covariance can only be equal to zero if wifes have either
never an incentive to leave the household or when spouses can fully commit. Thus, we have
cov
(
∆ log x′′f , εf
)
> 0. In summary, whether condition (89) holds or not is ultimately a
quantitative question. The right panel in Figure 6 shows that condition (89) is met in the
simulated model.
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A.6 Model with altruism
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The first-order conditions imply the intra-household risk-sharing condition(
















The limited commitment couple household problem features state-dependent Pareto weights.
Utility is given by
v
(
cm, cf , µ
′) = (µ′ + %f · (1− µ′)) · um (cm) + (1− µ′ + %m · µ′) · uf (cf ) +(




+ %m · µ′
)
·Ψ,
and the risk-sharing condition is
(



















between Spouses is Limited
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1 Introduction
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is an important concept in both labor economics and
macroeconomics. It measures how willingly individuals substitute hours worked intertempo-
rally. The Frisch elasticity determines the labor-supply responses to temporary changes in
hourly wage rates and to predictable life-cycle patterns in wage rates. It is also a decisive
determinant of the cost of business cycles and the fiscal multiplier. Despite its importance,
there is no consensus about a range of values for the Frisch elasticity with estimates from
microeconometric studies diverging substantially from the results of macroeconomic studies,
see, e.g., Keane and Rogerson 2015.
The Frisch elasticity is defined as the reaction of labor supply to changes in wage rates
holding marginal utility of wealth constant. Hence, it can be estimated in a regression of
hours worked on wage rates when controlling for consumption, the latter being closely tied to
the marginal utility of wealth, see, e.g., Altonji (1986). However, the relevant consumption
variable would be consumption of the individual worker and this information is usually not
observed in household panel surveys which are needed to account for unobserved heterogeneity
in preferences for work. Instead, the consumption information (if available at all) provided by
most household panel surveys relates to the level of the household.1 Household consumption
may be insufficient for a consistent estimation of the Frisch elasticity because most workers
live in families2 and there are strong theoretical and empirical arguments that consumption
of a household can develop quite differently from consumption of its individual members.
Recent papers in family economics have referred to models of limited commitment to explain
differential dynamics of individual and household consumption. There is strong empirical
1To cope with a number of issues regarding consumption data, the seminal paper by Altonji (1986) proposed
to estimate the labor supply condition in growth rates and to identify the Frisch elasticity as the coefficient
on expected wage growth. The latter is uncorrelated with changes in marginal utility when households have
sufficient access to insurance or borrowing possibilities. In empirical applications, the Altonji (1986) approach
faces two challenges. First, consumption insurance possibilities are limited in the real world and a substantial
share of households has close to no wealth (see Kuhn and Ŕıos-Rull 2016) reducing their ability to self-insure.
Domeij and Floden (2006) have shown that this results in a substantial downward bias in the estimated
Frisch elasticity. Bredemeier et al. (2019) have shown that this challenge can be overcome by exploiting the
double-earner structure of most households and have derived an estimation procedure that yields an unbiased
estimate of the Frisch elasticity in presence of borrowing constraints. The second challenge is that the Altonji
(1986) approach requires information on expected wage growth which is usually obtained using instrumental
variables. However, wage growth – in contrast to wage levels – is hard to predict and hence instruments tend
to be weak, see Keane (2011) for a discussion.
2In 2019, 98 million labor-force participants in the U.S. are part of a married couple (84 million) or of an
opposite-sex unmarried couple (14 million). This amounts to almost 77% of the U.S. labor force. Numbers
stem from the US Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements 2019, Tables FG1 and UC1.
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evidence for this kind of household behavior, see Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Mazzocco
(2007), Robinson (2012), Cesarini et al. (2017) and Lise and Yamada (2019). Because
commitment is limited, individual household members’ shares in total household consumption
vary and reflect members’ relative bargaining positions.
In this paper, we analyze the consequence of limited commitment in the family for the
estimation of labor-supply elasticities. As intra-household bargaining positions depend on
income potentials and thus on wage rates, proxying individual consumption by household
consumption in a labor-supply regression yields biased estimates of the Frisch elasticity. We
study the quantitative importance of estimation biases arising from limited commitment,
develop new estimation approaches that yield unbiased estimates of the Frisch elasticity and
apply these approaches to panel data from the United States.3 In a first part of the paper,
we build a quantitative model of decision making with limited commitment between spouses
in dual-earner households which we use to document estimation biases arising from limited
commitment and to develop improved estimation procedures. In such a model, a rise in
an individual’s hourly wage rate exerts three effects on the individuals’ labor supply. First,
labor supply increases due to a conventional substitution effect that is governed by the Frisch
elasticity and can be used to recover this elasticity. Second, household consumption increases
which induces labor supply to fall due to a wealth effect. Third, the individual’s bargaining
position in the household may increase reflecting the improvement of its outside option. This
leads the household to grant more leisure to the individual thereby reducing its labor supply
through a limited-commitment effect.4 Both the income effect and the limited-commitment
effect could be accounted for with data on individual consumption, but data on household
consumption can only account for the income effect but not the limited-commitment effect.
We study the impact of this limited-commitment effect on labor-supply estimations in two
ways. First, we exploit first-order conditions of our model to show analytically that conven-
tional estimation procedures yield biased results. Second, we run Monte-Carlo experiments
3Specifically, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Recent waves of the PSID include more
detailed information on household consumption than the waves used by, e.g., Altonji (1986) where researchers
were restricted to using food expenditures as a proxy for consumption. Still, also in recent waves of the
PSID, consumption information is provided on the level of the household. Blundell et al. (2016) and Blundell
et al. (2018) use these data to estimate the parameters of life-cycle models with intra-household risk sharing,
including labor-supply elasticities. Other papers that have used the consumption data from the PSID are,
e.g., Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014), Hokayem and Ziliak (2014), Andreski et al. (2014), and Charles et al.
(2014).
4While for some applications, the total effect may be a sufficient statistic, other applications require dis-
entangling changes in labor supply due to intertemporal substitution from changes due to wealth effects or
changes in bargaining powers, i.e., to identify the Frisch elasticity. For example, in many macroeconomic
contexts, one is interested in the reaction of labor supply to temporary changes in aggregate wage rates. This
reaction is mostly driven by intertemporal substitution as the wealth effect is small and outside options are
affected rather symmetrically.
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to document the quantitative importance of these biases using simulated model data from our
quantitative model. Estimating a standard labor-supply condition may yield an estimated
Frisch elasticity that is up to 30% below its true value when household consumption rather
than individual consumption is controlled for.
We then use our model to develop improved estimation procedures that can be applied
when data on individual consumption is not available. The key to obtaining an unbiased
estimate of the Frisch elasticity in a limited-commitment context without having access to
individual consumption data is to use information on other household member’s behavior to
assess bargaining positions: In dual-earner households, hours worked and wage rates of ones
spouse convey information about relative bargaining positions.
A first approach is to use information on hours worked and the wage rate of the spouse
as additional controls in a labor-supply regression. We use our model to show analytically
that this approach yields almost unbiased estimates when these variables are included in
sufficiently flexible form. We use Monte-Carlo experiments to quantify the bias reduction
achieved by this approach and find that it can reduce the bias due to limited commitment
by more than three quarters when a second-order polynomial is used. Second, we develop an
iterative procedure. In this approach, we deduce spouses’ relative bargaining positions from
relative labor supply and relative wage rates based on a guess of the Frisch elasticity and other
parameters, then update this guess in a labor-supply regression where the deduced bargaining
position is added as an additional control. This procedure is iterated until convergence. We
show in Monte-Carlo experiments that, while more complicated than the first approach, this
procedure converges to an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity.
In the empirical part of the paper, we apply our approaches to panel data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics. The results are strongly supportive of our theoretical results.
Applying our improved estimation approaches, we find estimates of the Frisch elasticity of
around 0.7. Our estimates are hence considerably larger than the estimates of many other
microeconometric studies where the elasticity of labor supply is estimated to be essentially
zero (see, for example, Browning et al. 1985, Blundell and Walker 1986, and Ziliak and
Kniesner 1999). Thus, controlling for consumption and correcting for biases due to limited
commitment between spouses can contribute to reconciling microeconometric evidence on the
Frisch elasticity with the results of macroeconomic model evaluations that typically deliver
larger Frisch elasticities.
This chapter contributes to both, the literature on estimating labor-supply elasticities and
the limited-commitment couple-household literature. Keane (2011) provides a comprehensive
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survey of the literature on estimating labor-supply elasticities. Specifically, the micro/macro
puzzle on the elasticity of labor supply is a central question in this literature, see Keane and
Rogerson (2015) for an overview. Several studies have contributed to solving the micro/macro
puzzle by pointing out a number of downward biases in microeconometric estimates, see, e.g.,
Blomquist (1985, 1988),Alogoskoufis (1987), Heckman (1993), Rupert et al. (2000), Imai
and Keane (2004), and Domeij and Floden (2006). This chapter adds to this by showing
that limited commitment between spouses – if not appropriately corrected for – also biases
estimates of the Frisch elasticity downward.
The literature on limited commitment between spouses in marriages has been surveyed
by Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017). A large part of this literature documents empirical
evidence for limited commitment, i.e., rejects the competing full-commitment paradigm, see,
e.g., Mazzocco 2007, Robinson 2012, and Lise and Yamada 2019. A second strand of the
literature studies the consequences of limited commitment, see, e.g., Mazzocco et al. (2014),
Voena 2015, and Ábrahám and Laczó 2018. While most papers in this second group focus on
welfare or policy effects, we study the consequence of limited commitment for labor-supply
estimations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We develop a limited-commitment
couple-household model in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive estimation approaches an-
alytically. In Section 4, we perform Monte-Carlo experiments to evaluate our estimation
approaches using synthetic data from a simulation of our calibrated model. In Section 5, we
provide an empirical application of our estimation approaches using PSID data. Section 6
concludes.
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2 A dual-earner household model with limited commitment
We consider an economy which is populated by a continuum of agents of mass 2. The
population is equally divided into men and women. We distinguish between agents (individual
persons) and households which consist of two agents. Agents differ by a deterministic wage
component (fixed effect) and by an idiosyncratic stochastic component. Wage rates are
exogenous in the model. Households differ from one another by the wage fixed effects of
household members, by the idiosyncratic productivities of household members, and by direct
utility gains from marriage. Intra-household decision-making of couples is characterized by
limited commitment among spouses. Specifically, this means that agent’s behavior will react
to changes in their relative bargaining positions that occur during the household’s life. This
is responsible for the bias in conventional labor-supply estimations as wage raises improve
bargaining positions which tends to increase leisure time and reduce labor supply. Spouses
are subject to joint budget constraints. Throughout, variables with a prime denote next
period values.
Spouses bargain over how much each of them works and consumes in different states
of the world. Bargaining positions are determined by spouses’ outside options which we
take to be the lifetime utility of single life. Importantly, we take into account that either
spouse can leave the household at his or her own choice (unilateral divorce) whenever the
outside option is preferable to life within the household. This approach follows, among others,
Mazzocco (2007), Voena (2015), and Ábrahám and Laczó (2018). Spouses acknowledge this
possibility in their bargaining process and understand that they have no possibility to enforce
promises made by the partner. Put differently, commitment to promises made to the partner
is limited. As a consequence, any bargained plan over consumption and labor supply has to
ensure that partners never actually want to leave the household. This can be understood as
a self-enforcing contract1 between the spouses as, under the given plan, incentives are always
as such that spouses want to stay in the household - or, more technically, that participation
constraints hold at any time.
We make use of the results of Nash (1950) and Marcet and Marimon (2019) which imply
that such a problem can be written as the problem of a Pareto planner with time-varying
1In fact, the limited-commitment couple-household literature uses the methods developed by the literature
on self-enforcing recursive contracts. Several studies have used the same general approach to study topics
from development economics, political economy, international economics, and labor economics. See Golosov
et al. (2016) for an introduction into the theoretical backgrounds and for an overview of the literature.
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weights on individual utilities wherein changes in individual Pareto weights reflect the bind-
ingness of the respective participation constraint. This formulation of the household decision
problem has an intuitive interpretation as one can understand changes in Pareto weights as
the household adjusting (or ”rebargaining”) the weight of an individual member when this
member would otherwise want to leave the household.
Preferences. Agents receive utility from consumption of goods and services c, and disutility
from labor n. An individual agent is denoted by ij, where i = {m, f} denotes the gender of
agent ij and j denotes the household. Individual preferences of agent ij are represented by
the concave utility function









when married, and by









if ij is single or divorced. 1/σ measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of con-
sumption, αij is the individual weight on disutility of labor, and ηi is the Frisch labor-supply
elasticity which may depend on gender. Agents discount future utility with the discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1). The direct utility gain from being married, Ψj , captures all gains and
losses from marriage not explicitly modeled such as love, companionship, intimacy, children,
returns to scale in consumption, home production, etc. Since we model being divorced as an
absorbing state, the utility gain Ψj also includes the negative value of remarriage possibilities
as a divorcee. Direct utility gains from marriage are household-specific and differences in this
parameter between households may reflect match quality. In Section 4.1, we calibrate this
parameter to match the extent of commitment issues in our model to an empirical target.
Wage rates and budget constraint. Market work, n, is rewarded by the real wage rate
w measured in units of the market consumption good c which is the numéraire. Individual
wage rates consist of three components: a fixed effect ψij , a gender-specific effect νi, and a
stochastic component zij :
logwij = logψij + log νi + zij . (90)
The vector of joint wage rate realizations is denoted by ωj = (wmj , wfj). The budget con-
straint of the couple is
cmj + cfj ≤ wmjnmj + wfjnfj . (91)
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We do not specify a particular wage process at this point since our analytical results in Section
3 do not require a particular specification of the wage process. In our quantitative analysis
in Section 4, we assume that the stochastic wage component follows a stationary first-order
autoregressive process (AR).
Intra-household decision-making under limited commitment. Intra-household decision-
making is characterized by limited commitment as in Mazzocco (2007), Voena (2015), and
Ábrahám and Laczó (2018). Following Ábrahám and Laczó (2018), we assume that the out-
side option of a spouse is being a single for the rest of her life.2 Formally, the participation
constraints of the individual spouses are
Vij (ωj , µij , µ−ij) ≥ Sij (wij) , (92)
where Vij denotes the expected lifetime utility of agent ij within the couple household, −ij is
individual ij’s spouse, and Sij denotes the expected lifetime utility when being single.
3 The
behavior of the couple under limited commitment is ex-post efficient such that the household
target function can be summarized as a weighted sum of individual utility functions, with
Pareto weights µmj and µfj , respectively, see Mazzocco (2007). We assume that initial Pareto
weights µmj,0 and µfj,0 are determined by Nash bargaining.
Compared to a situation with full commitment, where participation constraints must be
only fulfilled once at the time of household formation, couples which are subject to limited
commitment face the participation constraints as additional constraints in every period and
in any state of nature. As a consequence, the maximization problem of the couple household
becomes non-stationary. Marcet and Marimon (2019) show that the non-stationary maxi-
mization problem with participation constraints of the spouses can be transformed into a
stationary problem where the Pareto weights of the spouses become additional time-varying
state variables.4 Individual Pareto weights react to changing outside options of the partners
as follows. Whenever one spouse has an incentive to leave the household, i.e., his or her par-
ticipation constraint is binding, the couple increases his or her Pareto weight such that his
or her participation constraint holds with equality. This is achieved by adjusting the Pareto
weight of the spouse by exactly the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the respective participation
2This assumption is for computational simplicity. A more elaborated modeling of the outside option would
yield the same implications in our context. Specifically, giving divorcees the possibility to remarry (as in
Voena (2015) would raise the value of the outside option and lead us to recalibrate the direct utility value
from marriage, Ψ, accordingly.
3The maximization problem of the single household can be found in Appendix A.1.1.
4A detailed derivation of the problem can be found in Appendix A.1.2.
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constraint (see Marcet and Marimon 2019).5
We formulate the household target function as
v
(






= µ′mj · umj (cmj , nmj) + µ′fj · ufj (cfj , nfj) .
The prime notation of the Pareto weights highlights that given the Pareto weights from the
previous period as state variables, couples update the Pareto weights and thereby the relative
Pareto weight whenever participation constraints are binding.
To summarize, the results of Nash (1950) and Marcet and Marimon (2019) allow to
formulate the household decision problem as a simple Pareto planning problem where the
couple household maximizes
Vj (ωj , µmj , µfj) = max
cmj ,cfj ,nmj ,nfj
v
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with the updating rule for the Pareto weights
µ′ij = µij + φij ,
where φij is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the participation constraint (92), subject to
the period budget constraints (91). E denotes the expectation operator which includes all
information in the particular period.
The first-order conditions are
λj = µ
′
mj · c−σmj = µ
′
fj · c−σfj , (94)












and the budget constraint (91), given the vector of wage rate realizations ωj and the previous
period Pareto weights, µmj and µfj . λj denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint (91). The ratio of marginal utilities of consumption of the spouses may vary over
time due to potential time variation in the Pareto weights which can be seen from the risk-
sharing condition (94). Thus, intra-household risk-sharing is imperfect since commitment is
5In the numerical implementation, we use that the problem can be further simplified such that the sole
additional state variable is the relative Pareto weight of one of the spouses, e.g., the male. In doing so,
we adapt the numerical approach of Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) to our model. Whenever the participation
constraint of one spouse is binding, the Pareto weight of this spouse increases which implies a change in the
relative Pareto weight of the male.
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limited. The labor-supply conditions are given by (95) and (96). Also these static first-order
conditions reflect spouses’ varying bargaining powers µ′ij . We use these first-order conditions
to derive estimation equations under limited commitment in Section 3.
Full commitment. As a benchmark to document estimation biases originating from lim-
ited commitment, we also consider the special case where spouses can fully commit. In
particular, we consider specifications where estimates of the Frisch labor-supply elasticity are
biased under limited commitment while they are unbiased under full commitment. In the
full-commitment case, Pareto weights are determined once and for all such that participation
constraints at the time of household formation are fulfilled. We assume that Pareto weights
are determined by a Nash bargaining solution as in the case of limited commitment. Since
Pareto weights are fixed under full commitment, we have µ′ij = µij = µ̄ij . The resulting
first-order conditions under full commitment are:
λj = µ̄mj · c−σmj = µ̄fj · c
−σ
fj , (97)












Note that the first-order conditions differ from the limited-commitment model only in that
the Pareto weights are constant. This has important implications for the consistency of
labor-supply estimations as discussed in the next section.
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3 Estimation approaches to recover the Frisch elasticity of
labor-supply
In this section, we use the first-order conditions of the model to derive conditions which
can be used to estimate the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Whether the estimations yield
unbiased estimates depends on the availability of data on individual consumption and on
whether there is full or limited commitment between spouses.
3.1 The estimation problem
We introduce time indices to clarify the panel dimension of the estimation. Rearranging the








where we define µijt = µ
′
ij for notational convenience. Using the first-order conditions for
individual consumption λjt = µijt · c−σijt and taking logs, the labor-supply condition becomes
log nijt = −ηi · logαij + ηi · logwijt − ηi · σ · log cijt.
Hence, if one had access to data on individual consumption, one could simply estimate
log nijt = δ0,ij + δ1,i · logwijt + δ2,i · log cijt + εijt, (100)
where δ1,i and δ2,i are regression coefficients, δ0,ij is an individual fixed effect, and εijt is
a residual stemming from measurement errors. Estimating equation (100) with OLS would
yield an unbiased estimate, δ̂1,i for the Frisch labor-supply elasticity,
E δ̂1,i = ηi.
However, to estimate condition (100), one needs data on individual consumption. In a
couple household, individual consumption can behave differently from household consump-
tion and usually only the latter is observed in household panel data. Then, the estimation
equation (100) could only be estimated using household consumption which would result in an
estimation bias when household consumption and individual consumption are not perfectly
correlated.
We now derive this bias analytically and discuss how it depends on the degree of com-
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mitment in the household. Household consumption is given by
cjt = cmjt + cfjt.
Household consumption can be related to individual consumption of one of the spouses
through the risk-sharing condition
µmjt · c−σmjt = µfjt · c
−σ
fjt.








where xijt = µijt/µ−ijt denotes the relative Pareto weight of individual ij, and −ij denotes
the spouse of agent ij. Using these conditions, the labor-supply condition can be written as






− ηi · σ · log cjt. (101)
Hence, if the relative Pareto weight xijt were observable, one could estimate







where γ0,ij is an individual fixed effect, γ1,i, γ2,i, and γ3,i are regression coefficients, and εijt
is a residual, and would obtain an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity,
E γ̂1,i = ηi.
However, while household consumption, cjt, on the right-hand side of (102) is in principle
observable, the relative Pareto weight, xijt, cannot be observed in empirical data. Thus, one
would usually estimate the equation
log nijt = κ0,ij + κ1,i · logwijt + κ2,i · log cjt + ε̃ijt, (103)














the estimated coefficient on the log wage rate is












Hence, such an estimation would still yield an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity if the
omitted relative Pareto weight were a constant, i.e., if there were full commitment. Then,






would simply become part of the individual fixed effect, κ0,ij .







time. The deviation from its individual-specific mean would then be part of the combined
residual ε̃ijt. This is problematic because the relative Pareto weight and hence the combined
residual is correlated with the wage rate. Wage raises improve outside options and hence
bargaining positions and can therefore lead to an increase in the individual’s Pareto weight.
Hence, logwijt and ε̃ijt (which includes a term decreasing in xijt) are negatively correlated
and, as a consequence, an omitted variable bias occurs and the estimate of the Frisch labor-
supply elasticity, κ̂1,i, is downward biased.
3.2 Addressing the estimation problem
The bias in the estimate of the Frisch elasticity originates from the fundamental unobservabil-
ity of spouses’ relative bargaining positions which are part of the true labor-supply condition






. In this section, we present two approaches that
ameliorate this problem. Both approaches have in common that they use the observable
behavior of an individual’s spouse to gather information about the individual’s relative bar-
gaining position. Specifically, information about relative Pareto weights can be obtained
from spouses’ relative labor supply conditional on wage rates. In particular, dividing the two





















in equation (101) and substituting in condition (104). The advantage of this
approach is that it yields a linear condition that can easily be estimated. Its disadvantage
stems from the necessary approximation which implies that the resulting coefficients are
subject to approximation errors.







(101) effectively observable by using condition (104) and then to estimate (102). This ap-
proach delivers an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity but requires iterative estimation








































(log xijt + log x) + Λijt,
(105)
where κ = 1 + x−1/σ, Φijt and Λijt are higher-order terms, and the last step uses that
xijt − x = 1/x · (xijtx − 1) is approximately 1/x · log(xijtx) in the vicinity of the point of
approximation.1











 logw−ijt − logwijt + logαij − logα−ij
+ 1ηi log nijt −
1
η−i
log n−ijt + log x
+ Λ2.
Inserting this equation in (101) and solving for nijt yields the approximated labor-supply
condition











· ηi · σ · log cjt − ηi ·
ϑ
1− ϑ









with ϑ = 1/ (κσ) . Hence, estimating
log nijt = ζ0,ij + ζ1,i · logwijt + ζ2,i · logw−ijt + ζ3,i · log n−ijt + ζ4,i · log cjt + εijt, (107)
where ζ0,ij is an individual fixed effect, ζ1,i, ζ2,i, ζ3,i, and ζ4,i are regression coefficients, and
εijt is a residual delivers an estimate of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
E ζ̂i,1 ≈ ηi,
which is close to the true Frisch elasticity if the first-order approximation in (105) is sufficiently
accurate. More accuracy can be achieved by adding the non-linear terms in Λ2, i.e., higher
orders and interactions of spouses’ wage rates and hours. We quantify the accuracy of this
1The particular point of approximation chosen, x, is irrelevant for the main results as it does not affect the
relation between wage rates and labor supply, see below.
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approach in our Monte-Carlo study in Section 4.2.
Iterative estimation






in equation (102) from observed information on relative labor supply and wage rates. From
equation (104), one can deduce the relative Pareto weight xijt from observations for wage
rates wijt and w−ijt and hours nijt and n−ijt when one has a guess for the parameters αij ,







for σ. The key to an unbiased estimate for the Frisch elasticity is that estimated coefficients
from a regression of condition (102) also contain information about all these parameters
which can be used to update guesses. Therefore, we propose an iterative approach where we
guess parameter values, infer relative bargaining weights, run a regression of condition (102),
update the guesses and then iterate until convergence.
Specifically, the estimation approach proceeds as follows. First, one makes a guess for ηm,
ηf , and σ as well as for the household-specific preference weights, αij . Then, one repeats the
following steps until convergence.
1. Use the observable information on wijt, w−ijt, nijt, and n−ijt as well as the guesses











for every individual ij and every period t.






run gender-specific regressions of condition (102).
Use the estimated coefficient to update the guesses as follows: ηi = γ̂1,i, σ = γ̂2,i/ηi,
and αij = exp (−γ̂0,ij/ηi).
After convergence, the estimate on the log wage rate in the regression for gender i is an
unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity,
E γ̂1,i = ηi.
3.3 Graphical illustration
We now illustrate graphically estimation biases resulting from limited commitment and how
exploiting observable behavior of spouses can help correcting these biases.For this, we use our
calibrated economy which is solved numerically (see Section 4 below for a description of our
calibration strategy). Here, we provide a graphical illustration of the different effects changes
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Figure 10: Policy functions.
(a) Labor supply of the husband
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(b) Relative Pareto weight of the husband
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(c) Consumption of the husband
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(e) Labor supply of the wife
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(f) Relative labor income of the husband
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NOTE.–See Section 4.1 for a description of the calibration of the quantitative model. The wage rate of
spouse ij is given by logwij = logψij + log νi + zij , where zij follows a first-order autoregressive process
with autocorrelation 0.9136 and innovation variance 0.0426. The gender wage gap is
νf
νm
= 0.8. In the fig-
ure, we consider a household where both spouses have the same fixed effect, ψij = −0.3428. Thus, (logged)
mean wage rates are −0.3428 (male) and −0.5659 (female). Wife’s wage rate wfj and relative Pareto weight
from the previous period, xmj , fixed at their respective mean levels.
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Figure 11: Illustration of estimation approaches.
(a) Labor supply, controlled for individual con-
sumption
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(b) Labor supply, controlled for household con-
sumption
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(c) Labor supply, controlled for household con-
sumption and spouse’s hours and wage rate
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(d) Labor supply, controlled for household con-
sumption and deduced bargaining weights
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NOTE.–See Section 4.1 for a description of the calibration of the quantitative model. The wage rate of
spouse ij is given by logwij = logψij + log νi + zij , where zij follows a first-order autoregressive process
with autocorrelation 0.9136 and innovation variance 0.0426. The gender wage gap is
νf
νm
= 0.8. In the fig-
ure, we consider a household where both spouses have the same fixed effect, ψij = −0.3428. Thus, (logged)
mean wage rates are −0.3428 (male) and −0.5659 (female). Wife’s wage rate wfj and relative Pareto weight
from the previous period, xmj , fixed at their respective mean levels.
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in wage rates exert on labor supply in our model, how they bias labor-supply estimations,
and how the observable behavior of the spouse can help correcting this bias.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the labor supply of the husband as a function of his wage
rate, hence, his labor-supply function. For the figures, we have fixed the wife’s wage rate
wfj and the relative Pareto weight from the previous period, xmj , at their respective mean
levels. Under full commitment (see dashed line), the labor-supply function of the husband
is smoothly upward sloping with a flattening out at high wage rates where income effects
are strong. Under limited commitment (see solid line), the labor-supply function has two
additional kinks. When the wage rate is high, the individual works less than under full
commitment and, reversely, the individual works more than under full commitment when the
wage rate is low. These kinks visualize the limited-commitment effect of changes in wage
rates on labor supply. They are the result of adjustments in the husband’s relative Pareto
weight xmj which is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1. When the wage rate increases, the
outside option of the husband improves. Eventually, he is tempted to leave the household
and can only be prevented from doing so when the household increases the weight of the
husband in household preferences. This induces the household to value his leisure time more
strongly and to reduce his labor supply accordingly. When the husband’s wage rate is low,
it is the wife who may be tempted to leave the household because she now has to give much
of her earnings to the husband which makes her outside option relatively more attractive.
Then, the Pareto weight of the husband is reduced and, accordingly, his labor supply is larger
compared to the case of full commitment.
To correct for the limited-commitment effect in a labor-supply regression, one needs to
include variables that carry sufficient information about spouses’ relative bargaining positions
or, put differently, also show the respective kinks which reflect adjustment of relative bargain-
ing weights. Panel (c) shows that individual consumption carries this information. When
commitment between spouses is limited, consumption of the husband kinks upward when
his relative Pareto weight increases and, reversely, his consumption kinks downward when
his relative weight is reduced. As discussed before, information on individual consumption is
mostly not available in household panel data and in empirical estimations one therefore needs
to rely on total household consumption. In contrast to individual consumption, household
consumption is substantially less informative about changes in bargaining positions, see panel
(d). Household consumption shows no kinks but only a slight and smooth reduction when
Pareto weights need to be adjusted.2
2In these situations, the spouse with the relatively low wage works relatively much and the other spouse
enjoys relatively much consumption in order to be kept in the household. Hence, labor earnings and thus
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Panel (e) shows the wife’s labor supply as a function of the husband’s wage rate. While
the cross-wage effect is generally negative reflecting income effects, we also observe kinks that
reflect limited-commitment effects. Thus, the cross-wage effect does contain some information
about changes in relative bargaining weights. When the husband’s wage rate is high and his
Pareto weight is increased, labor supply of the wife rises because the household values her
leisure time relatively less.3. This shows that controlling for the spouse’s hours worked in
a labor-supply regression picks up some of the limited-commitment effect which one wants
to correct for in order to isolate the substitution effect and thus helps to identify the Frisch
elasticity. Note that this approach is feasible in empirical applications as household panel
surveys usually do report variables for the partner. Finally, panel (f) of Figure 10 shows the
husband’s relative labor income which is connected to the term in condition (104) which we
use to deduce relative bargaining weights in our iterative procedure. Also this variable shows
kinks where Pareto weights are adjusted under limited commitment. Note that the latter
two variables, the cross-wage labor supply and relative labor earnings, are informative about
changes in relative bargaining weights because the kinks in those variables go into opposite
directions depending on whether the husband’s relative Pareto weight is adjusted upward or
downward. By contrast, household consumption is fundamentally inept to account for the
limited-commitment effect because household consumption is reduced whenever weights are
adjusted, independent of the direction of the adjustment.
In Figure 11, we illustrate our estimation approaches graphically. Specifically, we plot
rearranged versions of the estimation conditions (100), (101), (103), and (107) where we
subtract terms from the right-hand side which are in principle observable or can be made
observable, respectively.4 In panel (a), we plot the term log nmj + σηm log cmj , i.e., the
husband’s labor supply controlled for the husbands’ consumption, against the log wage rate
of the husband. Under both full and limited commitment, the result is a straight line with
slope 0.69 which is the Frisch elasticity of husband’s labor supply in our a calibration. This
illustrates that, if one had access to data on individual consumption, the Frisch elasticity
could be inferred from a simple labor-supply regression with individual consumption as a
control. Under limited commitment, the policy function for labor supply has kinks but these
kinks are straightened out by controlling for individual consumption which shows the opposite
kinks, see panels (a) and (c) of Figure 10.
consumption decrease relative to the full-commitment case.
3The opposite happens for low wage rates of the husband, where the wife’s Pareto weight is increased and
her labor supply is thus reduced
4The resulting lines can be understood as the analogs to scatterplots where one shows residuals from a
regression of the dependent variable on control variables against the regressor of interest.
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In panel (b) of Figure 11, we take into account that individual consumption data is
usually not available and control for household consumption instead, i.e., we plot the term
log nmj + σηm log cj against the husband’s log wage rate. If there were full commitment
between spouses, the result would still be a straight line and the slope would equal the Frisch
elasticity ηm. However, under limited commitment, the kinks from the policy function for
labor supply are not straightened out by controlling for household consumption since the
latter has no kinks.
In Panel (c) of Figure 11, we consider our linear estimation approach from Section 3.2. We
plot the husband’s labor supply controlling for household consumption as well as hours worked
and the wage rate of the wife, i.e., the term log nijt− ζ̂2,i · logw−ijt− ζ̂3,i · log n−ijt− ζ̂4,i · log cjt
from a rearranged version of the estimation condition (107), using the estimated coefficients
from the Monte-Carlo regressions.5 Under full commitment, the result is a straight line with
a slope close to the true Frisch elasticity which is 0.69. This is not surprising as already
controlling for household consumption alone delivers this result, see panel (b). Under limited
commitment, where controlling for household consumption alone is insufficient to straighten
out the kinks in the labor-supply function, additionally controlling for the partner’s hours and
wage rate with their informative kinks does achieve a substantial straightening. Furthermore,
the resulting line is only slightly flatter than its full-commitment counterpart, illustrating that
an estimate close to the true Frisch elasticity can be achieved in a labor-supply regression
that controls for household consumption as well as hours worked by the partner and the
partner’s wage rate.
Panel (d) of Figure 11 illustrates the final step of our iterative estimation procedure.
When parameter guesses have converged sufficiently, the deduced value x̃ for the relative
Pareto weight is close to its true value x. Then, plotting the term log nmj + σηm log cj −
σηm log(1 + x̃mj
−1/σ), which is the rearranged left-hand side of condition (102) when the
latter two terms are added, against the log wage rate of the wife results in a straight line for
both full and limited commitment. In both cases, the slope of the line is equal to the true
Frisch elasticity for women.
5Here, we use regression coefficients instead of model parameters because the parameter κ in the linearized
condition (106) depends on the point of approximation, which we do not need to specify for the regression,
and is infinite under full commitment.
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4 Monte-Carlo study
In this section, we use our model to perform Monte Carlo studies to evaluate the performance
of the estimation approaches discussed in Section 3.
4.1 Calibration and simulation set-up
Table 22 summarizes the parameter values. The parametrization is a combination of setting
some parameters to values taken from the literature and calibrating others. Our calibration
strategy focuses on targets in the labor market and the extent of commitment issues since
these aspects are the most relevant for our analysis.
The stochastic wage rate component is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive
process
zijt = ρ · zijt−1 + εijt,




. Floden and Lindé (2001) estimate such
a process for a joint sample of men and women from PSID data. We use their estimates and set
ρ = 0.9136 and σ2ε = 0.0426. Wage-rate shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated among spouses
which is in line with Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) who document a very low correlation of
employment shocks for spouses who report different occupations. The parametrization of the
fixed-effect component also follows Floden and Lindé (2001) who estimate σ2ψ = 0.1175. As
Floden and Lindé (2001), we assume that the fixed effect can take two values, ψij = exp(−σψ)
and ψij = exp(σψ), with equal probability. We account for heterogeneity in mean wages to
generate heterogeneity in mean Pareto weights across households which allows us to calibrate
the degree of commitment problems, see below. Hyslop (2001) documents a correlation of
wage fixed effects in households of 0.5 which we achieve by setting the shares of households
where both spouses have the same fixed effect to 37.5% each. The shares of households where
spouses have different fixed effects are set to 12.5% each. We calibrate the gender-specific
components of the wage rates to match the observed gender wage gap of about 20% (see,
e.g., Blau and Kahn 2017). To match this target, we set νm = 1 and νf = 0.8.
The true Frisch labor-supply elasticities in our model are given by the parameters ηm
and ηf . In line with the empirical results of Bredemeier et al. (2019), we set ηm = 0.69 and
ηf = 1.05.
In line with the parametrization of the wage process, we consider two different average
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Table 22: Parameter values, baseline model
Description Parameter Value Source
Autocorrelation wage shock ρ 0.9136 Floden and Lindé (2001)
Variance wage shock σ2ε 0.0426 Floden and Lindé (2001)
Variance fixed effect σ2ψ 0.1175 Floden and Lindé (2001)
Gender-specific wage component ...
... men νm 1 calibrated
... women νf 0.8 calibrated
Frisch labor-supply elasticity ...
... men ηm 0.69 Bredemeier et al. (2019)
... women ηf 1.05 Bredemeier et al. (2019)
Disutility weight labor ...
... highly educated men αm,high 13.69 calibrated
... less educated men αm,low 28.75 calibrated
... highly educated women αf,high 19.79 calibrated
... less educated women αf,low 54.27 calibrated
Marriage utility gain parameter ...
... households with commitment issues Ψlow 0.0286 calibrated
... households without commitment issues Ψhigh 5 set
Discount factor β 0.96 set
Risk aversion σ 1.5 set
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labor-supply targets by gender. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) document average hours worked
of different education groups, both for men and women. We distinguish between individuals
with a high-school degree or less and individuals with some college education or more. These
groups’ average weekly hours are 37.04 and 43.05, respectively, for men and 21.84 and 29.86,
respectively, for women. Dividing by a weekly endowment of freely disposable time of 112
hours gives the calibration targets nlow,m = 0.33, nhigh,m = 0.38, nlow,f = 0.20, and nhigh,f =
0.27. We set the group-specific disutility weights to match these targets.1
We distinguish between two different values for the direct utility gains from marriage,
Ψj .
2 Del Boca and Flinn (2012) find that 93% of all households behave only ex-post efficient
while 7% of households appear to behave in a way that is also ex-ante efficient, i.e., spouses
seem to be able to fully commit to promises made to each other. Accordingly, for 7% of
households, we set the direct utility gain from marriage to a value that implies that Pareto
weights never need to be adjusted.3 For the remaining 93% of households, we calibrate direct
utility gains from marriage in order to match the ratio of the within-household variance of
relative Pareto weights to the between-household variance of one to four as documented by
Lise and Yamada (2019). This ratio is informative for the strength of commitment problems
within households as the within-household variance of relative Pareto weights reflect revisions
or rebargaining of these weights which only happen under limited commitment. By contrast,
the between-household variance reflects heterogeneity across households at time of marriage.
The remaining model parameters are set to standard values from the literature. The
discount factor is β = 0.96 and we assume σ = 1.5.
Having solved the model4, we simulate synthetic data for 5,000 households of each house-
hold type, i.e., 40,000 households in total. For each household, we simulate 1,500 periods
and discard the first 500 periods to avoid dependence on initial conditions which gives a total
of 40,000,000 household-year observations. In our Monte-Carlo experiments, we draw 10,000
samples of 15,000 year-household combinations taking into account the the population shares
of the household types. We report average point estimates and average standard errors in
our estimations.
1In Aguiar and Hurst (2007)’s sample from the American Time Use Survey, nearly 50% of all men and
women have a high school degree or less which is consistent with our calibration of the wage fixed effects.
2Together with the four household types in the wage fixed-effect dimension, there are in total eight household
types.
3We set Ψhigh = 5.
4See Appendix A.2 for details on the numerical solution of the model.
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4.2 Simulation results
In this section, we present our Monte-Carlo results. We use simulated data to estimate the
four estimation approaches discussed above, i.e., conditions (100), (102), (103), and (107).
Table 23 summarizes the results for men and Table 25 in the Appendix shows the results for
women. When describing the results, we focus on those for men. Qualitatively, results are the
same for women. In both tables, the first two columns refer to the reference economy with
full commitment while columns 3 through 6 refer to the model with limited commitment.
We start by estimating condition (100), i.e., we run a regression of log hours worked
on an individual fixed effect, the log wage rate, and log individual consumption. This is
possible in the Monte-Carlo set-up where we can observe individual consumption while this
is usually not possible with real-world data as household panel data usually lack information
on individual consumption. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 23 show that, under both full and
limited commitment, such an estimation delivers an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity
(recall that the true Frisch elasticity is ηm = 0.69 for men).
We now estimate condition (102) where individual consumption is replaced by household
consumption. If spouses in a couple were able to fully commit to promises made to each
other, controlling for household consumption would be sufficient to obtain an unbiased esti-
mate of the Frisch elasticity, see column (2) of Table 23. The reason is that, with constant
Pareto weights under full commitment, individual consumption is proportional to household
consumption and the former can hence be perfectly proxied by the latter. However, taking
into account that commitment between spouses is limited in most households shows that
controlling for household consumption instead of individual consumption leads to a substan-
tial bias in the estimated Frisch elasticity of about 30%, see column (4) of Table 23. Put
differently, the true Frisch elasticity is about 50% larger than the results of such a regression
suggest.
We now turn to our improved estimation approaches. We apply them only for the model
with limited commitment since, in the reference model with full commitment, already the
simple regression (102) yields unbiased estimates. We start with our linear approach (107),
where the labor-supply regression is augmented by information on the wage rate and labor
supply of the individual’s spouse. Since the estimation approach is based on an approxima-
tion, its accuracy has to be assessed quantitatively. We consider two variants of our linear
estimation approach. First, we estimate condition (107) without any higher-order terms.
Second, we add the second-order terms from a Taylor expansion of the term log(1 + x−1/σ)
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Table 23: Monte-Carlo results for men, from synthetic household panel data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
full commitment limited commitment
log wage rate logwmjt 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.48 0.60 0.74 0.69
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
log individual -1.04 – -1.04 – – – –
consumption log cmjt (0.00) – (0.00) – – – –
log household – -1.04 – -0.80 -1.46 -1.62 -1.04
consumption log cjt – (0.00) – (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
log wage rate – – – – 0.34 0.34 –
of the spouse, logwfjt – – – – (0.00) (0.00) –
log hours worked – – – – -0.38 -0.34 –
by the spouse, log nfjt – – – – (0.00) (0.01) –
logwmjt × logwfjt – – – – – -0.07 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
logwmjt × log nfjt – – – – – 0.05 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
logwfjt × log nfjt – – – – – -0.05 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
(logwmjt)
2 – – – – – 0.03 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
(logwfjt)
2 – – – – – 0.04 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
(log nfjt)
2 – – – – – 0.02 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
deduced relative Pareto – – – – – – 1.04
weight term log(1 + x
−1/σ
mjt ) – – – – – – (0.00)
bias in % – – – -30 -13 7 –
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
empirically feasible no yes no yes yes yes yes
NOTE.–Results are for men. The dependent variable is (logged) hours of the male in household j in period t. A
constant and household-type fixed effects are included but not reported. Table shows average estimates from 10,000
Monte-Carlo draws, with average standard errors in parentheses.
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which reflects the role of bargaining positions in the labor-supply equation. 5
The results reported in column (5) of Table 23 show that extending the labor-supply
regression by the partner’s wage rate and hours reduces the estimation bias by more than
half. However, there still remains a bias of about 13%. When we add the second-order terms
in column (6), we obtain another reduction of the bias by about half. The estimated Frisch
elasticity is now 0.74 and hence differs from the true value of 0.69 by only 7%.6
This remaining bias can be eliminated by our iterative procedure. In this approach, we
alternate between deducing relative Pareto weights based on parameter guesses and using
results from estimating condition (102) to update the guesses. This procedure converges to
a regression where relative bargaining weights are adequately controlled for and which hence
yields an unbiased estimate of the Frisch elasticity. Our quantitative results reported in
column (7) of Table 23 show that our iterative approach delivers an unbiased estimate when
applied to the calibrated economy.
In order to analyze robustness to initial parameter guesses, we report the convergence
properties of our iterative approach for four different sets of initial parameter guesses in Figure
12.7 Recall that each iteration includes two regressions (one for each gender) with individual
fixed effects. Our iterative approach is found to be robust to initial parameter guesses. Even
for the worst set of initial guesses, #4, the estimator converges after about 200 iterations.8
The starting values for the disutility weights αm and αf are relatively unimportant for the
convergence of the estimates for the Frisch elasticities ηm and ηf .
9
In an application to empirical data, our iterative procedure is complicated by the fact that
one has to estimate a labor-supply regression also for women even if one is only interested in
estimating the Frisch elasticity for men. In the real world, female labor supply is subject to a
5Since log x can be expressed as a linear function of logwm, logwf , lognm, and lognf , see (104), the second-
order term of the Taylor expansion includes the quadratic terms (logwm)
2, (logwf )
2, (lognm)
2, and (lognf )
2,
the multiplicative terms logwm × logwf , logwm × lognm logwm × lognf , logwf × lognm, logwf × lognf ,
and lognm× lognf , as well as constants. Of these terms, we include in the regression for men all but the ones
that contain the left-hand side variable logwm. We have checked that alternatively including also these terms
confounds the estimation substantially.
6Including also third-order terms (not shown) yields an estimated Frisch elasticity of 0.71. Hence, the bias
is reduced by another four percentage points which comes, however, at the costs of including ten additional
terms (terms not including lognm). We view the regression including second-order terms shown in column
(6) of Table 23 as a reasonable compromise between consistency and applicability.
7We use identical initial guesses for the labor-disutility weights for each individual. We then update them
individually as described in Section 3.2. In the figure, we focus on the estimates for ηm and ηf . The convergence
behavior of the other parameters is similar.
8For the set of initial guesses #4, the estimates after 100 iterations are 0.7038 for ηm and 1.0777 for
ηf . After 200 iterations, the estimates are almost unbiased, 0.6913 for ηm and 1.0526 for ηf (true values:
ηm = 0.69, ηf = 1.05).
9In initial-guess set #3, we consider the case where initial guesses for αm and αf are far away from their
true values. Nevertheless, the lines in both panels are virtually indistinguishable to the lines for the more
elaborated initial guesses in set #1 .
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Figure 12: Convergence of the iterative procedure.
(a) Estimate of the labor-supply elasticity
for men, ηm














(b) Estimate of the labor-supply elastic-
ity for women, ηf












NOTE.–Convergence properties of our iterative approach for four different sets of initial guesses.
Initial guesses #1: ηm = 0.8, ηf = 0.8, αij = 20, σ = 2.
Initial guesses #2: ηm = 0.3, ηf = 2, αij = 20,, σ = 2.
Initial guesses #3: ηm = 0.8, ηf = 0.8, αij = 50, σ = 2.
Initial guesses #4: ηm = 30, ηf = 30, αij = 1200, σ = 5.
number of issues which are substantially less relevant for men and which we did not account
for in our simulation study. Examples are selection into the labor force (see e.g., Kimmel
and Kniesner 1998) and costs of child care (see e.g., Domeij and Klein 2013). These issues
would have to be taken into account in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of women’s
Frisch elasticity which is needed to identify men’s Frisch elasticity in the iterative approach.
For this reason, and given the good performance of the linear approach when second-order





We use PSID data to estimate our approximated linear-regression approach. Our sample
selection closely follows Blundell et al. (2016) who use PSID waves 1999–2009 to investigate
family labor supply as an insurance mechanism. As discussed by Blundell et al. (2016), a
key advantage of recent waves of the PSID is the newly included detailed information on
household consumption. The new design of the PSID covers over 70% of all consumption
items covered in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).1 We update the Blundell et al.
(2016) sample and consider the extended sample period 1999-2017. During this period, the
PSID data has been collected biennially.
We drop the Survey of Economic Opportunity sample and the immigrant sample. We
consider married households where both spouses are 30-57 years old as the intensive margin
of labor supply is the dominating one in this age group, see Blundell et al. (2016). To apply
our approach, we have to select dual-earner households where both spouses are working. As
in Blundell et al. (2016), we drop couples in the period where they dissolve but include these
household heads when they marry again.
We use the same definition of non-durable consumption and services as Blundell et al.
(2016).2 Missing values in the subcategories of consumption are treated as zeros. Also
following Blundell et al. (2016), we construct an education variable with three categories
that is consistent over time.3. As is standard in the labor-supply literature, the hourly wage
is constructed by dividing annual earnings of the spouses by their annual hours worked.4
We apply similar sample selection criteria to reduce the impact of measurement error as
Blundell et al. (2016). Specifically, we drop observations with wages below half the hourly
minimum wage, observations where couples have very high asset values ($20 million and
1See Blundell et al. (2016) for a comparison of consumption data from the PSID with the CEX and NIPA.
2Nondurable consumption consists of food at home and gasoline consumption and services consists of food
out of home, health insurance, health services, utilities, transportation, education, child care, home insurance,
and rent (or rent equivalent). Some sub-items of consumption (e.g., within the health services item) are not
reported after 2011.
3Category 1 is 0-11 grades (includes those with no schooling); category 2 is 12 grades, i.e. high school
with and without nonacademic training; category 3 is college dropout, college degree, or college and ad-
vanced/professional degree.
4Our regressions will take into account the so-called division bias resulting from the constructed wage rate
variable. Earnings consist of labor earnings, the labor part of business income, and the labor part of farm
income of household head.
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more), couples who receive transfers higher than twice the total household earnings and we
do not use data displaying extreme jumps from one PSID wave to the next.5
5.2 Empirical results
Table 24 summarizes our baseline estimation results from the PSID. In all specifications, we
use the same sample of household heads for which we have non-missing data on education,
consumption, wage rates, and hours worked for husband and wife (see bottom line in the
table). As is well known in the labor-supply literature (see, e.g., Altonji 1986; Borjas 1980;
Pencavel 1986 and Keane 2011), OLS results are subject to a division bias as the wage
rate is computed as earnings divided by hours worked which generates a spurious negative
correlation of the calculated hourly wage with hours worked because measurement error in
hours worked occurs on both sides of the regression equation. We therefore run an initial
wage regression and use it to calculate predicted wage rates which are uncorrelated with the
measurement error in hours worked. We then use predicted wage rates w̃ijt in the labor-
supply regression. In the wage regression, we include age, age squared and interactions of
these two variables with education, household consumption, two binary variables indicating
whether the individual is African American or white, a full set of state dummies, as well as
time effects. By taking into account the interaction terms in age and education, predicted
wages are identified through the age profiles of the returns to education, taking into account
a set of control variables as well as time effects that exploit trend and cyclicality of wages for
prediction.6 We also considered extended specifications for the wage regression, where we for
instance include age and education of the individual’s spouse or where we include additional
interactions between year and education. We found that this has no strong effect on our
baseline results. After estimating the wage regression, we eliminate the observations that fall
into the 0.25 percentile of the distribution of estimated wage residuals by year (corresponding
to 33 observations in total) and re-estimate the wage regression for the cleaned sample. This
way, we drop individuals who tend to over-report hours most strongly.
Table 24 shows the results of our labor-supply regressions. In all specifications, we include
the (log) wage rate, individual and time fixed effects and a quadratic in age. By including
time effects in the labor-supply regression we filter out effects related to the economy-wide
business cycle, i.e., demand-determined fluctuations in hours worked. By including age, which
is also included in the wage equation, we control for the most important labor-supply taste
5A jump is defined as an extremely positive (negative) change from t − 2 to t, followed by an extreme
negative (positive) change from t to t+ 2, see Blundell et al. (2016), footnote 16, for details.
6Such a specification for the wage regression is widely used in the literature. In our case, the wage regression
has an R2 of about 33%.
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Table 24: Estimation results for men, from PSID data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log wage 0.08 0.26 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.65
rate log w̃mjt (0.02) (0.13) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37)
p=0.00 p=0.05 p=0.06 p=0.07 p=0.06 p=0.08
log household – -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.04
consumption log cjt – (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
p=0.17 p=0.09 p=0.10 p=0.12 p=0.66
log wage rate – – 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.60
of the spouse logwfjt – – (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
p=0.24 p=0.24 p=0.22 p=0.07
log hours worked by – – 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.20
the spouse log nfjt – – (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
p=0.53 p=0.54 p=0.50 p=0.16
number of children – – – 0.00 0.02 –
– – – (0.01) (0.01) –
p=0.83 p=0.05
family size – – – – -0.01 –
– – – – (0.01) –
p=0.05
age of youngest child – – – – 0.00 –
child – – – – (0.00) –
p=0.14
quadratic in age yes yes yes yes yes yes
individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
second-order terms no no yes yes yes yes
predicted consumption no no no no no yes
Observations 12,086 12,086 12,086 12,086 12,086 11,517
NOTE.–Results are for men. The dependent variable is (logged) hours of the male in house-
hold j in period t. log w̃mjt is the predicted (logged) wage rate (see main text). A constant,
individual fixed effects, time effects and a quadratic in age are included in all specifications but
coefficients are not reported. Column 3 shows our preferred approach where the wage rate and
hours worked of the individual’s partner are included as well as higher-order terms. Columns 4




logwf , logwm × lognf , and logwf × lognf . Standard errors in parentheses. p is the p-value of
rejection the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero.
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shifter in our context. When the disutility from labor varies in a way that is correlated
with (predicted) wage rates, this could bias the estimated labor-supply elasticity. As a
consequence, the estimated effects of wages on labor supply could pick up a life-cycle profile
in the taste for work which we avoid by including age in the labor-supply regression.7
Column 1 refers to a simple regression where we regress (log) hours worked on (log) wage
rates, taking into account individual and time fixed effects as well as age. As discussed before,
such a regression is unable to identify the Frisch elasticity as no variable is included that
attempts to control for the marginal utility of wealth and hence income effects. As expected,
we estimate the wage sensitivity of hours worked to be very small in this specification. The
second column shows that the coefficient on the wage rate increases substantially when total
household consumption is included and hence the income effect is taken into account. Such
a regression is in the spirit of Altonji (1986) and yields an estimate for the Frisch elasticity
of 0.26. In line with the presence of wealth effects, we estimate a negative coefficient on
household consumption but the estimate is imprecise in this specification. Our analysis has
shown that total household consumption is an imperfect proxy for individual consumption
since commitment between spouses is limited. As discussed before, a regression using total
household consumption leads to an underestimation of the Frisch elasticity. The relatively
small value of 0.26 for the estimated Frisch elasticity is indicative for this downward bias.
Our Monte-Carlo studies have shown that time variation in bargaining weights can be
captured to some extent in a regression that controls for hours worked and the wage rate
of the individual’s spouse, next to household consumption. A more accurate estimation of
the Frisch elasticity is obtained when also higher-order terms are included. Our empirical
results for the PSID are in line with these theoretical predictions. When we control for
hours worked and the wage rate of the partner as well as for higher-order terms of these
variables, which is our preferred approach, we estimate a Frisch elasticity of 0.71, see column
3 in Table 24. This estimate is substantially larger than the estimate from the Altonji (1986)
regression in column 2 which does not take into account changes in bargaining weights. In our
preferred specification where the household consumption variable is augmented by variables
that capture changes in bargaining weights, the coefficient on household consumption turns
statistically significant at the 10% level. Note that our preferred estimate for the Frisch
elasticity is also very similar to our own estimate that we obtain using a different estimation
approach in first-differences where one has to control for a bias due to borrowing constraints,
7While the level term in age is collinear to time effects and is hence already controlled for, we add the
quadratic term in age to account for a non-linear pattern in the disutility of work over the life-cycle.
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see Chapter II of this Thesis.8
Columns 4 and 5 report results for robustness checks that take into account additional
potential taste shifters in labor supply. Other variables than age used in the wage regression
may also be considered taste shifters in labor supply, an example is education. However, as
they are time-invariant they are already accounted for in the labor-supply regression by the
individual fixed effects. As potential taste shifters that display time variation, we control
for the number of children, family size, and the age of the youngest child in the household.
We find that this has close to no additional effect on our preferred estimate for the Frisch
elasticity reported in column 3.
To make our setting directly comparable to Altonji (1986), we also consider a specifica-
tion where we use predicted consumption rather than reported consumption. Altonji (1986)
discusses that variation in the relative tastes for leisure and consumption can lead to a corre-
lation between consumption and labor supply that does not necessarily reflect wealth effects
only.9 We follow Altonji (1986) and predict consumption using information on household
wealth, family size, children, health and also include year effects (that capture the interest
rates used by Altonji), and individual fixed effects (that capture race and characteristics of
the place of residence which are used by Altonji).10 In this specification, we estimate a similar
Frisch elasticity as in our preferred specification, see column 6 of Table 24.
8The estimated coefficient on the partner’s wage rate is similar to the one in our Monte-Carlo analysis
but it is estimated imprecisely. The estimated coefficient on hours worked by the partner shows the opposite
sign than in our Monte-Carlo studies which may be due to complementarities in leisure between spouses.
Such complementarity would not impact on the informativeness of spousal hours about relative bargaining
positions.
9Note that these arguments relate to the coefficient on consumption and not directly to the one on the wage
rate. In addition, only those idiosyncratic fluctuations in taste shifters are concerned that are not already
captured in time- or individual fixed effects.
10We construct assets as the sum of cash, bonds, stocks, the value of any business, vehicles, housing and
other real estate, pension funds, and substract mortgages and other debts.
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6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the consequence of limited commitment in the family for the estimation of
labor-supply elasticities. In principle, the Frisch elasticity can be estimated in a regression
of hours worked on the hourly wage rate where one controls for consumption as a measure of
the marginal utility of wealth. We show that such a regression yields an unbiased estimate
only when information on individual consumption is available or when there is commitment
in the household. We have developed and calibrated a dual-earner household model with
limited commitment to analyze the quantitative importance of the bias that results when
commitment between household members is limited and household consumption is used as a
proxy for household consumption. In such a misspecified model, we have found that estimated
Frisch elasticities are around a third below their true values.
We have developed two improved estimation approaches that reduce or fully eliminate this
bias. Our approaches exploit information on other household member’s behavior to assess
bargaining positions. We have performed Monte-Carlo experiments to study the quantitative
performance of our estimation approaches. The best combination of close to unbiased esti-
mates and empirical applicability is achieved by a simple linear labor-supply regression that
includes hours worked and the wage rate of the individual’s partner as well as second-order
terms in these variable and the individual’s own wage as additional controls. This approach
is easy to apply and reduces the bias in the estimated Frisch elasticity to 7%.
We have applied this approach to U.S. panel data from the PSID and found Frisch elas-
ticities for men of about 0.7. In line with the predictions of our model, these estimates are
substantially larger than those obtained from labor-supply regressions that do not control for
behavior of the partner and hence fail to account for the effects of limited commitment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Intra-household decision-making under limited commitment
A.1.1 The maximization problem of the single household (outside option)
The outside option of agent ij in household j in a particular period is given by the expected
lifetime utility of being single. The maximization problem of ij being single can be stated as
Sij (wij) = max
cij ,nij







subject to the period budget-constraint
cij ≤ wijnij . (109)
The first-order conditions of the maximization problem are
wij =




∂uij (cij , nij)
∂cij
, (111)
where λij denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, and the budget con-
straint. The resulting expected lifetime utility of agent ij, Sij (wij), is used as the outside
option in his or her participation constraint (92).
A.1.2 The maximization problem of the couple household under limited
commitment
For the detailed presentation of the intra-household decision-making under limited commit-
ment from Section 2, we put more structure in the model notation. A (sub-)index t of a
variable denotes the value of the particular variable in period t. As described in Section 2,
the wage rates of the spouses are stochastic. The current state of nature is denoted by st and














. Note that the wage rates may depend
on the history of states, for example when the wage rates include an autoregressive compo-
nent. All decisions of the spouses depend also on the history of states and the current state
of nature. The unconditional probability of a particular state is given by π (st). The history
of events until time t is st = (s0, ..., st). Thus, the unconditional probability of a particular
169




. Therefore, the conditional probability of a particular history of
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using the fact that any (ex-post) efficient allocation of a couple household can be retrieved as
the solution of a maximization problem where the target function of the couple household is









the initial Pareto weights of the male and the female, respectively. For now, we take the
initial Pareto weights as given, we consider the determination of the Pareto weights below in
the household formation. Note that initial Pareto weights are determined such that they are








∣∣ s−1) · [uij (cij (st) , nij (st))− usingleij (csingleij (st) , nsingleij (st))] ≥ 0,∀i.
i.e., spouses have a higher expected lifetime utility within the couple household than being sin-
gle. Note, the conditional probability π
(
st
∣∣ s−1) indicates that the participation constraints
must be fulfilled once, at household formation. Further, note that the subindex s−1 implies
that the initial participation constraint must hold only in expectations. The particular shock
realizations in the first period, period t = 0, does not matter.
If commitment between spouses is limited, expected lifetime utility of both spouses must
be at least as high within the couple as in the outside option. Thus, there is an infinite














r) , nsingleij (s
r)
) ≥ 0,∀st, ∀t, ∀i.




shows that the participation constraints must be ful-
filled in every period, after any history of states, and in any state of nature. Using these












































































































































denotes the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint. The initial Pareto
weights µ0 and 1− µ0 guarantee that the initial participation constraints hold. However, in
contrast to a situation of full commitment, participation constraints must be fulfilled even in
the first period after the first shock realizations.

























































































































, see Marcet and Marimon (2019) for details. The intuitive
idea is that the first term of the participation constraints, which is the lifetime utility of being
member of the couple household, can be summarized with the individual utility functions in
the household target function, which is also the lifetime utility of being member of the couple
household. Both terms can be summarized into one term when one allows the Pareto weight
of the particular spouse to change whenever his or her participation constraint binds causing





































































































































Since the outside options, the second terms of the participation constraints, do not depend
on any decision of the couple household, they can be skipped from the Lagrangian as long





long as one controls whether the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers φij are positive or zero. Finally,
























































































, µmj , µfj
)
= max
cmj ,cfj ,nmj ,nfj
v
(

















with the updating rule for the Pareto weights
µ′ij = µij + φij ,
subject to the period budget
cmj + cfj ≤ wmjnmj + wfjnfj .
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A.1.3 Nash bargaining
We endogenize initial Pareto weights using Nash (1950)’s bargaining approach in a household
formation step. Pareto weights are determined before shocks in the first period realize.1
Spouses only enter the couple household when there is a gain from marriage such that
their expected lifetime utility of being married is higher than their corresponding value as a
single. Formally, initial Pareto weights are determined such that the participation constraints
E0Vmj (ωj , µij0, µ−ij0) ≥ E0Sm (wm) , (112)
E0Vf (ωj , µij0, µ−ij0) ≥ E0Sf (wf ) , (113)
are fulfilled. The resulting Nash program is
NP = max
µij0,µ−ij0
[E0 (Vmj (ωj , µij0, µ−ij0)− Sm (wm))]0.5·[E0 (Vfj (ωj , µij0, µ−ij0)− Sf (wf ))]0.5 .
We assume that initial Pareto weights sum up to one such that µ−ij0 = 1− µij0.2 Then, the
Nash program simplifies to
NP = max
µij0
[E0 (Vmj (ωj , µij0)− Sm (wm))]0.5 · [E0 (Vfj (ωj , µij0)− Sf (wf ))]0.5 ,
where we have skipped the second Pareto weight argument since it is a function of the first
Pareto weight argument. The first-order condition is
E0 (Vmj (ωj , µij0)− Sm (wm))
E0 (Vfj (ωj , µij0)− Sf (wf ))
= −E0 (∂Vmj (ωj , µij0) /∂µij0)
E0 (∂Vmj (ωj , µij0) /∂µij0)
.
The Nash program and the resulting first-order condition can be used in the numerical solu-
tion to determine µij0.
1We highlight this by using the time index 0.
2This assumption does not change the results, however, notation becomes easier.
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A.2 Computation
Consumption and labor supply of the spouses can be written as a function of wage rates
and Pareto weights. Cij (ωj , µij , µ−ij) denotes the consumption policy function of spouse ij,
and Nij (ωj , µij , µ−ij) denotes the corresponding labor-supply policy function. Analogously,
the policy functions for Bachelor households and for limited-commitment couples are given
by CSij (wij), N Sij (wij), and C
fc
ij (ωj , µ̄ij , µ̄−ij), N
fc
ij (ωj , µ̄ij , µ̄−ij), respectively. µ̄ij and µ̄−ij
denote the Pareto weights under full commitment.























cmj + cfj = wmjnmj + wfjnfj , (117)
where x′mj denotes the relative Pareto weight of the male. One can determine the intra-
household allocation (114)-(117) using the relative Pareto weight instead of using two indi-
vidual Pareto weights. Therefore, the state space can be reduced by one dimension such that
one has to consider the wage pair ωj and the relative Pareto weight of one spouse xij .
Algorithm 4 summarizes the numerical solution of the Bachelor household maximization
problem from Section A.1.1. We need the solution to the Bachelor household problem as
the outside options in the solution of the limited commitment couple model. Algorithm
5 describes the algorithm to solve the full commitment case. Since we abstract from sav-
ings opportunities, the policy functions Cfcij (ωj , x̄ij) and N
fc
ij (ωj , x̄ij), where x̄ij denotes the
relative Pareto weight of spouse ij under full commitment, describe the optimal behavior of
unconstrained households. We can use these policy functions in the limited commitment algo-
rithm to check where participation constraints bind. Algorithm 6 summarizes the numerical
solution of the limited-commitment model.
Algorithm 4 (Bachelor households) The algorithm consists of the following two steps:
1: Set a convergence criterion ξ. Discretize the exogenous wage rate processes using the
approach of Tauchen (1986).
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2: Solve the non-linear first-order conditions (109)-(111) given the grids from step 1. The
results are the optimal policy function CSij (wij), N Sij (wij), i ∈ {m, f}.
3: Choose initial guesses for the value functions Smj,0 (wmj), and Sfj,0 (wfj).
3a: Given that you are in iteration step k, use the Belman equation (108) to get:
Smj,k+1 (wmj) = umj
(
CSmj (wmj) ,N Smj (wmj)
)







Sfj,k+1 (wfj) = ufj
(
CSfj (wfj) ,N Sfj (wfj)
)







3b: If sup |Smj,k+1 (wmj)− Smj,k (wmj)| < ξ, and sup |Sfj,k+1 (wfj)− Sfj,k (wfj)| < ξ
stop. Otherwise set k = k + 1 and go back to Step 3a. Iterate until convergence.
Algorithm 5 (Full commitment) The algorithm consists of the following three steps:
1: Set a convergence criterion ξ. Discretize the exogenous wage rate processes using the
approach of Tauchen (1986). Build an equi-distant grid for the relative Pareto weight
{x1, ..., xNx}.
2: Solve the non-linear first-order conditions (91), and (97)-(99) given the grids from step
1. The results are the policy function Cfcij (ωj , x̄ij) and N
fc
ij (ωj , x̄ij).
3: Choose initial guesses for the value functions V fcmj,0 (ωj , x̄ij), and V
fc
fj,0 (ωj , x̄ij).
3a: Given that you are in iteration step k, use the Belman equation


























to get updates of the value functions.3
3b: If sup
∣∣∣V fcmj,k+1 (ωj , x̄ij)− V fcmj,k (ωj , x̄ij)∣∣∣ < ξ, and sup ∣∣∣V fcfj,k+1 (ωj , x̄ij)− V fcfj,k (ωj , x̄ij)∣∣∣ <
ξ stop. Otherwise set k = k+ 1 and go back to Step 3a. Iterate until convergence.
Algorithm 6 (Limited commitment) The algorithm consists of the following eight steps:
1: Set convergence criteria, ξ1 and ξ2. Discretize the exogenous income processes using the
approach of Tauchen (1986). Build an equi-distant grid for the relative Pareto weight
{x1, ..., xNx}.
2: Bachelor household solution. Perform Step 2 and Step 3 of Algorithm 4 with ξ = ξ1.
3: Full commitment solution. Perform Step 2 and Step 3 of Algorithm 5 with ξ = ξ1.
4: Initialization limited commitment solution.
3We have skipped the arguments of the policy functions for notational convenience.
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4a: Guess initial values for the value functions Vmj,0 (ωj , xij), and Vfj,0 (ωj , xij).
4b: Guess initial values for a state-dependent Pareto weight grid Θ0 (ωj , xij).
4c: Construct a state-independent Pareto weight grid Θ̃ for the unconstrained case.
5: Unconstrained solution (ignoring participation constraints). Given that you are in iter-
ation step k, use the Belman equation (93) to get:


























6: Checking the participation constraints.
6a: Find values on the grid of µ such that the participation constraints hold with equal-
ity, using the value function Vmj,k+1 (ωj , xij) and Vfj,k+1 (ωj , xij) from Step 5. To
do so, solve for the roots of
Vmj,k+1 (ωj , xij)− Smj (wmj) = 0,
Vfj,k+1 (ωj , xij)− Sfj (wfj) = 0,
where Sij (wij) denotes the outside option of spouse i. ν (ωj) denotes the Pareto
weight such that participation constraint of the husband holds with equality. ν (ωj)
denotes the Pareto weight such that participation constraint of the wife holds with
equality.
6b: Build a new grid Θk+1 (ωj , xij) = Θ̃. Replace all values for a particular ωj which
are smaller than ν (ωj) by ν (ωj). Replace all values for a particular ωj which are
larger than ν (ωj) by ν (ωj).
7: Constrained case (respecting participation constraints). Constrained case (respecting
participation constraints). Find all values of Vmj,k+1 (ωj , xij) smaller than Smj (wmj).
Replace these values by Smj (wmj). Find all values of Vfj,k+1 (ωj , xij) smaller than
Sfj (wfj). Replace these values by Sfj (wfj).
8: If sup |Vmj,k+1 (ωj , xij)− Vmj,k (ωj , xij)| < ξ1, sup |Vfj,k+1 (ωj , xij)− Vfj,k (ωj , xij)| <
ξ1, and sup |Θk+1 (ωj , xij)−Θk (ωj , xij)| < ξ2 stop. Otherwise set k = k + 1 and go
back to Step 5. Iterate until convergence.
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A.3 Additional Monte-Carlo results
Table 25 shows the Monte-Carlo results for women and is the analogue to Table 23 which
shows the results for men.
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Table 25: Monte-Carlo results for women, from synthetic household panel data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
full commitment limited commitment
log wage rate logwfjt 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.71 0.90 1.16 1.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
log individual -1.58 – -1.58 – – – –
consumption log cfjt (0.00) – (0.00) – – – –
log household – -1.58 – -1.18 -3.38 -3.40 -1.58
consumption log cjt – (0.00) – (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
log wage rate – – – – 1.29 1.16 –
of the spouse, logwmjt – – – – (0.01) (0.02) –
log hours worked – – – – -2.10 -1.69 –
by the spouse, log nmjt – – – – (0.01) (0.05) –
logwfjt × logwmjt – – – – – -0.03 –
– – – – – (0.01) –
logwfjt × log nmjt – – – – – 0.23 –
– – – – – (0.01) –
logwmjt × log nmjt – – – – – -0.12 –
– – – – – (0.01) –
(logwfjt)
2 – – – – – 0.04 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
(logwmjt)
2 – – – – – 0.00 –
– – – – – (0.00) –
(log nmjt)
2 – – – – – 0.20 –
– – – – – (0.02) –
deduced relative Pareto – – – – – – 1.58
weight term log(1 + x
−1/σ
fjt ) – – – – – – (0.00)
bias in % – – – -32 -14 11 –
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
empirically feasible no yes no yes yes yes yes
NOTE.–Results are for women. The dependent variable is (logged) hours of the female in household j in period t. A
constant and household-type fixed effects are included but not reported. Table shows average estimates from 10,000










Chiappori (1988) has extended Becker (1965)’s seminal model of the family by recognizing
conflicts between household members and introduced collective models of the family that
take into account household bargaining. The subsequent literature on collective models has
assumed that family decision making is subject to full commitment between spouses. Full
commitment means that, at the time of household formation, spouses choose a contingency
plan for their future lives and can make binding promises to stick to this plan. This as-
sumption has been challenged strongly by empirical studies, see, e.g., Dercon and Krishnan
(2000), Duflo and Udry (2004), Mazzocco (2007), Robinson (2012), Voena (2015), Blau and
Goodstein (2016), Cesarini et al. (2017), Lise and Yamada (2019), and Chiappori et al.
(2019).
A number of recent papers have taken a new direction in modelling decision-making
by taking into account that commitment within the household is limited. Chiappori and
Mazzocco (2017) provide a first survey of the limited-commitment literature focusing on the
general theoretical modelling strategy and applications. Full and limited-commitment models
have in common that spouses join the household only if their expected lifetime utility within
the couple is at least as high as their corresponding expected lifetime utility outside the couple,
i.e., their participation constraints must be fulfilled. A key difference between both model
types is the frequency of relevant participation constraints. In the full commitment case,
participation constraints must be fulfilled only at the stage of household formation. Under
limited commitment, by contrast, participation constraints must be fulfilled in every period
and in any state of the world because household members are free to leave the household at
any time (unilateral divorce). Taking into account these additional participation constraints
affects both, behavior and welfare of couple households because spouses cannot commit to
plans which may be beneficial to both spouses ex ante but later in life impose incentives for
one of the partners to leave the household.
Ligon et al. (2002) have shown that the inability to fully commit to agreed-upon plans
implies that intra-household allocations are ex-ante inefficient. Limited commitment can
affect household decisions in many aspects of life, ranging from education choices to fertil-
ity decisions. Accordingly, limited commitment can induce various sources of inefficiencies.
Some inefficiencies are of particular importance when markets are incomplete and individuals
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have an incentive to self-insure against idiosyncratic risk. Such a world is described by the
heterogeneous-agents incomplete-markets model, the full-commitment version of which has
become the leading tool for quantitative analysis in macroeconomics, see Heathcote et al.
(2009) for a survey of this literature. When markets are incomplete, commitment problems
between spouses can be expected to have a particular relevance for consumption risk sharing
and for savings behavior.
In this paper, we introduce limited commitment in a dual-earner heterogeneous-agents
incomplete-markets economy and investigate inefficiencies due to limited commitment in sav-
ing and risk-sharing behavior. This chapter is closely related to Ábrahám and Laczó (2018)
who analyze the optimal savings behavior in a couple-household model with limited com-
mitment between spouses. Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) show that couples save more when
commitment between spouses is limited. Voena (2015) and Angelini et al. (2019) provide
empirical evidence for this and document that unilateral divorce leads to increased savings
by married couples. Theoretically, the higher savings incentives under limited commitment
reflect a strategic motive to make divorce costly to the spouse who may be tempted to file for
divorce in the future. The wealthier the household, the more this individual would lose upon
divorce. Therefore, higher household savings relax future participation constraints. From an
ex-ante perspective, this behavior is inefficient because it would not have been necessary if
spouses could fully commit to plans in which case spouses could save less and enjoy more
consumption earlier in life.1
The baseline setting considered by Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) is one where income shocks
of spouses are perfectly negatively correlated such that total household income is constant,
where spouses lose all assets upon divorce and where divorcees cannot save in the outside
option. The assumption of constant household income is useful for their purposes because it
shuts down precautionary savings under full commitment and hence isolates savings due to
limited commitment. The assumptions regarding asset losses and saving possibilities upon
divorce facilitate the derivation of analytical results and the numerical solution of the model.
While Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) discuss that their main results carry over to more general
set-ups, there is a still lack of quantitative results on savings and risk sharing under limited
commitment. In our paper, we contribute by developing a generalized version of the Ábrahám
and Laczó (2018) set-up where we introduce general stochastic income processes, relax the
1In the second part of their paper, Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) analyze hidden savings. While household-
public assets are lost upon divorce, hidden private savings remain upon divorce. Ábrahám and Laczó (2018)
show that hidden private savings do not occur in equilibrium since all incentives to save hiddenly are inter-
nalized by the optimal savings decision in household-public asset holdings.
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assumption that all household assets are lost upon divorce, and allow divorcees to save. We
use our model to provide a quantitative analysis of risk-sharing and precautionary savings
under incomplete markets and limited commitment.
First, we quantify the theoretical result of Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) that limited com-
mitment induces couple households to save more and and compare the quantitative impor-
tance of this saving motive to the well-studied precautionary saving motive. The latter is
precluded in the Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) set-up because, there, precautionary savings are
shut off under full commitment. Second, we perform a quantitative analysis of the study
of property division rules upon divorce of Ábrahám and Laczó (2016) and how they affect
behavior within the marriage.2 While Ábrahám and Laczó (2016) relax the assumptions
of Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) regarding asset losses and saving possibilities upon divorce,
they continue to assume that income is constant at the household level and varies only at
the individual level. Hence, the results from our generalized model complement their results
quantitatively.
For our quantitative analysis of couple’s savings behavior under limited commitment in a
generalized set-up, we develop a practically feasible and fast numerical approach which con-
stitutes another contribution of this chapter to the literature. Under limited commitment, the
additional participation constraints complicate the numerical solution. Marcet and Marimon
(2019) have shown that this can be handled by including the Pareto weights of spouses in the
household’s planner solution as an additional time-varying state variable. Previous papers
on limited commitment have used this procedure in restrictive settings (Ábrahám and Laczó
2016, Mazzocco 2007) or have applied the simplifying restriction that the sum of spouses’
Pareto weights is constant over time (Oikonomou and Siegel 2015, Foerster 2019, Obermeier
2019). For a number of applications, including ours, it is crucial to study the behavior of
couple households with limited commitment in less restrictive environments. For example,
Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017) call for recognizing the endogeneity of the outside option
that arises from the accumulation of wealth within the household. This endogeneity is ruled
out by assumption in the Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) framework. In particular with regard
to savings behavior, the simplifying assumptions that Pareto weights sum up to one in each
period used by Oikonomou and Siegel (2015), Foerster (2019) and Obermeier (2019) can
lead to substantial biases in the model-predicted behavior of couple households.3 In order
to combine endogenous outside options and unrestricted endogenous bargaining weights in
2Ábrahám and Laczó (2016) is a follow-up paper to Ábrahám and Laczó (2018).
3For intertemporal decision problems, Marcet and Marimon (2019) have shown that Pareto weights grow
over time such that they do not add up to one.
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an infinite-horizon model, we extend Carroll (2006)’s endogenous grid method (EGM) to the
case of incomplete-markets limited-commitment couple models.
Our results show that the savings effect of limited commitment is quite substantial. In
our calibrated model, limited commitment induces couples to increase their yearly saving by
about 4% and leads to an average rise in accumulated wealth of about 11%. This leads to two
counteracting effects of limited commitment on consumption insurance. Higher wealth which
is accumulated under limited commitment leads to a lower volatility of household consump-
tion compared to the full-commitment case. However, time-varying individual consumption
shares which reflect changes in relative bargaining positions induce individual consumption
to vary more strongly than under full commitment. In our model simulations, the second
effect dominates and individuals are effectively insured worse under limited commitment de-
spite the fact that they live in wealthier households. Quantitatively, limited commitment
reduces the insurance value of marriage by one fifth. In terms of welfare, we find that limited
commitment reduces married couples’ well-being by a consumption equivalent of about 0.3%
– which corresponds to about one third of the costs of business cycles estimated by Krusell
et al. (2009). Oversaving is responsible for about 40% of the welfare loss due to limited
commitment.
Regarding the rules governing asset division upon divorce, we find that asset losses upon
divorce and penalties for the spouse who files for divorce can have substantial impacts on deci-
sion making within the marriage. Both measures have the potential to reduce intra-household
inefficiencies substantially. Large asset losses or penalties of about 70% can even raise con-
sumption insurance within the marriage to the efficient full-commitment level. However, the
largest efficiency gains are obtained for moderate losses or penalties. Losses or penalties in
the range of 20% already close half of the efficiency gap in consumption insurance due to
limited commitment. By contrast, uneven property division rules that do not depend on
events within the marriage or on who files for divorce, affect efficiency within the marriage
only to a small degree.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a dual-
earner incomplete markets economy with limited commitment. Section 3 provides a detailed
discussion of the numerical issues and procedures to solve this model. Section 4 provides a
quantitative comparison of savings behavior, risk sharing, and welfare under full and limited
commitment. Section 5 studies rules determining property division upon divorce and their
effects on saving and risk-sharing behavior within the marriage. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2 A dual-earner incomplete markets economy with limited
commitment
In this section, we present a dual-earner heterogeneous-agents incomplete-markets economy
with limited commitment. In this economy, there are two channels of risk-sharing: intra-
household risk-sharing and precautionary savings. We will show that limited commitment
deteriorates insurance, causing welfare losses compared to an environment of full commitment.
Bachelor households. Households can save in a single non-state contingent asset with
risk-free interest rate r. Borrowing is excluded. The maximization problem of a bachelor
household is
Si (Ωi) = max
ci,a′i







subject to the period budget constraint
ci + a
′
i ≤ yi + (1 + r) ai, (119)
and the borrowing constraint
a′i ≥ 0. (120)
The state variables of an individual with gender i are summarized by Ωi = (ai, yi). The





λ− ξ = β · (1 + r) · Eλ′, (122)
ξ ≥ 0, a′i ≥ 0, ξ · a′i = 0, (123)
and the budget constraint (119), given the income realizations and the initial asset values. λ
is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. ξ denotes the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on
the borrowing constraint (120). CSi (Ωi) and ASi (Ωi) denote the optimal policy functions for
consumption, labor supply, and savings. Lifetime utilities result from the Bellman equation
(118) using the optimal policy functions














ASi (Ωi) , y′i
)
. These lifetime utilities are used as outside options in the participa-
tion constraints of couples.
Full-commitment couple. Spouses face idiosyncratic income shocks, yi, which follow a
Markov process. The vector of joint income realizations is y = (ym, yf ). Household prefer-
ences are given by the weighted sum of individual preferences
v
(








· uf (cf ) + Ψ. (124)




















subject to the period budget constraint
cm + cf + a
′ ≤ ym + yf + (1 + r) a, (126)
and subject to the joint borrowing constraint
a′ ≥ 0. (127)
The first-order conditions are1












λ− ξ = β · (1 + r) · Eλ′, (130)
ξ ≥ 0, a′ ≥ 0, ξ · a′ = 0,
and the budget constraint (126), given the vector of income realizations y and the initial
asset values. λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the joint budget constraint. ξ denotes the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the joint borrowing constraint (127). Condition (130) is the Euler
equation of a potentially borrowing constrained couple household.
(128) and (129) yield the risk-sharing condition
∂um (cm) /∂cm





Under full commitment, risk-sharing is perfect since the right-hand side of (131) is constant
1A derivation can be found in Appendix A.2.1.
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over time and over states. The full-commitment model is used as the Pareto efficient bench-
mark.
Limited-commitment couple. The opportunity to save implies that households take
intertemporal decisions. Then, following Marcet and Marimon (2019), not only the relative
Pareto weights matter but also the absolute value of Pareto weights. In a model with savings
opportunities, Pareto weights need not sum up to one which reflects that the couple does not
weigh each period equally. Specifically, periods where participation constraints are binding
are weighted higher. This implies that couples have an incentive to transfer resources to
these periods to avoid binding participation constraints. To capture these incentives, it is
important to account for the absolute values of individual Pareto weights and the sum of the
Pareto weights.
The timing is as follows. Spouses enter the period with state variables Ω. Then, income
shocks realize. The updating of the Pareto weights depends on incomes and on asset holdings.
In consequence, a given income combination may cause an updating of the Pareto weights
in some situations but not in others, depending on asset holdings and potentially binding
participation constraints.
The recursive formulation of the couple problem under limited commitment can be derived
using the results of Marcet and Marimon (2019).2 The key step is to include the participation
constraints directly in the problem. The participation constraints are








≥ Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a)








≥ Sf (yf , (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · a) ,
where Ω′ = (a′,y′) summarizes all state variables except the Pareto weights. Couples lose a
constant share, ϕ, of all assets if they file for divorce. The remaining joint asset holdings are
distributed with shares κ and 1− κ to the former husband and the former wife, respectively.
Whether commitment issues become less or more severe due to the opportunity to save
depends on the two parameters ϕ and κ. Commitment issues become on average less severe
with higher asset losses upon divorce.3
2The transformation of the maximization problem to its Marcet and Marimon (2019) version can be found
in Appendix A.1.
3Voena (2015) discusses different divorce law regimes with respect to their implications for the division of
property upon divorce. We focus on unilateral divorce.
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The recursive couple maximization problem including the participation constraints is










− νm · Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a)− (132)









subject to the period budget constraints (126) and the joint borrowing constraint (127), with
v
(













where νg denotes the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the participation constraint of a spouse with
gender g. In problem (132), the two additional terms correspond to the right-hand sides of
the participation constraints. The left-hand sides of the participation constraints are included
in the first term v
(






due to the update of the Pareto weights.
Marcet and Marimon (2019) show that the current period Pareto weight is the previous
period Pareto weight plus the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the current period participation
constraint. Thus, Pareto weights evolve according to µ′g = µg + νg, with g = {m, f}. Initial
Pareto weights are given by µm0 = µ0 and µf0 = 1 − µ0. Although the Pareto weights
are unbounded, the relative Pareto weight is bounded. Using the results of Ligon et al.
(2002), one can show that state-dependent optimal intervals of the relative Pareto weight
exist implying an updating rule for the relative Pareto weight. The relative male Pareto








with υg = νg/µ
′
g. Following Ábrahám and Laczó (2018), We use the relative Pareto weight x
as a co-state variable instead of the two Pareto weights. This allows to reduce the number of
relevant state variables from two, µm and µf , to one, x. This approach is feasible if one uses
additionally the term υg to characterize the Euler equation. We will discuss this approach in
detail in Section 3.






if x < x′ (Ω) ,
if x ∈ [x′ (Ω) , x′ (Ω)] ,
if x > x′ (Ω) ,
(134)
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with the lower and upper bounds of the intervals implicitly defined by






= Sf (yf , (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · a) , and






= Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a) .
Thus, x′ (Ω) is the maximum value of the relative male Pareto weight such that the wife is
indifferent between staying in and leaving the couple. x′ (Ω) is analogously the minimum
value of the relative male Pareto weight such that he is indifferent between staying in and
leaving the couple. We use the optimal intervals in the numerical implementation of the
model.
The first-order conditions of the couple maximization problem are4








λ− ξ = β · E
[
(1 + r) · λ′ − ν ′m ·
∂Sm
∂a′





ξ ≥ 0, a′ ≥ 0, ξ · a′ = 0,
and the budget constraint (126), given the vector of income realizations y and the initial asset
value. λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. ξ denotes the Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier on the joint borrowing constraint (120). In comparison to the model with full
commitment, there are two additional terms on the right-hand side of the Euler equation
(137). Spouses take into account in their expectations that savings may have an impact on
the Pareto weights in the next period. There are two different saving incentives. First, a
short-run incentive depends on whether spouses expect that the Pareto weight will change in
the next period or not. If for example a spouse with a relatively high Pareto weight expects
that her Pareto weight will decrease in the next period, the person has an incentive to save
less since she would receive only a smaller share of these future asset holdings than in the
current period. Thus, an expected decrease of the Pareto weight may reduce savings. This
incentive is primarily captured by the first term in the brackets on the right-hand side of
the Euler equation. The second, longer-term, saving incentive is caused by the impact of
savings on future commitment issues. When higher savings reduce the likelihood of binding
participation constraints in the future, spouses have an incentive to save more. In contrast,
more assets may also increase the likelihood of binding participation constraints. This longer
4A derivation can be found in Appendix A.2.2.
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term saving incentive is captured by the second and third term in the brackets on the right-
hand side of the Euler equation. Whether more or less savings increase or decrease future
commitment issues is a quantitative question. In any case, however, savings behavior is
inefficient due to the additional wedge in the Euler equation which is absent in the Pareto
efficient full-commitment benchmark case.
Conditions (135) and (136) imply the risk-sharing condition
∂um (cm) /∂cm





Risk-sharing is imperfect as the Pareto weights vary over time and states, resulting in a
welfare loss compared to the case of full commitment.
Individual lifetime utilities result from the Bellman equation (132) by









using the policy functions Ci (Ω, µm, µf ) and Ai (Ω, µm, µf ), with Ω′ = (Ai (Ω, µm, µf ) ,y′).




Knowing current state variables and the optimal savings decision described by the Euler
equation, all other decisions follow from intratemporal conditions. Thus, the algorithm is
based on the idea to find optimal savings first and thereafter determine all other decisions.
The state space of the couple maximization problem is N = Nym × Nyf × Nx × Na, where
Nyi denotes the number of income grid points of spouse i, Nx is the number of grid points of
the relative Pareto weight, and Na denotes the number of asset grid points.
3.1 Full commitment
Algorithm 7 summarizes the numerical solution to the full-commitment maximization prob-
lem.1
Algorithm 7 (Full commitment) The algorithm consists of the following four steps:
1: Set convergence criteria ζ1 and ζ2. Discretize the exogenous income processes using the
approach of Tauchen (1986). Build a grid for the relative Pareto weight {x1, ..., xNx}.
Build a grid for current period assets a, {a1, ..., aNa}. Build a grid for next period assets
a′, {ã1, ..., ãNa}.
2: EGM step.





2b: Given that you are in iteration step j, find male or female consumption in the
next period as a function of next period incomes and next period asset holdings
using the budget constraint (126) and the risk-sharing condition (131), given next






2c: Use the Euler equation (130) to calculate current period male or female consump-
tion as a function of current period incomes and next period assets. Use the
risk-sharing condition (131) to find the consumption of the other spouse.
2d: Calculate the endogenous grid of current period assets â using the current period
budget constraint (126). This yields a mapping of the endogenous grid to the
exogenous grid of a′: a′ (â).






2f: Check whether the borrowing constraint (127) is binding. If the borrowing con-




smaller than the borrowing
limit by the borrowing limit.
1The algorithm for Bachelor households can be found in Appendix A.3.
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2g: If sup
∣∣∣Afcj+1 (Ωfc, xfc0 )−Afcj (Ωfc, xfc0 )∣∣∣ < ζ stop, set Afc (Ωfc, xfc0 ) = Afcj+1 (Ωfc, xfc0 ).
Otherwise set j = j + 1 and go back to step 2b. Iterate until convergence.




, using the period budget con-
straint (126) and the risk-sharing condition (131).














































∣∣∣V fcm,j+1 (Ωfc, xfc0 )− V fcm,j (Ωfc, xfc0 )∣∣∣ < ζ2, and sup ∣∣∣V fcf,j+1 (Ωfc, xfc0 )− V fcf,j (Ωfc, xfc0 )∣∣∣ <
ζ2 stop. Otherwise set j = j+ 1 and go back to Step 4a. Iterate until convergence.
In Step 1 of Algorithm 7, we construct a grid with an odd number of grid points and
monotonic increasing grid points for the Pareto weight such that x1 = 1/xNx , x2 = 1/xNx−1,
and so on.2 We use a grid with monotonic increasing grid points for the assets to achieve
more grid points near the borrowing constraint to capture the non-linearities of the policy
functions near the borrowing constraint.
Steps 2b to Step 2g are a policy function version of Carroll (2006)’s endogenous grid
method (EGM, henceforth). While Carroll (2006) uses a value function approach, our ap-
proach combines the speed advantages of both a policy function approach (see Heer and
Maussner 2009) and EGM. In this approach, we iterate over the asset policy function until
convergence. The EGM approach is based on the idea that the dynamic problem is inversed.
Typically, one searches for the solution to a dynamic problem given current period exogenous
and endogenous state variables. Carroll (2006) inverses the dynamic problem and discretizes
the next period endogenous state variable.3 Taken this next period endogenous state and
the current period exogenous state as given, Carroll (2006) solves for the current period en-
dogenous state as the endogenous grid. The idea is: given my next period asset stock is anext
2The advantage of such a grid is that solutions are symmetric if there is no parameter heterogeneity between
spouses. Other grid choices are possible. We checked that our numerical results do not depend on a specific
choice for the grids.
3Carroll (2006) considers a dynamic problem with a single endogenous state variable. Generalizations for
more endogenous state variables are available, see Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010), Druedahl and Jørgensen
(2017), and Ludwig and Schön (2018). However, several endogenous state variables reduce the speed gain
from EGM compared to more traditional solution methods like value function iteration substantially.
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and my current period exogenous income is w, how high must my current asset stock be if I
behave optimally.
When the asset policy function has converged, all other policy functions can be calcu-
lated using the period budget constraint (126) and the risk-sharing condition (131). Finally,
individual value functions are recovered by iterating the Bellman equation (125).










one has to solve for male consumption in the next period as a function of next period state
variables in Step 2b of Algorithm 7. The utility function (140) implies that female con-
sumption, male labor supply, and female labor supply can be stated as function of male
consumption using the first-order conditions.4






where xfc0 denotes the relative Pareto weight under full commitment. Using the policy func-





· cm +Afcj = ym + yf + (1 + r) a. (142)
Given the beginning-of-period state variables ym, yf , and a and the asset policy function
Afcj , one can determine male consumption as the solution to the non-linear equation (142).
In Step 2b of Algorithm 7, we determine next period male consumption as a function of next
period incomes and asset holdings, given the asset policy function Afcj . To do this, we solve











f + (1 + r) a
′.
We use a fast vectorized bisection root-finding routine to determine this consumption policy
function.
We search for current period consumption as a function of current period exogenous states
and next period asset holdings in Step 2c of Algorithm 7. Given the utility function, the Euler
4More general, three of the four variables, male consumption, female consumption, male labor supply, and
female labor supply, can be stated as a function of the fourth variable.
5We skip the functional notation to simplify the notation.
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equation is





The borrowing constraint is ignored in this step. Potential negative savings are handled in
Step 2f of Algorithm 7. Given c′m as a function of next period state variables and using
the Markovian structure of the stochastic component of the income, one can calculate cm as
a function of current period exogenous states and next period asset holdings. Then, using
conditions (141), one gets female consumption as a function of current period exogenous
states and next period asset holdings.
Finally, one can use the budget constraint (126) to calculate the endogenous grid â ana-
lytically in Step 2d of Algorithm 7:
â =
cm + cf + a
′ − ym − yf
1 + r
.
Since all variables are functions of current period exogenous states and next period asset
holdings, we have a one-to-one mapping for each income combination from the endogenous
grid â to next period assets: a′ (â).
This mapping can be used in Step 2e of Algorithm 7 to find a new asset policy func-
tion using interpolation methods. We use linear interpolation and interpolate a′ (â) on the







In Step 2f of Algorithm 7 it is checked whether borrowing constraints are binding. All
values Afcj+1 < 0 are replaced by 0. In Step 2g of Algorithm 7 it is checked whether the asset
policy function has converged or not. If not, a new iteration step is started using the new
asset policy function as initial guess and Step 2b to Step 2f are performed again. If yes, one
calculates the final policy functions for cm and cf in Step 3 of Algorithm 7 using the budget
constraint (126) and the risk-sharing condition 141). In the final Step 4 of Algorithm 7, value
functions are obtained by iterating the Bellman equation (125) for given policy functions.
3.2 Limited commitment
In the limited commitment model, the participation constraints have to be checked in each
iteration step and the optimal savings decisions, the value functions and the state-dependent
grids of the relative Pareto weight have to be determined simultaneously. In addition, it-
erating on the Euler equation (137) requires initial values of the redefined Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers of the participation constraints, υg, in each iteration step. Thus, one has to iter-
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ate until six value and policy functions have jointly converged.6 In the full-commitment case,
one can iterate on the optimal savings decisions and on the value functions separately which
is much faster. Algorithm 8 summarizes the numerical solution of the limited-commitment
maximization problem.
Algorithm 8 (Limited commitment) The algorithm consists of the following eight steps:
1: Set convergence criteria ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, and ζ4. Discretize the exogenous income processes
using the approach of Tauchen (1986). Build a grid for the relative Pareto weight
{x1, ..., xNx}. Build a grid for current period assets a, {a1, ..., aNa}. Build a grid for
next period assets a′, {ã1, ..., ãNa}.
2: Bachelor household solution.
3: Full-commitment solution.
3a: Perform Step 2 of Algorithm 7.
3b: Perform Step 3 of Algorithm 7.
3c: Perform Step 4 of Algorithm 7.
4: Initialization limited-commitment solution.
4a: Guess initial value functions Vm,0 (Ω, x), and Vf,0 (Ω, x).
4b: Guess initial values for a state-dependent relative Pareto weight grid Θ0 (Ω, x).
4c: Construct a state-independent relative Pareto weight grid Θ̃ for the unconstrained
case.
4d: Guess initial asset policy function A0 (Ω, x).








5: Unconstrained solution (ignoring participation constraints). Given that you are in iter-
ation step j, perform the following steps:
5a: Given next period assets a′ by the exogenous grid {ã1, ..., ãNa}, the guess for the as-
set policy function Aj (Ω, x), and the guess for the state-dependent relative Pareto
weight grid Θj (Ω, x), find male or female consumption in the next period as func-
tion of next period incomes and next period asset holdings using the budget con-
straint (126) and the risk-sharing condition (138).
5b: Use the Euler equation (137) with υm,j (Ω, x) and υf,j (Ω, x) to calculate current
period male or female consumption as a function of current period incomes and
next period assets. Use the risk-sharing condition (138) to find consumption of the
other spouse.
6Convergence of the redefined Kuhn-Tucker multipliers is guaranteed by the convergence of the state-
dependent grids of the relative Pareto weight.
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5c: Calculate the endogenous grid of current period assets â using the current period
budget constraint (126). This gives a mapping from the endogenous grid to the
exogenous grid of a′: a′ (â).
5d: Upper envelope step. Perform Algorithm 9 to find the monotone endogenous grid
á.
5e: Use a′ (á) to interpolate a′ on the exogenous grid {a1, ..., aNa} to find the asset
policy function Auncon (Ω, x).
5f: Check whether the borrowing constraint (127) is binding. Replace all values of
Auncon (Ω, x) smaller than the borrowing limit by the borrowing limit.
5g: Use the budget constraint (126) and the risk-sharing condition (138) to find Cunconm (Ω, x)
and Cunconf (Ω, x).
5h: Use the Bellman equation to get:














6: Check participation constraints.
6a: Find values of x such that the participation constraints hold with equality, using
the value functions V unconm (y, x), and V
uncon
f (y, x) from Step 5. To do so, solve
for the roots of
V unconm (Ω, x)− Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a) = 0,
V unconf (Ω, x)− Sf (yf (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · a) = 0,
where Si denotes the outside option of spouse i. ν (Ω) denotes the relative Pareto
weight such that the participation constraint of the husband holds with equality.
ν (Ω) denotes the relative Pareto weight such that the participation constraint of
the wife holds with equality.
6b: Build a new grid Θj+1 (Ω, x) = Θ̃. Replace all values for a particular state combi-
nation Ω which are smaller than ν (Ω) by ν (Ω). Replace all values for a particular
Ω which are larger than ν (Ω) by ν (Ω).
7: Constrained case (respecting participation constraints). Given that you are in iteration
step j, perform the following steps:
7a: Set Vm,j+1 (Ω, x) = V
uncon
m (Ω, x) and Vf,j+1 (Ω, x) = V
uncon
f (Ω, x). Find all val-
ues of Vm,j+1 (Ω, x) smaller than Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a) and replace these values by
Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a). Adjust the corresponding values of Vf,j+1 (Ω, x) by interpo-
lating V unconf (Ω, x) on the corresponding relative Pareto weights. Find all values
of Vf,j+1 (Ω, x) smaller than Sf (yf (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · a) and replace these values
by Sf (yf (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · a). Adjust the corresponding values of Vm,j+1 (Ω, x) by
interpolating V unconm (Ω, x) on the corresponding relative Pareto weights.
7b: Interpolate Auncon (Ω, x) on the new state-dependent relative Pareto weight grid
Θj+1 (Ω, x) to get Aj+1 (Ω, x).
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7c: Update policy functions for υm and υf using the definition of the relative Pareto
weight (133):




1− υf,j+1 (Ω, x)
1− υm,j+1 (Ω, x)
,
for υm,j+1 (Ω, x) and υf,j+1 (Ω, x).
8: If sup |Aj+1 (Ω, x)−Aj (Ω, x)| < ζ1, sup |Vm,j+1 (Ω, x)− Vm,j (Ω, x)| < ζ2, sup |Vf,j+1 (Ω, x)− Vf,j (Ω, x)| <
ζ2, sup |Θj+1 (Ω, x)−Θj (Ω, x)| < ζ3, sup |υm,j+1 (Ω, x)− υm,j (Ω, x)| < ζ4, and sup |υf,j+1 (Ω, x)− υf,j (Ω, x)| <
ζ4 stop. Otherwise set j = j + 1 and go back to Step 5. Iterate until convergence.
Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3 of Algorithm 8 follow from Algorithm 7 and Appendix A.3.
We use the same grids for the relative Pareto weight and assets as for the full-commitment
solution. The solution of the bachelor model in Step 2 of Algorithm 8 is used in Step 5b in
the Euler equation and to check borrowing constraints in Step 6a.
We use the lifetime utilities of the full-commitment couple as initial guesses for the value
functions in the limited-commitment solution. We use the grid of the relative Pareto weight
from Step 1 of Algorithm 8, {x1, ..., xNx}, as initial guess of the state-dependent relative
Pareto weight grid in Step 4b of Algorithm 8. The same grid should be chosen for the
state-independent relative Pareto weight grid, Θ̃. We use the full commitment optimal sav-
ings decision as initial guess for the limited-commitment model in Step 4d of Algorithm
8, A0 (Ω, x) = Afc (Ω, x). We initialize the redefined Kuhn-Tucker multipliers υm and υf
compatible to the full-commitment model where both multipliers are always equal to zero,
independent of the particular state variables, υm,0 (Ω, x) = 0 and υf,0 (Ω, x) = 0.
7
Steps 5 to Step 8 of Algorithm 8 are our EGM solution approach to the limited-commitment
couple model. The solution algorithm is based on the idea that beginning with the next pe-
riod commitment between spouses is limited. To illustrate the differences between the full
commitment and the limited-commitment solution, we use the same utility function, see
(140).
In Step 5a of Algorithm 8 one has to calculate next period male or female consumption
as a function of next period state variables. Since commitment between spouses is limited in
the next period and thereafter, one needs the value of the relative Pareto weight with which
the couple starts in the next period. We use the initialized Pareto weight grid, {x1, ..., xNx},
as starting values for the next period. Thus, we consider Nx different starting values of the
relative Pareto weight in the next period, and the couple starts in the next period with the
7This initialization strategy follows Ábrahám and Laczó (2018).
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relative Pareto weight x. Thus, we have x′ = x since there was no updating of the relative
Pareto weight in the current period, i.e., the next period starting value of the relative Pareto
weight is the current period relative Pareto weight. All other state variables are summarized
by Ω′. Given the initial guess for the state-dependent relative Pareto weight grids, Θj (Ω, x),
the relative Pareto weight is updated when participation constraints are binding. Thus, the
Pareto weight after the update is given by x′′ = Θj (Ω
′, x′) = Θj (Ω





)−1/σ · c′m. (144)




)−1/σ · c′m +Aj = y′m + y′f + (1 + r) a′.
Thus, given the asset policy function, Aj (Ω, x) and the state-dependent relative Pareto weight
grids, Θj (Ω, x), one can calculate next period male consumption as a function of next period
state variables and the current period Pareto weight. We use a fast vectorized bisection
root-finding routine to determine this policy function.
In Step 5b of Algorithm 8, one finds current period consumption and current period
labor supply as a function of current period incomes, next period asset holdings and the
current period relative Pareto weight. These functions can be determined using the Euler
equation (137) and the initial guesses of the re-defined Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the par-
ticipation constraints υm,j (Ω, x) and υf,j (Ω, x). Using male marginal utility of consumption,
∂um (cm) /∂cm = c
−σ
m , the Euler equation (137) can be rewritten as
8
c−σm = β · E
[

















The partial derivatives ∂Sm/∂a
′ and ∂Sf/∂a
′ can be obtained from the Envelope conditions
of the bachelor household problem with
∂Sm
∂a′












where ϕ denotes the constant share of assets which is lost when a couple files for divorce,
and κ denotes the share of the remaining joint asset holdings of the former husband. Thus,
the solutions of the bachelor household problems are needed to capture the impact of savings
8A derivation of the equation can be found in Appendix A.3.
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decisions on future outside options in the Euler equation of the limited-commitment problem.
To find the consumption values of the bachelor households cbach,′m and c
bach,′
f , we interpolate
the corresponding policy functions on a′m = (1− ϕ) ·κ ·a′ and a′f = (1− ϕ) ·(1− κ) ·a′. Then,
one can find current period male consumption as a function of current period incomes, next
period asset holdings, and the current period relative Pareto weight using the Markovian
structure of the model. Thereafter, one can use condition (144) to find current period female
consumption as functions of the current period incomes, next period asset holdings, and the
current period relative Pareto weight.
Step 5c of Algorithm 8 is similar to the full-commitment case, see Step 2c of Algorithm 7.
One can calculate the endogenous grid â analytically by using the budget constraint (126):
â =
cm + cf + a
′ − ym − yf
1 + r
.
Since all variables are functions of current period incomes, current period relative Pareto
weight, and next period asset holdings, we have a one-to-one mapping for each income and
relative Pareto weight combination from the endogenous grid â to next period assets: a′ (â).
Upper envelope step. A particular challenge for the EGM-approach is that the presence
of an endogenous state variable in the participation constraints may induce non-convexities.
This can be problematic for two reasons. First, the first-order conditions are only sufficient
for a global maximum when the target function is concave and all constraints are convex, see
Stokey et al. (1989).9 To deal with this potential issue, we have solved the model several
times with different initial guesses. The results were always the same. The second issue
is that non-convex constraints may induce ranges in the endogenous grid â where the one-
to-one mapping a′ (â) is not monotone. Thus, potentially there can be grid points of the
endogenous grid which are mapped to two or more different values for next period assets.
Only one of these values can be optimal. To deal with this issue, we adapt the upper envelope
approach of Iskhakov et al. (2017) to be compatible with our limited-commitment model.10
Their approach can be used in all cases where non-convexities cause non-monotonic ranges
of the endogenous grid as long as there is only one endogenous state variable.11 Algorithm 9
summarizes the adapted upper envelope approach of Iskhakov et al. (2017).
Algorithm 9 (Upper envelope algorithm) The algorithm consists of the following four
9Strictly speaking, constraints must be non-empty, compact-valued, convex and continuous.
10Fella (2014) provides an alternative approach to deal with non-monotonic endogenous grids. Druedahl
and Jørgensen (2017) generalize the approach of Iskhakov et al. (2017) to multiple endogenous state variables
and non-convexities.
11In the original set-up considered by Iskhakov et al. (2017), non-convexities are caused by discrete choices.
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steps:
1: Calculate the lifetime utility of both spouses as a function of current period incomes, the
current period relative Pareto weight, and next period asset holdings. This gives for each
ω-x combination a value function Ṽm,ω−x and Ṽf,ω−x as a function of the endogenous
grid â. These value functions imply that the household target function can be written
as Ṽω−x = Ṽm,ω−x + x
−1 · Ṽf,ω−x.
2: For each ω-x combination, find non-monotonic ranges of the endogenous grid. In par-
ticular, for each ω-x combination and each j = 1, ..., Na − 1 check whether âj > âj+1.
If yes, perform Step 3. If no, go to Step 4.
3: Find j′ > j such that âj′ > âj. Define partitions, N1 = {1, ..., j}, N2 = {j, ..., j′},
and N3 = {j′, Na}. Interpolate the household target function from Step 1 on these
partitions. Using these interpolated values of the target function, detect suboptimal
values of â. Delete these suboptimal values.
4: Set á = â.
After resolving the problem of non-monotone ranges in the endogenous grid, one can use
the mapping a′ (á) to find the new asset policy functions using interpolation in Step 5e of
Algorithm 8. In particular, we use linear interpolation and interpolate a′ (á) on the exogenous
grid a1, ..., aNa to get Auncon (Ω, x).
We search for Ω − x combinations where the borrowing constraint is binding in Step 5f
of Algorithm 8. We replace all values Auncon (Ω, x) < 0 by 0.
In Step 5g of Algorithm 8, we use the budget constraint (126) and the risk-sharing con-
dition (138), to calculate unconstrained male and female consumption. For the given utility
function, we solve
cm + x
−1/σ · cm +Auncon = ym + yf + (1 + r) a
for cm to get Cunconm (Ω, x). Thereafter, one can use (144) to calculate Cunconf (Ω, x).
In Step 5h, we calculate the unconstrained value functions. As before, this reflects the
basic idea of the algorithm that beginning with the next period commitment between spouses
is limited. Accordingly, the continuation value on the right-hand side of the Bellman equations
is the initial guess of the limited-commitment value functions.
These value functions are used in Step 6a to check the participation constraints. The
lifetime utilities of the outside options are obtained by interpolating the value functions
Sm (ym, am) and Sf (yf , af ) on the asset values (1− ϕ) · κ · a and (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · a. ν (Ω)
denotes the relative Pareto weight such that the participation constraint of the husband holds
with equality. ν (Ω) denotes the relative Pareto weight such that the participation constraint
of the wife holds with equality. Thus, for any income and asset combination, there exists an
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optimal interval [ν, ν] where both participation constraints are fulfilled at least with equality.
These intervals can be used in the simulation of the model to update the relative Pareto
weight.
In Step 7a of Algorithm 8, we calculate the new value functions under limited commitment.
To do so, we set Vm,j+1 (Ω, x) = V
uncon
m (Ω, x) and Vf,j+1 (Ω, x) = V
uncon
f (Ω, x). Then, we
replace all values which are smaller than the outside options by the values of the outside
option. Note that also the values of the value function of the spouse have to be replaced. We
interpolate both value functions on the new Pareto weight grid Θj+1 (Ω, x). This guarantees
that both participation constraints are always fulfilled and that the lifetime utilities of spouses
with non-binding participations constraints correspond to the correct Pareto weight value.
These interpolated value functions become the initial guesses in the next iteration of the
algorithm.
To get the new asset policy function, we interpolate the unconstrained asset policy
function Auncon (Ω, x) on the state-dependent relative Pareto weight grid Θj+1 (Ω, x) to get
Aj+1 (Ω, x) in Step 7b of Algorithm 8. The policy function Auncon (Ω, x) describes the opti-
mal savings behavior of the couple knowing that beginning with the next period commitment
is limited. To find the new constrained policy function, one has to consider that the relative
Pareto weight may also be updated in the current period. The couple starts the period with
the relative Pareto weight x. Then, the relative Pareto weight is updated such that both par-
ticipation constraints are fulfilled. This is done by the policy function Θj+1 (Ω, x). To find
the constrained asset policy function, one has to interpolate the unconstrained asset policy
function on the relative Pareto weight updating policy function. This gives the asset policy
function of a constrained household which starts with relative Pareto weight x. If the relative
Pareto weight is not updated in the current period the constrained asset policy function is
simply the unconstrained asset policy function from Step 5f. If the relative Pareto weight
is updated in the current period the constrained asset policy function is the unconstrained
asset policy function from Step 5f evaluated at the new value of the relative Pareto weight.
Finally, the new values of the redefined Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the participation
constraints υm,j+1 and υf,j+1 are calculated in Step 7c. Since the new values of the state-
dependent Pareto weight grids Θj+1 (Ω, x) are derived from the state-independent grid Θ̃,
one can derive these values implicitly through




1− υf,j+1 (Ω, x)
1− υm,j+1 (Ω, x)
. (145)
Since we abstract from divorces, only one participation constraint can be violated at the same
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time. Thus, to calculate υm,j+1 one can set υf,j+1 = 0. Then, υm,j+1 is given by
υm,j+1 (Ω, x) =
0,1− Θ̃Θj+1(Ω,x) ,
if Θj+1 (Ω, x) ≤ Θ̃,
if Θj+1 (Ω, x) > Θ̃.
The re-defined Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the male participation constraint is equal to 0
whenever the relative Pareto weight does not increase since the male participation constraint
is not binding in this case. This can be seen from the definition of the re-defined Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier:




where νm (Ω, x) is zero whenever the constraint is not binding. When the male participation
constraint is binding and the female participation constraint is not binding, the value of
υm,j+1 follows from (145) with υf,j+1 = 0. Analogously, one can calculate υf,j+1 by




if Θj+1 (Ω, x) ≥ Θ̃,
if Θj+1 (Ω, x) < Θ̃,
using υm,j+1 = 0.
In Step 8 of Algorithm 8, we check the convergence of the constrained value functions
Vm (Ω, x) and Vf (Ω, x), the constrained asset policy function A (Ω, x), the state-dependent
relative Pareto weight grids Θ (Ω, x), and the re-defined Kuhn-Tucker multipliers υm (Ω, x)
and υf (Ω, x). If all functions have converged, the solution to the limited-commitment model
is found. Otherwise, one has to repeat Steps 5 to 7 of Algorithm 8 until convergence.
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4 Quantitative results for savings, risk sharing and welfare
under limited commitment
We now investigate the savings behavior of couples under limited commitment quantitatively.
In Section 4.1, we introduce functional forms and the parameterization. In Section 4.2, we
discuss policy functions and Section 4.3 presents simulation results.
4.1 Functional forms and parametrization





where 1/σ measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption. We assume
σ = 1, such that (146) becomes
u (ci) = log ci. (147)
We set the discount factor β to 0.96, which is a standard value for a yearly calibration of an
incomplete-markets model, see, for example, Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), and Krusell
and Smith (1998). We calibrate the interest rate r such that the bottom 40% of the asset
distribution own 0.6% of total wealth in line with the results of Kuhn and Ŕıos-Rull (2016)
for the U.S. economy.
We use an empirical target from Lise and Yamada (2019) to calibrate the extent of
commitment issues. In the model, commitment issues can be strengthened or weakened by
adjusting the direct utility gains from marriage, Ψ. Lise and Yamada (2019) find that the
intra-household variance of the (logged) Pareto weight of the male is 0.0061.1 As discussed
in Section 2, Pareto weights do not sum up to one when one uses the Marcet and Marimon
(2019) approach. When individual Pareto weights grow over time their variance is infinite.
However, one can re-define relative Pareto weights such that they become compatible with
the target of Lise and Yamada (2019). The intratemporal allocation depends only on the
relative Pareto weight and individual Pareto weights do not matter for the intratemporal
allocation. Therefore, we construct individual weights, ςm and ςf , from the relative Pareto
1The analysis by Lise and Yamada (2019) is for Japan. In the U.S., divorce rates are higher than in Japan,
see OECD (2019), so that the model calibration is conservative in terms of the strength of commitment
problems.
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weight which sum up to one, ςm + ςf = 1.






This can be used to determine the individual weights which sum up to one in each period for
all simulated households. Then, we calibrate the direct utility gains from marriage, Ψ, such
that the intra-household variance of ςm is 0.0061.
Log income is given by a standard AR(1) process
log yi = zi, with (149)
z′i = ρ · zi + εi,
where ρ denotes the autocorrelation, and the income shock ε is normally distributed with




. The parameters of the income process are taken from Aiyagari
(1994) and shown in Table 26. In comparison to (149), Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) consider
a special case of an income process where total (household) income is constant. Individual
incomes are i.i.d. in their analysis and can take three values with equal probability. As total
income is constant, there is a perfectly negative correlation between spouses’ incomes, i.e.,
when an individual has the high income, its spouse has the low income and vice versa. Thus,
Ábrahám and Laczó (2018) consider a total of three different exogenous stochastic states
in their model. In contrast, we consider a standard income process from the incomplete-
markets literature that can be calibrated realistically. Because total household income is
constant in Ábrahám and Laczó (2018), households have no income risk and there is hence
no motive for precautionary savings under full commitment. By contrast, our model features
household income risk and hence precautionary savings under full commitment which is
important because we want to compare the quantitative role of the savings motive due to
limited commitment to the well-studied precautionary savings motive.
In the baseline parameterization, we assume that divorcees do not lose any assets upon
divorce, following Mazzocco et al. (2013) or Voena (2015). Hence, we set ϕ = 0. In line
with Voena (2015), we assume a community property regime in the baseline model. This
implies that assets are divided equally among spouses upon divorce, κ = 0.5. Of course,
other predetermined shares are possible which will be investigated in Section 4.
In the numerical solution, we use 9 income grid points per spouse, 101 grid points for
2Note that these individual weights are not equal to the Pareto weights in our model which are unbounded.
However, given the optimal savings decision, the resulting intratemporal decisions are identical.
203
Table 26: Parameter values
Description Parameter Value Source
CRRA parameter σ 1 set
Discount factor β 0.96 set
Interest rate r 0.035 calibrated
Marriage utility gain Ψ 0.018 calibrated
Autocorrelation income shock ρ 0.9 Aiyagari (1994)
Standard deviation income shock σε 0.0872 Aiyagari (1994)
Asset losses upon divorce ϕ 0 Voena (2015)
Division of assets upon divorce κ 0.5 Voena (2015)
Figure 13: Relative Pareto weight of the wife
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NOTE.–The figure shows policy functions for the relative Pareto weight of the wife as a function of her income. Male
income is hold constant at its mean value. ā denotes mean asset holdings of couples under limited commitment from
the simulated model. asimulmax denotes the maximum asset level in the simulated economy.
the Pareto weight grid, and 201 grid points for the asset grid, resulting in a total of 9× 9×
101 × 201 = 1, 644, 381 grid points. After having solved the model, we simulate a panel of
5, 000 couple households, both under full and limited commitment, using the same stochastic
shocks. We also simulate 5, 000 singles of each gender. We simulate 1, 500 periods and discard
the first 500 periods to avoid dependence on initial conditions. Initial Pareto weights are 0.5
since spouses are ex-ante identical.
4.2 Policy functions
We display policy functions as functions of the income of the wife. The husband’s income
is fixed at its mean value, ym = 1, i.e., ln ym = 0. The relative Pareto weight of the wife
from the previous period, 1/x, is assumed to be at its long-run value 1 (there is no gender
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heterogeneity in the baseline parameterization). To highlight the impact of asset holdings
on the strength of commitment issues, we consider three different asset levels in the figures,
a = 0, a = ā, and a = asimulmax , where ā denotes average asset holdings in the stationary
economy and asimulmax denotes the maximum asset level in the simulated economy.
Figure 13 shows how the relative Pareto weight of the wife depends on her own income.
Under full commitment (solid line), the relative Pareto weight of the female is independent
of the state of nature and household wealth. The dashed lines refers to the case of zero asset
holdings under limited commitment, i.e., to a situation where the borrowing constraint tends
to bind. In this case, low income realizations of the female cause a binding participation
constraint of the male implying a decrease in the relative Pareto weight of the wife. In
contrast, if the wife’s income realization is high, her participation constraint binds such that
her relative Pareto weight increases. Thus, the relative Pareto weight of the wife is weakly
increasing in her income under limited commitment. The other two lines show a similar
pattern in couples with higher asset holdings. Again, the relative Pareto weight of the female
is weakly increasing in her income. Even in couples with very high asset holdings, see the
dashed-dotted line, the relative Pareto weight of the female shows this pattern but the figure
also shows that the relative Pareto weight reacts more modest when asset holdings become
larger. Thus, Figure 13 suggests that commitment issues become less severe with higher asset
holdings.
Figure 14 shows the savings decision of couples, for different levels of assets. Both, under
full and limited commitment, household savings are increasing in female income. In all four
panels, savings under limited commitment are higher than under full commitment. Even
for high asset holdings, couples have an incentive to accumulate more assets than under
full commitment. This reduces the likelihood of binding participation constraints in the
future. However, the difference between full and limited commitment becomes smaller when
households have more wealth. This is in line with the finding from Figure 13 that the strength
of commitment issues decreases in asset holdings.
4.3 Simulation results
Commitment issues. The quantitative model was calibrated so that the variance of the
Pareto weight of the male is 0.0061, see Section 4.1. As an untargeted statistic, we consider
the rebargaining frequency as a second measure of the strength of commitment issues. The
rebargaining frequency in the simulated model is 16.7%. This implies that couples rebargaing
on average every 6 periods (years) over the relative Pareto weight.
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Figure 14: Savings policy functions
(a) a = 0




























(b) a = 0.5 · ā

























(c) a = ā


























(d) a = asimulmax
























NOTE.–The figure shows savings policy functions as a function of the wife’s income for different asset
holdings. Income of the husband is hold constant its mean value. ā denotes mean asset holdings of cou-
ples under limited commitment from the simulated model. asimulmax denotes the maximum asset level in the
simulated economy.
206
Figure 15: Pareto weights and asset holdings
NOTE.–The figure shows a scatterplot of the relative Pareto weight of the male and asset holdings of the
couple, simulated using our baseline model.
Commitment issues are smaller in wealthier households. This is illustrated in Figure 15
which shows a scatterplot of the relative Pareto weight of the male and asset holdings of the
couple. The dispersion of Pareto weights becomes smaller when couples have more wealth.
Wealth reduces the strength of commitment problems even when no wealth is lost to the
couple upon divorce (as in our baseline calibration). The reason is that, from the perspective
of the spouse who is tempted to file for divorce, the divorce is associated with a de-facto
wealth loss. Remaining in the marriage, this spouse can expect to consume more than 50%
of household consumption, including consumption out of household wealth, because his or
her Pareto weight is high. By contrast, in case of a divorce, this spouse would have to cede
50% of household wealth to the other spouse.
Savings. Average asset holdings are 0.77 under full commitment and 0.87 under limited
commitment. Thus, the savings of couples are on average about 12% higher under limited
commitment than under full commitment. Figure 16 shows a histogram of the stationary
distribution of asset holdings under full commitment (black bars) and under limited com-
mitment (white bars). The shape of the stationary distribution is in both cases similar to
a Pareto distribution which is usually used to specify the wealth distribution empirically.
Under full commitment, the borrowing constraint is binding more often and very small asset
holdings are observed more often than under limited commitment. By contrast, medium
and larger values of asset holdings occur more often under limited commitment than under
full commitment. Since the full commitment case is the Pareto efficient benchmark, couples
under limited commitment over-save inefficiently.
We now investigate asset flows instead of stocks. For this, we perform a counterfactual
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Figure 16: Stationary distribution of assets












NOTE.–The figure shows the stationary distribution of asset holdings under full commitment (black bars)
and under limited commitment (white bars). Maximum asset holdings in the simulation are about 20.
simulation. To discriminate between potentially different savings decisions caused by different
asset holdings and different relative Pareto weights, we simulate a counterfactual where the
Pareto weight is held constant at its previous period value but the asset holdings are taken
from the original limited-commitment couple. This experiment allows to assess which amount
couples would save when the couple could commit to the previous-period relative Pareto
weight from now on, given their actual current wealth. We find that, on average, the couple
under limited commitment saves 4% more than the counterfactual couple. This deviation from
the Pareto efficient benchmark causes a welfare loss under limited commitment compared to
a situation of full commitment. In summary, couples have on average 11% higher asset
holdings (stock dimension) and save on average 4% more in every period (flow dimension)
when commitment among spouses is limited.
The flow dimension helps to illustrate the efficiency loss associated with the increased
saving under limited commitment. While being 11% wealthier gives couples a larger buffer
stock against income risk, their utility is reduced by the 4% additional saving each year
and the associated drop in yearly consumption. Under full commitment, couples efficiently
balance the trade-off between consumption and wealth. The limited-commitment friction
induces them to deviate from this efficient behavior and save inefficiently much and hence
consume inefficiently little.
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Variance of consumption growth
Household, Ξ – 0.27 0.25
Men, Ξm 0.40 0.27 0.28
Women, Ξf 0.40 0.27 0.28
Kaplan-Violante coefficients
Men, φm 0.40 0.65 0.60
Women, φf 0.40 0.65 0.60
NOTE.– Ξ denotes the variance of consumption growth at the couple level and Ξi denotes the variance of
individual consumption growth for spouse i, Ξi = var(ln c
′
i − ln ci). φi is the Kaplan and Violante (2010)
insurance coefficient of spouse i, φi = 1 − cov (ln c′i − ln ci, εi)/var (εi).
Risk sharing. Couples have two sources of insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks,
intra-household risk sharing and precautionary savings. The first three rows in Table 27 show
the variance of consumption growth, Ξi = var(ln c
′
i − ln ci), as a measure of uninsured con-
sumption risk. The variance of individual consumption growth is highest for bachelor house-
holds as bachelors can insure themselves only through precautionary savings. Individuals in
full-commitment couple households have the lowest individual consumption growth variance.
Limited commitment couples achieve more stable consumption than bachelor households but
their consumption is more volatile than under full commitment. Under limited commitment,
the aggregate couple consumption growth variance is not equal to the individual ones which
shows that intra-household risk sharing is imperfect under limited commitment. The higher
wealth which is accumulated under limited commitment leads to a lower volatility of house-
hold consumption compared to the full-commitment case. However, time-varying individual
consumption shares which reflect changes in relative bargaining positions induce individual
consumption to vary more strongly than under full commitment. Hence, individuals are ef-
fectively insured worse under limited commitment despite the fact that they live in wealthier
households.
An alternative measure of insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks is the Kaplan and
Violante (2010) insurance coefficient which measures how strongly an individual’s consump-
tion reacts to shocks to the individual’s income. Formally, the Kaplan and Violante (2010)
coefficient is defined as φi = 1−cov (ln c′i − ln ci, εi)/var (εi). The Kaplan and Violante (2010)
insurance coefficient document the same pattern as the consumption variances, see the fourth
and fifth row of Table 27. The insurance coefficients are smallest for bachelor households and
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Table 28: Welfare losses from limited commitment (consumption equivalents)
Group
total inefficient imperfect
effect saving risk sharing
Male, ζm 0.31 0.14 0.17
Female, ζf 0.32 0.12 0.20
Couple, ζ 0.32 0.13 0.19
NOTE.–ζi denotes the welfare loss from limited commitment in terms of consumption equivalents (per-
centage consumption compensation). The effect due to increased savings is determined in a counterfactual
analysis where limited-commitment couples are allowed to fix their Pareto weights but savings policy func-
tions are evaluated at their actual wealth levels from the limited-commitment solution. The effect due to
imperfect risk sharing is calculated as the difference between the total effect and the effect due to inefficient
savings. Differences between genders are caused by numerical imprecision.
highest in the case of full commitment. Insurance coefficients for couples under limited com-
mitment lie in-between. Quantitatively, the insurance coefficient of married individuals is 25
percentage points higher than the one of single individuals. Under limited commitment, this
number is reduced to 20 percentage points. Put differently, limited commitment reduces the
insurance value of marriage by one fifth.
Welfare. Table 28 shows the welfare losses from limited commitment due to imperfect risk
sharing and inefficient savings, expressed as consumption equivalents. We determine welfare
under limited commitment and under full commitment, respectively, in simulations of the
respective model versions that start at the same distribution of wealth. Specifically, we start
both simulations at the ergodic wealth distribution of the limited commitment economy. We
then determine the consumption equivalent for gender i, ζi as the percentage increase in
simulated consumption under limited commitment that would yield the same average level
of lifetime utility for individuals of this gender as under full commitment.
On average, one needs to give couples about 0.32% more consumption to compensate them
for the welfare losses from limited commitment. Welfare losses are equal for both genders up
to numerical precision since spouses are homogeneous. To put this welfare loss due to limited
commitment among spouses into perspective, the welfare losses of the business cycle are
measured between 0.08%, see Imrohoroğlu (1989), and 1% of consumption, see Krusell et al.
(2009). The general set-up considered in the latter study is particularly comparable to ours
as their economy is also an incomplete-markets economy. Further, the welfare effects of the
limited-commitment friction in household decision making seems to affect married couples’
well-being to an extent that is similar to the effect of their special tax treatment. Guner
et al. (2011) estimate a consumption equivalent of 0.2% for the welfare effect of abolishing
opportunities for married couples to file income taxes jointly.
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To disentangle the two channels through which limited commitment affects welfare, we
apply a counterfactual simulation of the full-commitment model where we draw for each
household a set of relative Pareto weights from the ergodic distribution of these weights in
the limited-commitment model. This simulation differs from the baseline simulation of the
limited-commitment model only in long-run household wealth but agents face the same risk
over their individual shares in household consumption. Therefore, comparing average welfare
in these two simulations measures the welfare effect of inefficient savings behavior under
limited commitment. Quantitatively, the welfare effect of inefficient saving is equivalent to
0.13% of lifetime consumption. Thus, oversaving is responsible for about 40% of the welfare
loss due to limited commitment.
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5 Property division upon divorce
When commitment in the marriage is limited, the threat of divorce affects behavior in the
marriage. Consequently, the rules for divorces impact on married couples’ decisions as they
determine when and for whom it can be tempting to leave the household. These rules can
be set by policy makers in the form of divorce laws or by the spouses themselves in the form
of, e.g., prenuptial agreements. In this section, we consider rules regarding property division
upon divorce, i.e., which share of spouses’ common wealth is owned by whom after a divorce.
The impact of property division upon divorce on behavior within the marriage has been
studied by a number of papers in the literature. Our analysis is closely related to Ábrahám
and Laczó (2016) who investigate optimal property division upon divorce in a limited-
commitment framework. In their model, there is a trade-off between risk sharing within
the marriage and insurance across marital states. Rules that improve the former usually
worsen the latter and vice versa. We complement their analysis quantitatively by studying
the effects of property division rules on risk sharing within the marriage in a less restrictive
setting, most importantly we abstain from the simplifying assumption of constant household
income which shuts off precautionary savings under full commitment. Rainer (2007) and
Abrahám and Gottardi (2017) also study the effects of property division rules on savings
incentives. Rainer (2007) does not provide quantitative results and Abrahám and Gottardi
(2017) focus on a different friction in household decision making, asymmetric information
about outside options. Further, there is a number of papers that study the impact of prop-
erty division rules on other decisions of married couples. For example, Voena (2015) focuses
on labor supply and Stevenson (2007) on education choices.
While we assumed in the baseline model that spouses do not face any costs when filing for
divorce and that they share their wealth equally after divorce, we now consider alternatives
to these assumptions. First, we introduce pecuniary costs of divorce in terms of wealth
losses. Thereafter, we consider different regimes of the distribution of joint asset holdings
after divorce. As before, we focus on couples’ saving and risk-sharing behavior under limited
commitment.
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5.1 Resource costs upon divorce
Costs of divorce occur because the divorcees have to pay legal fees or payments to lawyers.
Divorces can also be costly when divorcees have to sell illiquid assets such as housing property
in a short amount of time which is usually associated with a loss. Hence, resource costs upon
divorce can be set by policy makers in divorce laws or by the spouses themselves through
their portfolio choices.
The literature has mostly considered one of two polar cases, either that divorcees do not
lose any assets, see for example Mazzocco et al. (2013) or Voena (2015), or that divorcees
lose all assets, see for example Mazzocco (2007) or Ábrahám and Laczó (2018). Ábrahám
and Laczó (2016) search for the optimal asset losses and the optimal distribution of assets
among divorcees but their analysis is not quantitative in nature. We use our quantitative
model to investigate how different degrees of wealth losses upon divorce impact on saving and
risk sharing in the marriage. For this, we solve the model for different values for the share of
assets that get lost upon divorce, ϕ, using an equidistant grid between 0% and 100%.
Panel (a) of Figure 17 shows that the extent of commitment issues, measured by the
rebargaining frequency, decreases when asset losses upon divorce increase. The mechanism
is that higher asset losses upon divorce make outside options relatively less attractive which
reduces commitment problems. The quantitative effects are quite substantial. While the
rebargaining frequency is about 17% in the baseline parameterization where there are no
ressource losses when couples file for divorce, the rebargaining frequency drops to about 11%
when spouses lose all assets upon divorce.
Panel (b) of Figure 17 shows the effects on average asset holdings. Theoretically, the
direction of these effects is not clear. Recall that the saving motive due to limited commitment
aims at making divorce costly. When the share of assets that is lost upon divorce is higher,
every unit of additional saving has a stronger effect on divorce costs. But also any given
level of targeted divorce costs can be obtained by lower levels of savings. In the restricted
set-up of Ábrahám and Laczó (2018), the first effect dominates and couples save more when
higher shares of assets are lost upon divorce. Our quantitative results confirm that higher
asset losses upon divorce induce larger average asset holdings so that the difference between
average asset holdings under full and limited commitment becomes larger (the solid line shows
the full commitment reference case). Quantitatively, while couples save about 20 percent more
when commitment is limited and if no assets get lost upon divorce, this number almost triples
when all assets are lost upon divorce. The effect is highly non-linear and already small asset
losses upon divorce impact substantially on savings. For example, a 10% wealth loss upon
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Figure 17: Ressource costs of filing for divorce
(a) rebargaining frequency
0 20 40 60 80 100





















(b) mean asset holdings
0 20 40 60 80 100






















(c) male insurance coefficient
0 20 40 60 80 100




























(d) female insurance coefficient
0 20 40 60 80 100





























NOTE.–The figure shows the impact of resource costs of filing for divorce on the extent of commitment
issues, mean asset holdings, and the Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficients. Resource costs are
paid by both spouses. Solid lines indicate the case where spouses can fully commit to an allocation rule.
Dashed lines indicate the case of limited commitment between spouses.
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divorce leads to a 25% increase in savings due to limited commitment.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 17 show the Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coeffi-
cients.1 Under full commitment, only about 20% of an individual’s income shock translates
directly to his or her consumption (solid line). Under limited commitment, insurance coef-
ficients increase with asset losses upon divorce (dashed line). This is a consequence of the
improved risk sharing in the household due to less frequent and smaller adjustments of Pareto
weights and the larger cushioning of household consumption against shocks due to increased
wealth.
Interestingly, the insurance coefficient under limited commitment becomes even higher
than under full commitment when more than 70% of assets get lost upon divorce. In general,
couples with limited commitment save more than under full commitment leading to a strong
buffer stock against shocks. With relatively stark wealth losses upon divorce, their Pareto
weights are adjusted rather rarely such that intra-household risk sharing is relatively strong.
In combination, this leads to better insurance against income shocks than under full commit-
ment. Nevertheless, this constitutes an inefficiently high degree of insurance against income
shocks, i.e., married individuals are overinsured in this situation. Insurance through precau-
tionary savings comes at the price of reduced consumption in order to achieve the necessary
wealth level. Without the limited-commitment friction, spouses would balance the trade-off
between consumption and insurance at a lower level of insurance and more consumption.
Importantly, the effect of property losses upon divorce on the insurance coefficients is
concave with small asset losses exerting the largest marginal effects and large property losses
having only small marginal effects. A wealth loss in the range of 20% already closes half of
the gap in consumption insurance due to limited commitment. This concavity has strong
implications for the trade-off between risk sharing within the marriage and insurance across
marital states, where one would want to avoid large asset losses upon divorce because they
induce high consumption volatility across marital states. The concavity in the benefits from
asset losses in terms of improved insurance within marriage implies that from an efficiency
perspective, a limited asset loss upon divorce is rather desirable while for large asset losses
the marginal disadvantages probably dominate.
5.2 Distribution of assets upon divorce
We now study how the distribution of assets upon divorce affects intra-household decision
making. We start with assigning partner’s uneven shares of assets which are fixed before
1The insurance coefficient is the same for husbands and wives since there are no gender differences in the
model.
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the marriage. That is, in our first experiment, the wealth share which one of the spouses
receives upon divorce can differ from 50% but is independent from what happens in the
marriage or from who files for the divorce. The relevant application of this analysis concerns
the treatment of wealth which was accumulated by one of the spouses before the formation
of marriage (and the capital income obtained from this wealth) in case of divorce. A spouse
can also obtain a disproportionate share of wealth accumulated within marriage, e.g., when
spouses save by enlarging or maintaining a house brought into the marriage by this spouse
or when they invest into an enterprise which was owned by this spouse before the marriage.
This treatment can be determined in divorce laws or in prenuptial agreements of the spouses.
In the baseline parameterization, it was assumed that spouses share assets equally upon
divorce, κ = 0.5. To analyze the impact of different asset shares of spouses upon divorce, we
now consider asset shares between 35% and 65%.2
Panel (a) in Figure 18 shows that commitment problems are smallest when assets upon
divorce are distributed evenly among spouses (κ = 0.5). The rebargaining frequency increases
for smaller and higher asset shares of the husband.3 Because divorce is unilateral, an uneven
division of assets upon divorce make participation constraints binding more often as the
partner potentially receiving the higher share of resources is more often tempted to leave the
household. However, the effects are modest quantitatively. The rebargaining frequency rises
by less than half a percentage points even for very asymmetric property divisions.
Panel (b) shows that average asset holdings under limited commitment are hump-shaped
in the asset share of the husband upon divorce (dashed line). Couple save most when both
spouses receive equal shares of assets upon divorce but, also here, the effects are small quan-
titatively. Even when property division is relatively asymmetric, average wealth is affected
by only about one percent.
The insurance coefficients shown in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 18 become smaller when
the asset share assigned to the respective individual in case of divorce increases. When a
spouse receives a larger share of assets upon divorce, his or her Pareto weight in the marriage
tends to increase. For example, consider the case where the wife would receive a larger share
of assets upon divorce. In this case, her participation constraint tends to bind already for
moderate positive shocks to her income as she can credibly threaten to leave the household
and receive a large share of household wealth. On the other hand, negative shocks to the
2If asset shares of spouses upon divorce are too high, divorces become attractive even in the presence of
(large) direct utility gains from marriage. Since such values of κ would create incentives to terminate efficient
marriages, we restrict our attention to cases where this does not occur.
3The effects to the left and to the right of κ = 0.5 are symmetric up to numerical precision.
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Figure 18: Distribution of assets upon divorce
(a) Rebargaining frequency
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(b) mean asset holding
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(c) male insurance coefficient
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(d) female insurance coefficient
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NOTE.–The figure shows the impact of the asset share distributed to the husband upon divorce on the ex-
tent of commitment issues, mean asset holdings, and the Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficients.
Solid lines indicate the case where spouses can fully commit to an allocation rule. Dashed lines indicate
the case of limited commitment between spouses.
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Figure 19: Policy function for consumption of the wife when the wife receives a large share of wealth
upon divorce.



























NOTE.–The figure shows consumption of the wife as a function of her income. Income of the husband is hold
constant at its mean value. The wife receives the share 1 − κ = 0.65 of all household assets upon divorce.
wife’s income do not tend to make the husband’s participation constraint binding because,
for him, the outside option is relatively unattractive due to the low share of wealth he would
receive. For the wife, who is treated preferentially in a divorce, this leads to a good insurance
against downward income risk while she can keep the upward risk to her income mostly to
herself. This is illustrated in Figure 19 which plots, for the case where the wife’s share in
household wealth upon divorce is 65%, the wife’s consumption against her income holding
constant the husband’s income. The figure shows that, compared to the full-commitment
benchmark, the wife’s consumption responds more strongly to shocks to her own income.
However, the wife is actually better off than under full commitment as her consumption is
always larger under limited commitment.
While uneven property division upon divorce induce some interesting dynamics in intra-
household decision making, we find that the quantitative effects on savings and risk sharing
are moderate. This implies that, while uneven property division strengthen problems related
to limited commitment to some extent, couples may be willing to accept this when other
arguments–such as making it attractive for an individual with higher pre-marital wealth to
join the marriage in the first place– are in favor of such an uneven property division rule.
5.3 Penalty for filing for divorce
We now consider the case where the asset share of the individual who files for divorce may
be different from the share of his or her spouse. An example for divorce rules including such
penalties for filing for divorce are alimony obligations. In our set-up, a spouse is tempted to
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leave the household when his or her income exceeds the income of the other spouse substan-
tially. If alimony obligations are connected to relative incomes, this constitutes a liability
for the spouse who files for divorce and this spouse’s net wealth is reduced by the expected
present value of the alimony liability. In turn, the other spouse’s net wealth is increased by
the expected present value of the alimony stream. In prenuptial agreements, spouses are free
to determine property division rules that may depend on who files for divorce. Ábrahám
and Laczó (2016) show that divorce rules that include such penalties can be very effective in
ameliorating commitment problems within the household as they make divorce unattractive
to exactly the spouse who would otherwise be tempted to file for one.
Penalties for filing for divorce affect the participation constraints as, in contrast to the
baseline model, it is now important who files for divorce. The participation constraints are
now given by








≥ Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · (1− %) · a)








≥ Sf (yf , (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · (1− %) · a) .
As in the baseline model, spouses lose a constant share, ϕ, of all assets if they file for
divorce. The husband receives the share κ and the wife receives the share 1 − κ of the
remaining assets. The difference to the baseline model is that the person who files for divorce
faces a wealth penalty, %. Thus, a when the husband files for divorce, he receives the share
(1− ϕ) ·κ · (1− %) of the household’s assets while the wife faces no penalty and receives share
(1 − ϕ) · (1 − κ). Reversely, when the wife files for divorce, she would face the penalty and
receive share (1− ϕ) · (1− κ) · (1− %) and the husband would face no penalty and receive
share (1− ϕ) · κ.
Figure 20 shows the rebargaining frequency, average household wealth, and the Kaplan
and Violante (2010) insurance coefficients plotted against the penalty for the spouse filing for
divorce. The figure is identical to Figure 17. Under limited commitment, only the asset share
of the person whose participation constraint is binding is relevant which coincides with the
person who would file for divorce if his or her Pareto weight were not adjusted. If this person
received an asset share of, say, 40%, he or she does not care about whether the household
as a whole looses 20% of assets and share the remainder evenly or whether there is a 20%
penalty for filing for divorce. Hence, the strength of commitment issues and the resulting
inefficiencies within the marriage are identical in both scenarios. However, the rules have
starkly different implications regarding transitions between marital states because penalties
for filing for divorce do not include actual asset losses for the household as a whole. As
219
a consequence, spouses should prefer penalties for filing for divorce over asset losses upon
divorce when setting up a prenuptial agreement.
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Figure 20: Penalty for filing for divorce
(a) Rebargaining frequency
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(b) mean asset holding
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(c) male insurance coefficient
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(d) female insurance coefficient
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NOTE.–The figure shows the impact of individual resource costs of filing for divorce on the extent of com-
mitment issues, mean asset holdings, and the Kaplan and Violante (2010) insurance coefficients. Resource
costs are paid by the spouse who files for divorce. Thus, when the husband files for divorce, he receives
the share (1 − ϕ) · κ · (1 − %) of the assets of the couple, where ϕ denotes total asset losses upon divorce,
κ denotes the share of assets distributed to the husband, and ϕ denotes the penalty for filing for divorce.
Analogously, the wife would receive the share (1 − ϕ) · (1 − κ) · (1 − %) when she files for divorce. Solid
lines refer to the case where spouses can fully commit to an allocation rule. Dashed lines refer to the case
of limited commitment between spouses.
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6 Conclusion
Limited commitment between household members induces them to save inefficiently much
and to share inefficiently little risk. In this paper, we have introduced limited commitment
in a dual-earner heterogeneous-agents incomplete-markets economy and have investigated
these inefficiencies quantitatively. To do so, we have developed a practically feasible and fast
numerical approach for solving intertemporal decision problems of multi-person households in
presence of limited commitment. We have calibrated our model to generate realistic strengths
of commitment problems.
Our results show that the effects of limited commitment on savings behavior are substan-
tial. On average, married couples’ yearly saving is increased by 4% and their long-run wealth
is increased by 11%. Despite living in wealthier households, married individuals share risk
less efficiently with their spouses when commitment between them is limited. Quantitatively,
limited commitment reduces the insurance value of marriage by about 20% and the wellbeing
of married individuals by an amount equivalent to 0.3% of lifetime consumption. About 40%
of this welfare loss is due to oversaving.
We have also analyzed how property division upon divorce affects savings and risk-sharing
behavior in the marriage. Wealth losses upon divorce and penalties for the spouse filing for
divorce can reduce commitment problems in the marriage substantially. Losses or penalties in
the range of 20% are found to close about half of the efficiency gap in consumption insurance
due to limited commitment.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Marcet and Marimon (2019) approach in a model with savings





















































∣∣ s0) = 1. These initial participation constraints also depend on initial asset hold-
ings and the recursive formulation is
Vm (y (s0) , am (s−1) + af (s−1) , µm0, µf0) ≥ Sm (ym (s0) , am (s−1)) ,
Vf (y (s0) , am (s−1) + af (s−1) , µm0, µf0) ≥ Sf (yf (s0) , af (s−1)) .
Thus, initial expected lifetime utility of both spouses must be at least as high within the
household than as a single.
In the limited commitment case, expected lifetime utility of both spouses must be at least
as high within the couple as in the outside option in any state of nature, after any history of


















































∣∣ st) = 1. These participation constraints also depend on asset holdings. Addi-
tionally, the rule for asset division upon divorce matters since it determines how many assets
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· [um (cm (sr)) + Ψ] ≥ Sm
(













· [uf (cf (sr)) + Ψ] ≥ Sf
(





Couples lose a constant share, ϕ, of all assets if they file for divorce. The remaining joint
asset holdings are distributed with shares κ and 1− κ to the former husband and the former
wife, respectively.






































































































denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint. This Lagrangian is non-
stationary since it includes forward looking constraints. Marcet and Marimon (2019) provide
a method that transforms this non-stationary Lagrangian to a stationary one.
The idea of Marcet and Marimon (2019) is to combine elements of the former Lagrangian
approach in a way such that the maximization problem becomes stationary. The left-hand
sides of the participation constraints (the inside options), which are the first term in the
brackets in the second and third line of the Lagrangian, can be combined with the weighted
utility of the particular spouse in the household target function. Marcet and Marimon (2019)
show that the introduction of additional state variables transforms the problem to a stationary
one. In particular, Marcet and Marimon (2019) show that introducing a ”new” Pareto weight


























> 0, his or her weight in the household target function is increased
as little as possible such that the participation constraint holds with equality. Marcet and
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Marimon (2019) show that the transformed maximization problem has the same solution as
the original one.



















































































































































































































































































and, without the state of nature notation, we obtain equation (132) from the main text:1
V (y, a, µm, µf ) = µ
′




















= µ′m is notational convention.
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A.2 Derivation of first-order conditions
A.2.1 Full commitment couple




















subject to the period budget constraint
cm + cf + a
′ ≤ ym + yf + (1 + r) a,













· uf (cf ) + Ψ.
For deriving the first-order conditions, we introduce the time index t. Then, the lifetime



























+ λt · (ymt + yft + (1 + r) at − cmt − cft − at+1) + ξtat+1
]
.



























= −βtλt + βt+1 (1 + r)Etλt+1 + βtξt = 0,
∂L
∂λt
= ymt + yft + (1 + r) at − cmt − cft − at+1 = 0,
ξt ≥ 0, at+1 ≥ 0, ξtat+1 = 0.
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λt = β (1 + r)Etλt+1 + ξt,
ymt + yft + (1 + r) at = cmt + cft + at+1,
ξt ≥ 0, at+1 ≥ 0, ξtat+1 = 0.










































λt = β (1 + r)Etλt+1 + ξt,
ymt + yft + (1 + r) at = cmt + cft + at+1,
ξt ≥ 0, at+1 ≥ 0, ξtat+1 = 0,
or, in standard dynamic programming notation











λ− ξ = β (1 + r)Eλ′,
ym + yf + (1 + r) a = cm + cf + a
′,
ξ ≥ 0, a′ ≥ 0, ξa′ = 0.
A.2.2 Limited commitment couple
The limited commitment couple household maximization problem in recursive formulation is










− νm · Sm (ym, (1− ϕ) · κ · a)−










subject to the period budget constraints
cm + cf + a
′ ≤ ym + yf + (1 + r) a,
and the joint borrowing constraint
a′ ≥ 0,
given the household preferences
v
(













For deriving the first-order conditions, we introduce the time index t. The current state of
nature is denoted by st and implies an income pair y (st) = (ym (st) , yf (st)). The uncondi-
tional probability of a particular state is given by π (st). The history of events until time t is





The conditional probability of a particular history of states in period r, given the history







∣∣ st) = 1. The Lagrangian of the maximization
























































































= µ′i is notational convention.
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Skipping the state of nature notation, the first-order conditions are







λ− ξ = βE
[










ξ ≥ 0 , a′ ≥ 0 , and ξ · a′ ≥ 0,







A.3 Numerical solution bachelor household
Solving the limited commitment model requires in Step 2 of Algorithm 8 the solution of the
bachelor household model. The solution is needed for checking the participation constraints
in Step 6. Algorithm 10 summarizes the numerical solution of the bachelor household maxi-
mization problem.
Algorithm 10 (Bachelor households) The algorithm consists of the following four steps:
1: Set convergence criteria ζ1 and ζ2. Discretize the exogenous wage rate processes using
the approach of Tauchen (1986). Build a grid for current period assets a, {a1, ..., aNa}.
Build a grid for next period assets a′, {ã1, ..., ãNa}.
2: EGM step.
2a: Choose an initial guess for the asset policy functions ASm,0 (Ωm) and ASf,0 (Ωf ).
2b: Given next period assets a′ by the exogenous grid {ã1, ..., ãNa} and the guess for
the asset policy function ASi,j (Ωi), find next period consumption of bachelor i as
a function of next period income and next period assets period using the budget
constraint (119).
2c: Use the Euler equation (122) to calculate current period consumption as a function
of the current period income and next period assets.
2d: Calculate the endogenous grid of current period assets âi using the current period
budget constraint (119). This yields a mapping from the endogenous grid to the
exogenous grid of a′: a′ (âi).
2e: Use a′ (âi) to interpolate a
′ on the exogenous grid {a1, ..., aNa} to find the asset
policy function ASi,j+1 (Ωi).
2f: Check whether the borrowing constraint (120) is binding. Replace all values of
ASi,j+1 (Ωi) smaller than the borrowing limit by the borrowing limit.
2g: If sup
∣∣∣ASm,j+1 (Ωm)−ASm,j (Ωm)∣∣∣ < ζ1, and sup ∣∣∣ASf,j+1 (Ωf )−ASf,j (Ωf )∣∣∣ < ζ1
stop, set ASm (Ωm) = ASm,j+1 (Ωm) and ASf (Ωf ) = ASf,j+1 (Ωf ). Otherwise set
j = j + 1 and go back to step 2b. Iterate until convergence.
3: Find policy functions for consumption CSi (Ωi), i ∈ {m, f}, using the period budget
constraint (119).
4: Choose initial guesses for the value functions V Sm,0 (Ωm), and V
S
f,0 (Ωf ).
4a: Given that you are in iteration step j, use the Bellman equation (118) to get
individual value functions:























∣∣∣V Sm,j+1 (Ωm)− V Sm,j (Ωm)∣∣∣ < ζ2, and sup ∣∣∣V Sf,j+1 (Ωf )− V Sf,j (Ωf )∣∣∣ < ζ2 stop.
Otherwise set j = j + 1 and go back to Step 4a. Iterate until convergence.
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A.4 Deriving the re-arranged Euler equation under limited commitment
Using male marginal utility of consumption, ∂um (cm) /∂cm = c
−σ
m , the Euler equation (137)
can be written as
µ′m · c−σm = β · E
[
(1 + r) · µ′′m ·
(
c′m
)−σ − ν ′m · ∂Sm∂a′ − ν ′f · ∂Sf∂a′
]
.







c−σm = β · E
[
(1 + r) · µ
′′
m




















m, the equation becomes
c−σm = β · E
[

















Finally, expansion of the fraction in the last term on the right-hand side yields
c−σm = β · E
[
















= β · E
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= β · E
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In this Thesis, I have analyzed intra-household behavior and the resulting economic out-
comes in quantitative models of the family. The particular focus was the estimation of Frisch
labor-supply elasticities in couple households and inefficiencies in economic outcomes in pres-
ence of limited commitment between spouses.
Conventional estimates of Frisch labor-supply elasticities are biased in presence of bor-
rowing constraints. In Chapter II (joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Falko Jüßen),
we have developed an incomplete-markets model with two-earner households and full com-
mitment. We have derived a new estimation approach for the Frisch elasticity that yields
unbiased estimates even in samples that include borrowing-constrained households. Our
approach exploits that the strength of the estimation bias depends on individuals’ relative
contribution to household earnings. It takes the form of a simple interaction-term model
with minimum data requirements. Using PSID data, we have estimated Frisch elasticities of
about 0.7 for men and rather homogeneous Frisch elasticities across the population.
In Chapter III, we have developed and calibrated an incomplete-markets model with
limited commitment in dual-earner households. We have used the model to quantify how
strongly empirically reasonable degrees of limited commitment reduce individuals’ possibil-
ities to share risk within the household. We also have identified for which types of agents
intra-household risk sharing is particularly aggravated by limited commitment. Our results
show that limited commitment reduces the insurance value of marriage by one fourth to one
third. This is associated with a welfare loss equivalent to 0.6% of lifetime consumption. In
the cross-section, risk-sharing possibilities are particularly reduced for individuals whose pa-
tience or risk aversion is below average while individuals with strong gains from marriage or
high degrees of altruism are less affected. Our results imply an increased demand for other
forms of insurance such as public insurance and provide a rationale for means-testing that
targets individuals rather than households.
In Chapter IV (joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Falko Jüßen), we have in-
vestigated how Frisch labor-supply elasticities can be estimated when commitment between
spouses is limited. In principle, the Frisch elasticity can be estimated in a regression of
hours worked on the hourly wage rate when controlling for consumption. Theory suggests to
control for consumption of the individual worker but most household panel surveys contain
consumption information only at the household level (if at all). We have shown that proxy-
ing individual consumption by household consumption causes substantial biases in estimated
Frisch elasticities when commitment between household members is limited. We have devel-
oped two improved estimation approaches that reduce or fully eliminate this bias. Applying
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these approaches to household panel data from the U.S., we have found Frisch elasticities of
about 0.7.
In Chapter V (joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Falko Jüßen), we have ex-
tended our analysis of limited commitment by introducing intertemporal decisions in the
form of savings. We have introduced limited commitment into a quantitative dual-earner
heterogeneous-agents incomplete-markets economy and provide a practically feasible and fast
numerical approach for solving such a model. We use this framework to study the inefficien-
cies in savings and risk-sharing behavior due to limited commitment. The effects of limited
commitment on savings are substantial, raising married couples’ yearly saving by 4% and
their long-run wealth by 11%. The insurance value of marriage is reduced by 20%. Property
division rules upon divorce can mitigate these inefficiencies. For example, a 20% wealth loss
upon divorce or a 20% wealth penalty for the spouse filing for divorce close about 50% of the
insurance gap due to limited commitment.
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